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Controlling access to firearms was one of the few truly successful Anglo-Irish policies of the 
eighteenth century and a founding tenant of the penal laws. This thesis examines how a 
concerted effort to remove access to firearms from the majority Catholic population was largely 
successful after the end of the Williamite war. Changing imperial priorities in the last four 
decades of the eighteenth century saw a disbarment policy, which had unified the imperial 
centre and the settlers on the marches dismantled piecemeal. At the same time, a growing 
awareness of the potential of the Irish Catholic population as recruits eventually overshadowed 
fears of the threat of the Catholic population gaining training in the use of arms. The resulting 
melange of ‘official’ non-enforcement of existing laws and the rise of confessional 
paramilitaries overlapped with the diffusion of state owned firearms into private ownership in 
the 1770s and 1780s, which made armed Protestants a threat to order rather than its guarantor. 
This thesis demonstrates how the gun acted as both a tool of coercive governance and a key 
component of the ritualized maintenance of a Protestant Ascendancy. Furthermore, it examines 
the remarkable story of the Catholic resurgence from being the chief domestic threat to the 
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Ireland provides one of the only examples in the early modern history of Western Europe of an 
indigenous population being disarmed by a minority settler community. The policy of 
controlling private ownership of firearms originated from the first arrival of firearms into 
Ireland in the fifteenth century. This was initially designed to keep firearms from the native 
Gaels but, after the 1640s, gradually became an issue of confessional rather than ethnic 
distinction. After the passage of the Popery Laws, the monopoly on firearms by Protestants 
was sustained as other aspects of penal legislation affecting land tenure and the education were 
relaxed or reformed in the 1770s. This process of enforced disarming was successfully 
undertaken over the eighteenth century through the use of a confessionally discriminating law 
code. In the face of a changing political and international landscape, the British state began 
dismantling one of the longest enduring and effective policies of these penal laws in order to 
secure a strategically valuable supply of Catholic manpower for military service in the 1760s. 
However, the limitation of domestic access to firearms by Catholics continued until 1793 when 
the restrictions surrounding Catholic ownership of firearms were reformed at the same time 
that the right for those who qualified to vote was returned.  This large-scale re-arming of 
Catholics for domestic military service followed the creation of a militia in response to the 
military threat from a resurgent republican France. This was  part of a wider trend in legislation 
in the 1790s where the British government attempted to disarm a disaffected population 
regardless of confessional identity, whilst at the same time expanding the size of state 
controlled armed forces.1  
                                                          
1 The number of acts regarding weapons in the 1790s demonstrates this clearly enough. There were 9 Acts 
regulated or restricting the importation of gunpowder or firearms into Ireland regardless of the confessional 
identity of those wielding them. The British establishment were far more concerned with political allegiance than 
faith in the period from 1791-1798. For English dimensions to this pattern, see J.E. Cookson, ‘The English 





The delicate equilibrium between the right to bear arms, the maintenance of law and order, and 
the balance of power between the citizen and the state became increasingly volatile in decades 
succeeding the Williamite victory of the 1690s and the passage of the Militia Act in 1793. This 
thesis examines how attempts at the enforcement of a monopoly on the gun by the Irish 
Protestant population affected relationships between the three main confessional groups of 
Ireland, as well as helping to define the relationship between the state and its citizens. By 
analysing the way that access to the gun became a litmus test of legitimacy historians can 
discuss the much larger issue of governance, state building and confessional violence.  
The thesis began after a surprising discovery of how little mention one can find of the gun by 
Irish historians. There are few studies that demonstrate the longue durée of state policy towards 
the gun. By writing a history of the gun in Ireland, this work fills in the lacuna that scholars 
working on eighteenth-century Ireland up to this point have had. Despite the continuing 
discussion on violence and politicization in eighteenth-century Ireland, the creation of the penal 
laws, and even the rebellion of 1798, the meaning of bearing firearms is made most 
conspicuous by its absence. The thesis has therefore been structured to use the debates 
surrounding the right to bear arms as a lens to view the enduring mistrust of Catholics at the 
level of local elites. Alongside the enforcement of the penal laws, this was a key component of 
the expansion of state authority across Ireland. Ultimately, domestic Protestant concerns about 
Catholic power lost ground to the growing need for Catholic soldiers to support the British 
Empire, but they certainty put up a spirited resistance. 
The chapters of this thesis are arranged both chronologically and thematically. Each chapter 
focuses on a specific area where the gun had an impact on Irish society and each chapter 
contributes to a larger discussion of how the gun was used as a symbol of both legitimacy and 
as a means of denying legitimacy to others. The gun was a necessary tool of governance 




was also a symbol of the state’s legitimacy. The thesis is equally a study of the successful 
physical removal of firearms from circulation and a study of the failure to remove their 
symbolic value. Fears of infiltration by those with suspect loyalty coincided with a similarly 
persistent worry of non-enforcement of existing laws by magistrates. The gun certainly held a 
kind of power even in its absence.  In effect, firearms were tools that could be used for both 
display and for coercion when that display failed. The way the gun was used in Ireland between 
confessional communities was layered with meaning and never entirely clear-cut. It is that very 
murkiness of when a gun was used as tool for the display of local political legitimacy, enforced 
coercion or international statecraft that makes it such an interesting topic.  
The gun is intimately tied to a full understanding of the way that power and politics interacted 
with one another on the fringe of cultural and religious boundaries. The gun facilitated 
resistance to the British state’s attempt at empire building in Ireland just as much as the 
mobilization and arming of the Irish population provided a valuable contribution to building 
an empire abroad. The general breakdown of imperial governance in the late eighteenth-century 
British Atlantic world emerged partly from the failure of a consistent policy regarding the right 
to bear arms. It also emerged from the confusion over who could be trusted not only to bear 
arms for the empire overseas, but also not to use those arms to resist the empire at home. 
Understanding attempts to control firearms in Ireland requires a realistic assessment of how 
effective state control of access to firearms was in the eighteenth century. Geographically, the 
work focuses on the boundaries between where a colony began and ancient regime endured, or 
the margins where rural traditions of a moral economy encountered the codified statutes of a 
growing empire. 
As with any historical work a discussion on the sources is necessary. Because of a conscious 
decision to look to the borders between urban and rural localities this work does not include 




officials and memoirs. I have also made some controversial decisions on what to research and 
discuss. The most obvious being the absence of civic republicanism until the last chapter of 
this work. Readsers will also notice an enduring fascination on the part of the author on the 
desire of Catholic émigrés to return home after military service despite legal and social 
discrimination.  
I have used the traditional letters and correspondence of the clergy and I also examine the 
evolving legal code. The bulk of the archival material has come from the British Library and 
the National Archives at Kew. The Southwell papers and the Blenheim papers were especially 
useful. I made two overseas research trips to Belfast and Dublin that were funded by the Royal 
Historical Society, the results of which have also been included in the work. The largest source 
base for recapturing the gun in Ireland was found in the Irish Revenue Board and Irish Board 
of Customs: Minutes, which provided a fascinating glimpse into everyday life, and from a less 
exalted social station than the letters between the landed elites. The record series consists of 
460 volumes covering the period of 1696 -1830, with substantial gaps in the first 13 volumes. 
The minutes are complimented by 12 volumes of the CUST 112 record series. CUST 112 
covers solicitor reports from the period of 1744 - 47. CUST 1 consist of entry books with an 
average of 200 folio pages that provide summaries of the incoming correspondences to the 
revenue board, the date and a summary of the letter contents, as well as instructions to be sent 
outward to individual officers. The years 1703-1713 remain missing after the bulk of the 
collection was transferred from the former London Customs House and Museum. This provides 
the foundation on which my work was built. My use of sermons and pamphlets concentrates 
heavily on the eighteenth century, and range from memoirs and travel books to policy 





This work takes the position that eighteenth-century Ireland was an ancien régime society with 
a settler population superimposed on its northern and eastern flanks. This work follows Ian 
McBride’s argument than Ireland defies the typical taxonomy of governance in early modern 
Europe, having elements of being a dependent kingdom, composite monarchy, colony and 
ancien régime .2 Crucially, no other European kingdom or province was subject to as extensive 
or sustained a colonization attempt. S.J. Connolly concludes that Ireland in the eighteenth 
century was a dependent Kingdom.3 Connolly lays out the post-1689 Irish political landscape 
as one of English parliamentary authority made manifest after periods of ambiguity in the 
preceding centuries.4 The dependency began first with the executive power of the Lord 
Lieutenant, from which patronage flowed downward through the civil, military and 
ecclesiastical establishment. Law and order were not as easily dispersed as patronage, however.  
It is clear that Ireland was a violent society by English standards, but did not necessarily stand 
out in comparison to some of its continental European neighbours.5 It was also experiencing at 
first-hand the growth and expansion of the state, though this process was uneven enough on 
the edges for the survival of banditry, which Connolly rightly highlights as a lifestyle requiring 
the permanent residence outside settled society. The expansion of the rule of law led to a rise 
in criminality as former traditional activities of life on borders such as cattle raids and factional 
fighting were resolved in the courts rather than on the field of battle. However, the expansion 
of that state’s authority was not uncontested and was concentrated in the immediate vicinity of 
military garrisons and the towns. Our most reliable scholars on violence in the period rely 
                                                          
2 Ian McBride, Eighteenth Century Ireland: The Isle of Slaves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 168-
170. 
3 S. J. Connolly, Religion, Law and Power: The Making of Protestant Ireland 1660-1760 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), pp. 218-222. 
4 Connolly, Religion, Law and Power, p. 107. 





heavily on Ulster and the limited surviving records.6 An area of concern for both the local elites 
and the wider Protestant population was securing their property and person from both an 
internal uprising of the domestic Catholic population as well as avoiding conquest from abroad. 
In such an environment of insecurity, the formulation and maintenance of the penal laws, and 
especially the provisions on the ownership of firearms are crucial in recovering the creation of 
a narrative of legitimacy to administer jurisprudence and resolve conflicts. The right to bear 
arms for the state came to replace the narrative of confessional notions of loyalty. This shifted 
legitimacy from those who would bear firearms domestically to defend Ireland, to those who 
would carry their firearms abroad. 
As an important area of Irish scholarship, the penal laws remain a divisive topic. J.G. Simms 
posited a law code created to subjugate the Catholic population.7 For Charles Ivar McGrath 
they were ‘the logical, formulated conclusion to an amalgam of Irish Protestant attitudes toward 
Catholics’.8 This thesis will reveal an Ireland that enforced the penal laws surrounding firearms 
to a greater level than previous scholars have attested. It furthermore contributes to an 
understanding of both the judicial and administrative evolution of a concerted attempt to disarm 
a majority of the population of Ireland. Doing so was not an easy task. The British state faced 
specific problems in imposing effective governance in Ireland for half a millennium. 
The fragmented principalities and bandit fiefdoms of Gaelic Ireland resisted government from 
England’s first forays in the fourteenth century, through the various rebellions of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries and perhaps most importantly serving as a battleground of contested 
royal succession in the 1690s. Irish soil served as the battleground that would determine the 
                                                          
6 Garnham, ‘How Violent Was Eighteenth-Century Ireland?’: 377-392. 
7 J. G. Simms, The treaty of Limerick, (Dundalk: Published for the Dublin Historical Association by Dundalgan 
Press, 1961), pp. 1-24; idem, ‘Remembering 1690.’ Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, 63, 251 (Autumn, 1974): 
231-242; idem, ‘The Bishops' Banishment Act of 1697 (9 Will. III, c. 1).’ Irish Historical Studies, 17, 66 (1970): 
185-199.   




issue of English and later British kingship.9 As Charles I’s and James II’s contested claims to 
power demonstrate, even issues of English rule could pivot on debates or policy in the 
peripheral edge of their dominions. These rebellions were led by Old English Catholics as well 
as the Gaelic Irish Catholics. England’s claim to legitimate possession, as well as its ability to 
govern Ireland was challenged throughout the early modern period. This challenge was based 
on confessional affiliation. The conquest of Ireland under Williamite forces and local Protestant 
auxiliaries secured Ireland for a new monarchical succession in 1691.  
This resulted in the effective disarming of the majority of the Catholic rebels. Local Protestant 
settlers further secured the Protestant Interest by permanently disarming the Catholic 
population through the passing of a series of statutes generally known as the ‘popery laws’ 
beginning in 1695.10 The body of law affected all aspects of Catholic life, from intermarriage 
and education to land tenure and the right to participation in civil and religious life. The 
exclusion of Catholics from learning ‘the mysteries of firearms’ and other offensive weapons 
played a crucial part in securing this process.11 Catholics were legally stripped not only of 
access to firearms, but also any industry that could be related to the manufacture of them. They 
were furthermore banned from trades ranging from blacksmithing to fowling. These provisions 
were strengthened periodically throughout the eighteenth century. Choosing an end date was 
                                                          
9 The 1707 Act of Union joined the crowns of Scotland and England together. On 1 January 1801 Ireland was 
formally added to the Union by the Acts of Union of 1800. 
10Protestant Interest is used in this work specifically in its Irish dimension of securing an Anglican ascendency  
across politics, wealth and religion. For an alternative understanding of the phrase as a component of an existential 
struggle of world Protestantism against the threat of Catholicism see Thomas S. Kidd. The Protestant Interest: 
New England After Puritanism (Yale University Press, 2004). 
11 7 Will. III c.5. This was a process that began in 1693 and was largely completed in the 1720s. ‘The mysteries 
of firearms’ refers to gunsmithing and the ability to make gunpowder, quoted from An Act to Better Secure the 
Government through Disarming Papist. The Act was made into a statute after being first implemented in the 
Disarming Proclamation of 31 July 1690. This provided an exemption for those Catholics with licenses to bear 
arms following the Treaty of Limerick, although in practice this was often ignored during periods of potential 
invasion. Charles Ivar McGrath’s ‘Securing the Protestant Interest: The Origins and Purpose of the Penal laws of 
1695.’ Irish Historical Studies Vol. 30, No. 117 (May, 1996): 25-46 provides an overview of that process. For a 
broad coverage of the proclamations see James Kelly & Mary Ann Lyons eds. The Proclamations of Ireland, 
1660-1820: James II, 1685-91: William and Mary, 1689-1702; Anne, 1702-14 Vol. 2 (Dublin: Irish Historical 




much less obvious. With the outbreak of conflict in the American colonies in 1775 the British 
government became increasingly committed to a policy using the garrisons of Ireland as they 
were initially envisioned: a manpower reserve for trouble spots further afield. In 1776 the 
Attorney General in London responded to the debates surrounding handing out arms to a 
reinstated Protestant Irish militia with the view that it would arm the very people who had been 
participating in the agrarian outrages during the 1760s and early 1770s.12 That the idea of 
providing firearms to lower class Protestants who had spent the last decade involved in attacks 
on representatives of the state was deemed a more dangerous proposition than the threat of a 
Catholic uprising is telling. This was a radically different world from the one imagined by the 
architects of the penal laws. This transformation of imperial policy was largely the result of the 
final breakdown of nearly a century of relative consensus over who should have access to the 
gun in Ireland.  
By 1793, Catholics gained the right to bear arms in the same bill that reinstated their right to 
vote and the passage of the Gunpowder Act effectively banned Protestants from arming 
themselves outside of state authority without a license. The thesis pivots around three 
watershed events in Ireland’s experience of the eighteenth century: the reduction of the Jacobite 
threat; the impact of the Seven Years War; and the outbreak of the American Revolution. This 
also provides the temporal boundaries for the time period covered in this work, which largely 
concerns itself with the years between 1691 and 1793. 
When the British state faced uprisings in Ireland in 1798 and 1803, controlling the gun assumed 
an even greater priority. The state attempted to coercively disarm the general population in the 
dragooning of Ulster in 1797, but to achieve this it was forced to rely on an armed loyalist 
                                                          
12 K.P. Ferguson, ‘The Army in Ireland from the Restoration to the Act of Union’ (PhD thesis, Trinity College 
Dublin, 1980).p. 209. Garnham, The Militia in Eighteenth Century Ireland: in defence of the Protestant interest 




paramilitary force, largely outside of state control to combat an uprising of Protestant 
Irishman.13 In turn the state armed a substantial Catholic militia to suppress a Catholic 
insurrection supported by French troops in 1798. Such a situation would have been unthinkable 
just 20 years before. The turning point for this great generational shift came in 1778. In Ireland, 
a huge number of men armed themselves outside of the authority of the state under the 
justification that they were defending themselves from both external threat and internal 
tyranny. While volunteering was a long standing tradition, their rhetoric and plurality of 
leadership were innovations. The political threat these men represented led to the passage of 
laws outlawing the practice of Volunteering at the same time that Catholics were allowed to 
once again legally possess firearms and crucially to participate in elections.  
How did the British state arrive at a policy of arming a substantial Catholic militia alongside 
an anti-Catholic paramilitary group in order to suppress a Catholic insurrection supported by 
French troops? Part of the answer can be found in looking at what united these diverse factions, 
namely the firearms they wielded. Since so much of the history of Ireland in the late eighteenth 
century revolves around the arming and disarming of communities, it is worth asking where all 
these arms came from and why their dispersal into the population was a noteworthy event. A 
large portion of those guns were from the state’s own arsenals, stamped with the mark of Dublin 
Castle and the ‘GB’ of the Crown, and were certainly not intended to be wielded by those who 
turned them against the government and each other. How could so many state weapons have 
been dispersed amongst the population at large? Understanding the limits of governance in the 
eighteenth century presents a partial answer. The loss of control over so many of the British 
state’s own weapons was a glaring example of the weakness of British governance in Ireland, 
                                                          
13 Nancy Curtis, ‘The Magistracy and Counter-revolution in Ulster, 1795-1798’ in Jim Smyth ed. Revolution, 
Counter-Revolution, and Union: Ireland in the 1790 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 39-54. 
She argues that the process was less effective at disarming the population than is commonly held. For a more 
traditional view, see Marianne Elliott, Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France (New Haven: 




and was the result of conflicting policies. The flow of firearms from state stockpiles into private 
hands was further lubricated by the way in which the gun increasingly became a symbol of 
legitimacy for the different confessional communities of Ireland over the eighteenth century. It 
is this aspect that marks Ireland as uniquely suited for a study of the gun during this period. 
Legitimacy has been likened by Robert Dahl to a reservoir.14 The deeper the reserves, the more 
cooperative the population is towards being governed. The lower the levels, the less freedom 
of action and opposition a state possesses. It is the view of this thesis that in Ireland, the 
reservoir of legitimacy reflected a sustained drought.15 The Crown and Parliament in theory 
exerted a monopoly on defining legitimate power in Ireland, enshrined in law and enforcing 
that monopoly through a range of coercive powers. This ranged from fines and transportation 
out of the polity, to corporal and often public punishments such as whipping and execution. 
However, in reality the weakness of the state precluded any realistic amount of control on large 
aspects of day to day life, especially in areas far from the centres of governance, as well as the 
state’s own lack of a desire to do so.  
Some issues were of more concern to those governing than others.16 One area of increasing 
state concern was that of regulating and controlling violence. Violence ranged from domestic 
altercations and fistfights to more serious incidents such as armed robbery, banditry and rioting. 
These were common enough occurrences and affected all levels of society. Violence was of 
                                                          
14 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 124–
188. 
15 For a different opinion of legitimacy in Ireland, see Neal Garnham’s view of Ireland as more violent than 
England, but on par with wider European norms. This is detailed in his article ‘How Violent Was Eighteenth-
Century Ireland?’: 377-392. S.J. Connolly, Religion, Law and Power: The Making of Protestant Ireland 1660-
1760 argues for Ireland as a typical ancient régime society. He further developed this in ‘Jacobites, Whiteboys 
and Republicans: Varieties of Disaffection in Eighteenth-Century Ireland.’ Eighteenth-Century Ireland / Iris an 
dá chultúr, Vol. 18, (2003): 63-79 and  Divided Kingdom: Ireland 1630-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
16 Peter Jupp, The Governing of Britain 1688-1848 (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 83-99 examines the interaction 
of the public and the executive in determining what these issues would be. Following the Glorious Revolution, 
and the subsequent growth of English power in the British archipelago, Ireland and Britain were dominated by a 




especial concern when directed at state officials, either in the form of excise officers and the 
gentry or the armed forces. The British government faced a number of challenges with limited 
resources, and had to choose where to exert control. When attempting to govern Ireland this 
meant maintaining a delicate balance of local concerns with wider objectives in an increasingly 
diverse empire.17  
Bills made in Dublin were finalized in Westminster and became the pronouncements and laws 
that radiated outward across the Irish Sea to the headquarters of governance in Dublin Castle, 
and from there across the counties of Ireland. From Dublin they travelled west to the isolated 
and rugged western coastlines of Connaught, Munster and Ulster, north up to the rolling hills 
of the densely populated and confessionally mixed landscape of Armagh and southward 
through the restive agrarian fields of Leister and Munster. Information and reports of the 
effectiveness of these policies in turn travelled back, largely through letters from local elites, 
concerned gentry, and officials. In this respect Ireland was similar to other areas of the wider 
British dominions and, as state priorities increasingly focused on raising regiments and revenue 
to finance warfare and territorial expansion, Ireland become one of the many overseas 
possessions of a growing empire.18  
Despite having been linked for centuries to its sister island Britain, life for Irish Protestants in 
Ireland was very distinct. One of the most important reasons life in Ireland differed from Britain 
itself was the need for security from a domestic uprising. It was this crucial difference, 
                                                          
17 Jupp, The Governing of Britain 1688-1848, pp. 2-4. After 1719, The Dependency of Ireland on Great Britain 
Act allowed Britain to make laws for Ireland if Irish elites did not follow British policy, see 6. Geo. I, c. 5. 
18 John Brewer’s Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Hutchinson, 1989) 
provides the model of Britain as a fiscal-military state. McGrath’s The Making of the Eighteenth Century Irish 
Constitution: Government, Parliament and Revenue, 1692-1714 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000) provides a 
detailed study of the Irish dimensions of the financing such a state, albeit without referencing Brewer, a point Ian 
McBride makes in his review. See The American Historical Review. Vol. 108, No. 3 (June 2003): 910-911. For 
the Irish dimensions of regionalism, see Kevin Whelan’s ‘The Regional Impact of Irish Catholicism 1700-1900’ 





combined with the need for defence (not only from outward forces potentially invading, but 
also from a majority of the local population) that governed Irish Protestant attitudes towards 
firearms. This work addresses debates as to the mentality towards arms bearing of Ireland’s 
confessional communities. After the general disarming of the Catholic population local 
Protestants remained more concerned about the spectre of foreign landings than local uprisings. 
Anglo-Irish confidence in the disappearance of Catholic Ireland following the passage of the 
Popery laws turned out to have been over-confidence. The survival of a vibrant Catholic 
community in the 1700s was the catalyst to renewed attempts to keep the Catholic population 
disarmed, as well as to integrate them into the fiscal-military state. 
A discussion about maintaining a monopoly of the gun naturally becomes a discussion about 
insecurity. However, the non-Catholic population and the state were not unified in what they 
feared. For imperial administrators in London, the prospect of foreign troops landing in Ireland 
was part of larger strategic concerns stretching from the Caribbean sugar islands to the coast 
of Malabar.19 In Dublin, by contrast, the Anglo-Irish elite increasingly viewed the maintenance 
of their monopoly of the ownership and training in the use of firearms as crucial to their security 
of both their persons and their political ascendency. The arguments for a Protestant monopoly 
of firearms were muddied by the presence of large numbers of Scots-Irish Presbyterians. 
Presbyterians existed outside of the established church yet within the uneasy framework of 
security aimed at thwarting the threat of a Catholic uprising.20 From the passage in 1705 of ‘An 
Act to further prevent the Growth of Popery’ Presbyterians faced restrictions on joining the 
militia as commissioned officers or forming their own defence associations, and argued that 
this betrayed their previous service as defenders of Protestant Ireland. In later years the spectre 
                                                          
19 First in 1713 with territory gained as a result of the Treaty of Utrecht and in 1763 following the Treaty of Paris. 
20 Stuart Daultrey, David Dickinson, and Cormac Ó Gráda provide estimates of population growth and some 
estimates of confessional affiliation in ‘Eighteenth-Century Irish Population: New Perspectives from Old 




of a rearmed and resurgent Catholicism was deemed a greater threat than the perils of sharing 
power with Dissenters.21 
Recovering the Catholic experience in the period is a challenge, but possible. Despite the 
optimistic pronouncements by local Protestants, the three quarters of the population excluded 
from owning or wielding firearms were not ‘silent’ and, as the eighteenth century progressed, 
were increasingly unwilling to be ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water.’22 The ban on owning 
arms not only removed a potential means of employment, but also raised the more immediate 
concerns of defending themselves and their property, or enjoying the liberty accorded to loyal 
subjects.23 Irish Anglicans and Presbyterians were not proscribed from owning firearms, but 
were not entirely trusted by the governing elites to be provided with them either. As we will in 
the first chapter of this work, all three communities had lost the privilege of serving in an ‘Irish’ 
army in the closing years of the seventeenth century and the start of the eighteenth, and instead 
Ireland’s security was to be provided by garrisoned British regiments paid for through Irish 
taxation. 
 
    
                                                          
21 Anon, An impartial relation of the several arguments of Sir Stephen Rice, Sir Theobald Butler, and councilor 
Malone, at the bar of the House of Commons of Ireland, Feb. 22. and at the bar of the House of Lords, Feb. 28th. 
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Chapter 1. A Prehistory of the Gun in Ireland 
Understanding how fears of security converged with attempts to control the access and 
ownership of firearms in Ireland in the closing decade of the sixteenth century in such a 
complex environment opens up wider questions of governance, law, and legitimacy. This 
chapter defines the parameters of the British state’s attempts to control the gun, examines the 
evolving body of legal proscriptions regarding firearm ownership by Catholics in the 
specifically Irish body of legislation called the ‘popery laws’ in the first four decades of the 
eighteenth century and explores how this process changed over time. The erosion of state 
control of the firearms in its arsenals would not only have profound implications for Ireland, 
but for the entire British empire as a largely effective disarming of the population collapsed in 
the last twenty years of the eighteenth century. Understanding firearms in Ireland before the 
diffusion of state owned firearms into private hands provides a counterpoint to the subsequent 
reports of nineteenth-century Ireland as a country awash in weapons.1 The opening chapter will 
also give the reader the necessary background knowledge for subsequent discussion that takes 
place in the chapters that follow.  
The primary aim of this chapter is to shown that the military victory of the Anglo-Irish over 
the Catholic Irish allowed them to disarm the Catholic majority. Furthermore, it seeks to equate 
the possession of firearms with having legitimacy to participate in politics. I provide an 
overview of the firearm in Ireland up to the end of the seventeenth century. This is followed 
by a section on the British Army in Ireland during the eighteenth century, and on tensions that 
resulted from the presence of a standing army in peacetime. Building on this, the issues 
surrounding the Treaty of Limerick in 1691, the creation of the Popery Laws beginning in 1695, 
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and general distrust by the Anglo-Irish population towards the rest of the Irish populace is 
explored. This discussion culminates with an examination of attempts to create a Protestant 
militia and failures in securing firearms during a period of imperial instability. The experience 
of serious agrarian unrest in Ireland during the 1760s stoked fears of relying on a plebeian 
militia, and instead the state was forced to rely on ‘a number of stout fellows’ to secure the 
countryside at a time of growing overseas commitments in ways similar to the outbreak of 
unrest in 1710-1713.2 These stout fellows were the frontier farmers who had inhabited the 
uneasy borderland between Catholic and Protestant. These settlers were men whose stoutness 
made them natural allies to the state, but they were uneasily governed and differed from the 
plebeian militia in that they armed themselves and typically were independently raised by a 
local landlord in times of necessity rather than being formed legislatively. Conversely, the need 
for men to fight overseas changed the balance of power both locally and internationally, much 
to the chagrin of the stout fellows so long tasked with enforcing the unenforceable. 
i. 
To understand how the gun in Ireland was removed from the majority of the population, it is 
important to examine how it first arrived. In what follows, I layout the increasing importance 
of the gun in Irish conflict and its role as a marker of legitimate authority. It is arranged 
chronologically and covers a period from the first recorded instance of a gun in Ireland in the 
end of the fourteenth century until the codification of the penal laws in the closing years of the 
seventeenth century. It also provides a general overview of confessional conflicts and early 
attempts at enforcing a state monopoly of the gun. Ireland’s position on the outer western 
boundaries of Europe and low population density combined with its relative isolation meant 
the survival of traditional forms of warfare longer than on the continent making a brief coverage 
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of the history of the gun in Ireland a necessary component of a discussion of its impact on Irish 
history in later periods. 
Firearms reached Northern Europe sometime in the 1300s, and had reached Ireland by the late 
1400s.3 The first recorded use of firearms in Ireland prefigured a pattern that would play itself 
out throughout the subsequent centuries. In 1487, Godfrey O’Donnell killed a Breifre 
O’Rourke with what was most likely a primitive cast iron hand cannon.4 Detailed in the Annals 
of the Four Masters, the text differs on the wording regarding what to call the new weapon. In 
Gaelic it was described as a ‘duchor peleir’ or ‘durchurdo ghunna’. This first recorded killing 
with a ‘ghunna’ was followed in the next year with the first use of heavy ordnance when Gerald 
Fitzgerald, then Earl of Kildare, used cannons in the taking of Balrath Castle in Co. 
Westmeath.5 He also received two of the earliest recorded foreign influx of firearms into 
Ireland, when six handguns were given as a gift from Germany. This was complemented with 
the arrival of German mercenary landsknechte most likely armed with firearms. A few hundred 
years later, these early German mercenaries from this earlier period would be directly 
compared to Hessian troops serving the British state by eighteenth-century Irish 
commentators.6 
G.A. Hayes-McCoy has written one of the only comprehensive articles regarding early Irish 
firearms, published over seventy years ago, and provides an overview of trends that affected 
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all the inhabitants of the shifting amorphous territories, kingdoms, and lawless margins that 
made up early modern Ireland.7 Hayes-McCoy compares the requirement to provide firearms 
as a component of the feudal levy as one indicator of the availability of firearms in Ireland as 
compared to Britain. He aptly demonstrates that Scottish Barons were required to deploy guns 
as early as 1454, with Anglo-Irish lords not required to do so until 1498.8 The Earl’s Parliament 
in Dublin in 1498 went on to request 60 firearms and ordnance for the defence of the city.9 
Hayes-McCoy lists the increasing passage of legislation and attempts to control and acquire 
the new technology, referencing one of the more neglected acts of Poynings’ Parliament.10  
One aspect of a series of pronouncements that is particularly interesting, and not discussed by 
other Irish historians, was the prohibition of private ownership of any firearms by anyone 
except the Lord Deputy of Ireland and those given direct licences.11 Checking the diffusion of 
firearms into private hands, outside the authority of the state, was an on-going concern for the 
faltering government of Dublin Castle three hundred years before similar debates took place in 
the late eighteenth century. The result was the passing of Poynings Act.12  Poynings’ Act served 
as the first piece of legislation attempting to restrict ownership of firearms in Ireland, and 
coincided with a resumption of resources devoted towards governing Ireland following a 
sustained period of instability. This was part of an on-going challenge of governance as the 
fortunes of the English in Ireland were on the wane in the face of a resurgent Gaelic Ireland 
during the 1400s.13 This was to be a very divisive issue over the entire early modern period in 
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Ireland. It is interesting to note that the Earl of Kildare was himself subsequently killed with a 
handgun, illustrating the dangers of such an innovation.14 
Most combatants were armed with a mixture of martial weapons such as spears, longbows and 
swords, and largely fought on foot and in small bands. Cavalry was an effective solution to the 
endemic cattle raiding and feuding taking place along the border between the more settled areas 
of Anglo-Ireland and the Gaelic interior, but these units were lightly armoured and could only 
be used seasonally. The gradual adoption of firearms into traditional Gaelic warfare 
increasingly served to mitigate the advantage of the heavier armoured soldiers of the English 
crown forces. Despite the virtual monopoly on large calibre artillery by the English forces, 
smaller firearms served to level the technological edge between native Gaels and the English.15  
A recurring problem for the English state was the danger of putting large numbers of firearms 
into the hands of men of suspect loyalty. In response to the likely loss of firearms to allies of 
dubious loyalty, Henry VIII’s ministers in Ireland were restrictive in allowing firearms to be 
given over to locals, preferring naval bombardment where possible.16 This can be seen as an 
early form of gunboat diplomacy. To use a more modern phrase, the policy was also an attempt 
to prevent ‘blowback’ from the arming of local groups who might turn those weapons towards 
their benefactors.17 In 1534-5, a dependent of the Earl of Kildare turned the King’s own 
firearms against the crown. After the rebellion was crushed it was discovered that the Earl had 
given ‘a part thereof to wilde Irish men, being the King’s mortall enemies’.18 This undermining 
of a supposed state monopoly of firearms was a continuing theme of the gun in Ireland, as was 
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the greater numbers of firearms entering into the country from abroad. The crown continued to 
attempt to assert the crown’s monopoly of the new technology. 
However, to make matters more difficult for the crown’s attempts to assert exclusive right to 
the gun, Gaelic forces had alternatives to using English firearms. The Gaels also had the tactical 
skill to use firearms effectively; changing battlefield tactics to emphasize the small scale 
skirmishes and raiding after the former safety of fortified strongholds became obsolete in the 
face of artillery bombardments. Firearms were utilized by a number of armed groups in Gaelic 
Ireland, shown through the increase of successful ambushes against crown forces all along the 
Irish Pale by the 1560s. In Ireland, military units were equipped with arquebuses, matchlocks 
and other technological innovations as the century progressed. Firearms continued to be taken 
up by both Gaelic and English forces in larger numbers. By 1596, the Irish were observed to 
have ‘muskets, fowling pieces, calivers, swords, morions, power and shot’. 19 As McCoy rightly 
highlights, the firearms in Ireland were comparable to those found in Continental Europe. As 
newer models and technologies were introduced, they were quickly integrated into local Irish 
arsenals.20 The seventeenth century would feature massive influxes of Spanish, French and 
Northern European firearms in return for exports of butter, hides and other goods exchanged 
through a gauntlet of privateers, pirates and corsairs. By the end of the seventeenth century 
firearms were also being brought into Ireland by large armies continuing continental conflicts 
on Irish soil.21 
Before the fifteenth century firearms were only available in Ireland through importation. By 
the reign of Elizabeth, there were attempts to establish a domestic arms production industry, 
culminating with the creation of Dublin Castle as a proofing house and domestic producer of 
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Crown firearms. Gaelic Ireland, lacking such facilities, relied on firearms acquired through 
various other means. Some firearms were captured from English units in battle, bought from 
English soldiers directly on the black market, or kept by soldiers serving as mercenaries for a 
fixed period and taking their weapons with them. Other options included importation from 
Scotland or more tenuous trade routes providing imported arms from continental Europe, 
largely from Spain.22 There is little evidence of native Gaelic production outside of some scant 
evidence of Scottish mercenaries moonlighting as blacksmiths and producing inferior copies 
of obsolete models.23 
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century, military victories were increasingly 
determined through siege craft and a reliance on artillery of varying quality. This took place in 
conjunction with firearms being adapted to traditional patterns of warfare. In this, Ireland was 
in keeping with changes in warfare happening throughout Western Europe in the early modern 
period.24 By the closing years of the sixteenth century, despite a lack of substantial English 
investment in either soldiers or funding, a larger section of Ireland was being incorporated and 
governed by the English Crown. Resistance to this advance culminated in a conflict between 
Gaelic Earls and the England Crown in a conflict known as the Nine Years’ War. This revolt 
required England to commit the largest concentration of its military power in the entire period, 
well beyond continental commitments in Flanders, and costing an increasingly heavy toll to 
the English treasury. The result of this investment in lucre and lives was a further erosion of 
Gaelic autonomy and the establishment of the plantation of Ulster in the beginning of the 
1600s. England secured the land with Scottish and English settlers, furthering a process taking 
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place on a more limited scale in the preceding centuries.25 These settlers would secure the 
borders as stout fellows maintaining the legitimacy of English rule through strength of arms 
and persistence, and would be a crucial component of subsequent state building. 
This process of seizure and resettlement to offset the cost of conquest to secure it from the 
native Irish would have implications for the increasingly fluid confessional and ethnic 
boundaries of Northwest Ireland, compounding the destabilizing effects of the on-going 
religious Reformation. The defeated leaders of the Gaelic contingents left Ireland in the ‘Flight 
of the Earls’ to enlist the support of foreign Catholic powers, taking their guns with them. This 
also marked a recurring theme in Irish history, as defeated remnants took their soldiers and 
arms with them to fight again, a pattern repeated in 1641 and 1692.  
At the beginning of the seventeenth century Ireland was the stage for a series of destructive 
and expensive conflicts involving larger and larger groups of armed men clashing on a scale 
unimaginable a hundred years before. These armed contingents largely following a principle 
of ‘bellum se ipsum alet’26 and disease and famine followed behind the path of conquest. 
Ireland served as a battlefield for armies of a size and complexity completely outside the scale 
of traditional low-intensity conflicts. A chronic problem for all these forces was the difficulty 
of securing finance, fodder and firepower locally. Maintaining an effective military force 
required the acquisition of a greater quantity of firearms. Even more importantly, access to 
firearms and training in modern military warfare increasingly determined issues of political 
rights and security. Access to gunpowder, ammunition and trained troops meant that the older 
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tradition of Gaelic warfare was outmoded and outgunned, and supply, either in terms of lucre, 
weaponry or soldiers, lay at the end of stretched supply lines.27  
The thirty-seven years of peace that endured from 1603-1640 was followed by a period of 
nearly continuous conflict and food insecurity. The Irish rebellion in 1641, economic collapse, 
famine, conquest and sectarian strife led to local populations caught between deposed kings 
and Interregnum conquistadors. However, even in a time of severe disruption, Catholics and 
Protestant figures in authority were reluctant to release firearms into the hands of the people.28 
Firearms represented both the authority and the coercive power of the state. Their possession 
gave the individual a small part of that coercive power. However, being found with arms also 
negated whatever limited protection civilians had from the ravages of war. The clubbing to 
death of unarmed Catholic soldiers following the siege of Drogheda emphasized the dangers 
of picking the losing side. Rumour and exaggeration of war crimes by people from all 
confessional background formulated fears that would last generations.29 S.J. Connolly rightly 
highlights that Cromwell’s declaration that the massacre at Drogheda was ‘a righteous 
judgement of god’ on what he termed ‘barbarous wretches’ obfuscates the fact that the majority 
of the soldiers were of English extraction and formerly under the command of the Munster 
army of Ichiquin.30  Less easily explained was the subsequent massacre at Wexford of the entire 
garrison as well as civilians who took up arms, demonstrating the repercussions for those found 
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possessing firearms in times of conflict, especially irregulars operating outside the nimbus of 
state authority. Cromwell denied ordering the killing of anyone not found to be carrying arms.31  
The Cromwellian conquest of Ireland in the 1650s resulted in the first systematic attempt at the 
disarming of Catholics collectively.32 However, As Jane Ohlmeyer conclusively demonstrated 
by examining Oliver Cromwell’s willingness to negotiate with the Marquis of Antrim to secure 
his supply ships, political expediency could take priority over sectarian prejudices.33 The 
removal of the gun was a decision as much motivated by a desire to prevent another massacre 
of Protestants on the imagined scale of 1641 as it was to secure the removal of the Irish nobility, 
gentry and common people from access to the power and independence that the firearms helped 
represent.  From the Interregnum until the forceful removal of James II from power Ireland 
was a contested battleground between Catholics, Anglicans and Dissenters in part determined 
through who would have the right to bear arms.  This resulted in situations where the ascendant 
faction attempted to disarm and depose the ‘other’ when the opportunity presented itself.  
Changes in governing regimes marked changing fortunes for the confessional communities of 
Ireland. Anglo-Irish adherents of the Church of Ireland confronted a larger population of Irish 
and old English Catholics seeking to regain lost power and status, as well as an increasingly 
independent and demographically important Presbyterian population retrenching in Ulster. 
Catholic fortunes catastrophically declined first during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms in the 
1640s, and fell even further during the Interregnum regime’s confiscations and enactment of 
penal legislation against Catholics. Those with the most wealth and status were the most 
impacted.  
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Catholics regained some status during Charles II’s resumption of Kingship in 1660, and hopes 
rose even further when his brother James II gained the throne in 1685.  This briefly reversed 
trends from the preceding decades. It is a misfortune that the historian does not have access to 
primary source materials that reflect this period more clearly.  Only a very small handful of 
Tyrconnel's letters have been found. Copies of Irish letters sent by James and his secretary of 
state, the earl of Sunderland, can be found in the secretaries' letter books, but only general 
matters of state. As John Miller observed, ‘Sunderland was careful to destroy incriminating 
material at the Revolution, so much of what survives is routine and innocuous.’34 The Ormond 
papers cease to provide material after 1686. Strict control of the press in 1685–8 produce little 
more than polemics. The type of interactions indicated from the poem below therefore provide 
a glimpse at day-to-day interactions that would be neglected from a study of only traditional 
sources. 
The impact of these changing circumstances on day to day interactions between people further 
down the social scale is accessible through an examination of a contemporary verse of Gaelic 
poetry. The poem shows a self-awareness of the role of firearms in determining or maintaining 
political status in a time of ambiguity. 
Behold there the Gael in arms every one of them, 
They have powder and guns, hold the castles and fortresses; 
The Presbyterians, lo have been overthrown, 
And the fanatics have left an infernal smell after them 
Whither shall John turn? He has now no redcoat on him, 
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Nor ‘Who’s there’ on his lips when standing beside the gate. 
‘You popish rogue’ they won’t dare to say to us, 
But ‘Cromwellian dog’ is the watchword we have for him.35 
As the above so well demonstrates, power relations could change in an instance. The poem is 
a commentary on the active disarming of Protestant soldiers and officers in the Irish army 
during the 1680s under Tyrconnel. The right to wield firearms was a crucial component in 
determining status that must be considered alongside more established rubrics of rank in Irish 
scholarship, such as land ownership or access to patronage. The display of the right to bear 
arms or disarming other members of other confessional groups played a key component in the 
interaction between confessional groups in times of political transition or uncertainty. These 
interactions often occurred outside of the direction of the authorities of the state. 
As the political landscape shifted, some Catholics supported claimants to the throne who they 
saw as being amicable towards reinstating former privileges and lands, as well as the right to 
bear arms to secure them. Other Catholics showed more initiative by either converting to 
Protestantism or by attacking those they saw as the religious enemies of James II directly. The 
minority Protestant population attempted to secure hard fought rights and privileges through 
armed service and a martial tradition of opposing Catholic monarchs as well as serving as the 
first line of defence against uprisings by the local Irish Catholic population. It would take one 
final conflict to determine who would control the gun in the eighteenth century.  
The Williamite war has traditionally been seen outside Ireland as a small part of the wider Nine 
Years War from 1688-97. In Ireland the conflict was also experienced as a civil war. James II 
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fled England for France after William III landed in 1688 with a Dutch army in Britain, to claim 
his right to the throne through his wife Anne. James was encouraged by Louis XIV to take an 
army to Ireland to regain his throne. He soon set sail to Ireland with six regiments of French, 
Walloon and German soldiers and a mix of Scotch and English refugees traded for an 
equivalent amount of Irish troops that would serve the French crown.36 James landed in 1690 
with a large Jacobite force in what he saw as the first part of a larger campaign for England. 
He was to find a Catholic host high in spirit but short on firearms and training. He reinforced 
native Catholics already embodying together under the command of the Earl Tyrconnell, 
Richard Talbolt.  
As mentioned earlier, Earl Tyrconnell was a man largely responsible for the disarming of 
Protestant soldiers and officers in Ireland, and the subsequent dispersal of formerly Protestant 
owned firearms to a newly created Catholic Militia. This stock of firearms added to those pre-
emptively seized in Ireland following Monmouth’s rebellion in England.37 Despite 
Tyrconnell’s best efforts to augment the supply of firearms, his men were described as being 
equipped with nail studded sticks and obsolescent firearms from a previous generation. This 
further demonstrates the continued scarcity of domestic firearms available in Ireland and a 
reliance on foreign imports in the late seventeenth century.38 Despite their obsolescence 
militarily, the guns seized from Protestants and wielded by formerly disarmed Catholics were 
a potent symbol of a chance of political fortunes, whatever they lacked in military utility.  The 
scarcity of serviceable firearms was somewhat eased as French firearms and money poured 
into Ireland.  
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The arrival of thousands of English troops led by Schomberg and tasked by William III to 
secure Ireland for the Glorious Revolution was greeted with enthusiasm from the Protestants 
besieged in Londonderry. This initial period of enthusiasm for their rescuers was soon muted 
by the general mismanagement of the encampment and general health of such a large force. 
The newly raised conscripts died of typhus, dysentery and other illnesses before coming in 
contact with the enemy.39 James II’s enthusiasm for his Irish campaign in turn faltered as 
French concerns in fields closer to home resulted in increasingly strained supplies of firearms, 
food and funding. The conflict dragged on into the winter of 1690, as William III arrived in 
Ireland with a multi-national cadre of well-equipped and well-supplied soldiers. 36,000 
English, German, Dutch, Danish, and French Huguenot troops fought their way south in both 
set piece battles and the smaller bloody skirmishes, looting, and scouting.  
The importance of armed Irish irregulars should not be underestimated in a conflict that was as 
much a civil war as a war for the throne.  After the landing of Schomberg in Belfast on 13 
August 1689, all adult Catholic males were ordered to take up arms. They were often 
confronting a Protestant militia raised from the settler population in areas under Williamite 
control.40  These small bloody clashes in the rear areas simmered as the larger forces marched 
south. The large areas outside of either sides control was contested between Protestant settler 
auxiliaries and Catholic rapparrees in a conflict closer to traditional Irish warfare than the 
battles and sieges taking place on the front lines.41 Determining who was an irregular and who 
was a civilian was a difficult task at the best of times. A lack of obvious weaponry was also 
not always an indication of passivity. 
                                                          
39 5,674 English soldiers would die encamped in a bog near Dundalk, largely through what John Childs describes 
as a lack of ‘common sense and hygiene’. Childs, ‘The Williamite War 1689-1691’, p. 195.    
40 McBride, Eighteenth Century Ireland, p. 175. 
41 In 1691, approximately 15,000 militia men were under arms compared to the 35,000 peak strength of William 




You may see a hundred of them without arms, who look like the poorest humblest 
Slaves in the World, and you may search until you are weary to find one Gun: but 
yet when they have a mind to do mischief, they can be ready in an Hours warning.42 
The result of these little conflicts may not have been mythologized in Protestant songs and 
eulogized in Gaelic verse in the years following the conflict alongside the larger battles. The 
struggle would survive in the tactics employed during agrarian unrest and the survival of 
banditry that simmered on the borders between confessional communities and between 
traditional notions of justice and expanding region of law and order in the decades following 
the end of the war. The experience of a generation of men who had fought against an armed 
and dangerous population that had appeared to be the ‘poorest humblest slaves in the world’ 
but could arm themselves in hours must have left an impression on those framing the 
subsequent peace. 
Catholic forces were defeated in a series of running engagements and sieges at Londonderry, 
the Boyne, and Aughrim. The conflict decisively demonstrated that the military revolution had 
arrived in Ireland. Modern well-armed and professional soldiers fought battles that were one 
component of a larger European war. The professional armies on both sides left Ireland for 
other flashpoints in the continuing conflict. Following the successful siege of Limerick, 13,000 
Catholic soldiers left Ireland to continue to serve the exiled King James. This event, the so 
called ‘flight of the wild geese’, marked the end of a century that had begun with a flight of the 
Irish earls. The irregular Protestant soldiers who remained behind returned to their farms and 
spinning wheels. 
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Catholics in Ireland had faced a hundred years of conflict, and had consistently been on the 
losing side. The victorious Anglo-Irish were in a position to take the gun out of Irish politics, 
or at least from the hands of their confessional rivals. Widespread participation in the conflict 
would entrench notions that the means to an enduring peace was to disarm the Catholic 
majority.  Throughout the entire period, securing firearms had played a decisive role in the 
opening period of rebellion. Disarming the old order had served as a visual reminder of political 
change. In Ireland, the seventeenth century was clearly a period where maintaining a monopoly 
over access to firearms and other martial weapons from confessional or political rivals was 
impossible, and this inability to effectively regulate who would control firearms added to an 
environment where security and social order were uncertain.  
For the resultant victors the peace allowed for the securing of two very different objectives, 
both involving the gun. For the victorious Williamite state it meant the freeing of a large body 
of armed men for service in the on-going conflict taking place in continental Europe. For the 
victorious Protestant settlers the high cost of victory reinforced the need to prevent the large 
Catholic population from ever posing a threat to Protestant power again.43 The penal laws 
would remove the ability of Catholics to revolt again through a restriction on land ownership 
and education, alongside coercive measures to discourage the Catholic faith. Crucially, this 
legacy of a perpetual peace was to be sustained through a policy of proscribing the majority 
Catholic population from access to firearms.  
Firearms had played an increasing role in the conflict between Gael and settler or Protestant 
and Catholic throughout the early modern period. This chapter has provided the necessary 
background to the period of the formation of the 1695 legislation banning the possession of 
firearms by Catholics. Crucially, is has highlighted the differences between the two dominant 
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views of the legacy of the victory of William of Orange over James II, which would have 
implications for both the imperial centre and the Irish people. This is in part because of different 
views of who should defend Ireland, and from what. Was the lesson to be learned from the 
Williamite war to be that Ireland’s future as a Protestant state was better secured by 
Presbyterians rallying to the walls of Derry, or by a multinational professional army headed by 
a monarch who viewed Ireland as one more theatre of a wider war?  
The next section will examine how the British Army’s place in Irish society shifted during the 
opening years of the eighteenth century following the end of the Williamite war, and the 
complexity that the presence of a standing army added to debates about controlling access to 
firearms to the local population.  
ii. 
After 1699, the largest officially sanctioned owners and users of firearms in Ireland were the 
soldiers of the British Army.44 One aspect of this topic which has been almost entirely 
neglected was how those troops were equipped.  The deficiencies that Ireland faced in the 
production of firearms were partially addressed by making Dublin a centre for firearms 
production in the British Isles. This is a topic that has been largely neglected by military 
historians.45 However, perhaps the most puzzling omission of recent histories of the British 
archipelago in the eighteenth century is the failure to adequately examine the uniqueness of 
Ireland as a largely disarmed society garrisoned by a large permanent standing army. The 
majority of Ireland’s population had the distinction of being legally proscribed from both active 
military service and private arms ownership.46 The view of this thesis is that this led to reliance 
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on the military for law and order to a greater degree than other areas of the British dominions 
and a reliance on paramilitaries to supplement local magistrates. 
Understanding the role of the army in eighteenth-century Ireland has produced a great deal of 
scholarship in the last forty years. Following an initial revision of the army in Ireland as an 
embodiment of a ‘garrison state’, recent work has instead placed Ireland into a broader 
narrative of military developments taking place throughout the British Isles.  
The available scholarship on the British army in Ireland has shifted to an ever more focused 
look at paramilitaries in the last years of the eighteenth century. Studies on the Volunteers, the 
Irish Militia, and the Yeomanry largely seek to understand militarization outside of the state, 
for obvious reasons. Those interested in a broader study of the army in the eighteenth century 
will find it necessary to consult the unpublished thesis of Kenneth Ferguson or Thomas Bartlett 
and Keith Jeffery’s A Military History of Ireland. Both of these works remain standard reading. 
In both cases, these works relate a generally peaceful and mundane tour of duty.47 Neal 
Garnham’s ‘Military Desertion and Deserters in Eighteenth-Century Ireland’ demonstrates 
endemic corruption at all levels of the Irish establishment. The appalling troop quality and 
overall experience of military life in Ireland in the middle of the eighteenth century involved 
alternating between long periods of mind-numbing boredom and actively life-threatening 
service depending on where and what the soldier was assigned to do.48 This was a truism of 
most military service in the period, but a point best not forgotten.  Martyn Powell has looked 
to cases of the mutilation of soldiers by Irish Catholics and the public reaction, or rather lack 
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of one, in more recent work to show that the life as a soldier may have been more eventful that 
other scholars have acknowledged.49 S.J. Connolly has stressed that even at the end of the 
eighteenth century the Irish, regardless of confessional background, were not overtly 
confrontational towards the Army. This can be seen as an additional clause towards his general 
assessment of a quiet eighteenth century.50 My own view on the issue of a quiet eighteenth 
century is, respectfully, in disagreement with Connolly’s position, an argument developed later 
in this work. My difference of opinion is based on a study of the minutes of the Irish revenue 
commission for the period of 1691-1765. Based on an extensive study of this source, the 
documents reveal a less settled and more violent world than the scholarly consensus seems to 
indicate.51 
The view of the army by the Anglo-Irish elite as alternatively a bulwark against a Catholic 
uprising or alternatively as an oppressive instrument of a foreign power has been presented by 
Martyn Powell as ‘too neat’.52 In the muddled reality of day-to-day life in eighteenth-century 
Ireland, these two viewpoints should not be seen as diametrically opposed positions. Nor can 
we chop the eighteenth century into convenient halves; with the garrison featuring as a bulwark 
against Catholic revolt before 1750 and after 1750 being viewed as an oppressive instrument 
of imperial rule. Neither can the large population of Catholic Irish be seen as being particularly 
prone to violent revolt, as S.J. Connolly has stressed in a number of his works over the last 
thirty years.53 Others have seen the lack of a violent uprising as being a result of a lack of 
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opportunity rather than a passive mentality.54 All of these appraisals examine the society as a 
whole over individual relationships. It is the purpose of this work to uncover how individual 
moments of violence or insubordination could impact on wider Irish society. This was 
especially true when there were confrontations between representatives of law and order such 
as the revenue officials and magistrates with the general population. This was also the case in 
confrontation between local people and the garrisoning army. 
The ambiguity of how to view the presence of the British army in Ireland stems from the 
uncertainty of what it was supposed to be doing there. One topic few of those discussed above 
engage with is the way firearms contributed to these altercations. This matters because in a 
society where the population was largely disarmed the gun served as a badge of status, the gun 
was power, and the gun was legitimacy. Conflicts between local individuals and barracked 
soldiers were not rare occurrences, and periodic outbreaks of violence by soldiers on civilians 
and armed civilians on soldiers demonstrated a relationship that was at best uneasy.55 Attempts 
to disarm local people could result in large numbers of casualties in these altercations.56  
That these altercations could escalate can perhaps be attributed to the fact that there was not an 
‘Irish’ army. Unlike Britain, Ireland was garrisoned by outsiders. The Scottish, Welsh and 
English soldiers would be supported by Irish funds, and the local Protestant population was not 
to be recruited into the army to maintain local Protestant numbers against the majority Catholic 
population. In the following section we examine the foreign origins of the largest group of 
sanctioned wielders of arms in detail, as well as the treaty which settled a lasting peace. 
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The Treaty of Limerick was a messy end to a messy war.57 The treaty marked the culmination 
of negotiations to end three years of conflict that had devastated Ireland materially and 
politically. The following section provides a summary of the legacies of the end of the 
Williamite war by examining the survival of a Catholic Irish army abroad, a remnant of landed 
Catholic elites, and the formation of a penal code to secure Protestant Ireland’s ascendency 
through the removal of Catholics from participating in politics, owning large amounts of land, 
and disarming the defeated Catholic majority. The role of the gun in eighteenth-century Ireland 
was heavily influenced by the repercussions of the treaty of Limerick.  
The treaty itself was a muddled temporary expedient for the nations embroiled in a wider 
conflict. The dishonouring of the majority of the clauses of the treaty demonstrated this clearly 
enough. It took the Irish parliament six years to ratify the clauses of the capitulation.  In the 
period between the signing of the treaty in 1691 and its ratification by the Irish parliament in 
1697, the civil clauses regarding confessional rights were dropped.58 The reasons the treaty 
failed to secure a lasting settlement between confessional communities highlights some of the 
underlying complexities and paradoxes of a treaty designed to end Ireland as one battleground 
in a wider struggle then but was not designed to the underlying settlement of a lasting peace 
for Ireland. The signatories of the treaty sought to return to continental affairs, and many of the 
soldiers involved (whether under the banner of William of Orange or James II) were on ships 
to Flanders or marching north from Paris as soon as the ink dried. A brief look at those who 
signed the document shows the lack of participants of Irish origins. The three main signatories 
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of the Treaty of Limerick were Dutch, French and English. This lack of Irish leadership was 
also reflected in the makeup of the Jacobite military, which only had six Irish officers of high 
rank.59 While the war had ended in Ireland, it continued on the continent for an additional six 
years. As J.G. Simms’ large corpus of writing on the topic of the period attests, Ireland was left 
with several legacies that would have a profound impact on the eighteenth century.60  
One of the most obvious of these was the rampant insecurity that the survival of an intact army 
in British red abjectly under the command of James II presented for both local Protestants and 
for the stability of the Protestant succession. 13,000 British and Irish Jacobite soldiers remained 
in service to the Stuart King, and thousands of others sought service with other continental 
Catholic powers.61 Irish Catholics seeking service overseas with England’s enemies were not 
figments of an overactive Protestant imagination. Revenue officers patrolling the coastlines 
regularly reported seeing men lurking in their ridings either actively seeking passage overseas 
or reported seizures of men attempting to do so. The numbers of people seeking service 
overseas were substantial and a visible reminder that not all threats were local. One Irish 
revenue official reported that 117 Irishmen had landed from two Dublin ships in France, 
alongside a report that he had had seized barrels of gunpowder from a ship in Cork he suspected 
was intended for a foul purpose.62 Revenue officers also seized the ships that had been 
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commissioned to bring Irish recruits overseas, some directly commissioned by the Pretender.63 
The Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745, despite being defeated without an uprising in Ireland 
did see a heavy commitment of Irish establishment regiments in their suppression. Fears of 
massacres or another rising along the lines of 1641 were kept fresh in the minds of subsequent 
generations, used to demonstrate the ability of armed Irish Catholics to pose a threat to 
Protestant Ireland.64 
The survival of Catholic landowners who submitted to an oath of loyalty at Galway in July of 
1691 or at Limerick in October of the same year were largely restricted to three counties in 
Western Ireland in the province of Connaught. The treaty also had provided guarantees that 
Catholics would maintain the right to openly practice their faith. Local Protestants were aghast 
at the prospect of sanctioned Catholic worship, and removed these guarantees when the treaty 
was ratified. On 26 November 1691, the Bishop Anthony Dopping of Meath condemned the 
Treaty of Limerick, citing the historical precedent of twenty two general rebellions and forty 
four local uprisings since the year 1172.65 Others compared the Irish Catholic population to the 
bogs that bedevilled travellers in the untamed country side, remarking that they ‘are like Boggs, 
never to be trusted to by going gently over, nor safely but by cutting your way to the bottom.’66 
One policy that both imperial officials and the local Protestant population could agree on was 
the need to disarm potential allies of the deposed King James pre-emptively. This was intended 
to reduce the ability of the majority Irish population from being able to prove military 
assistance in the event of a French or Jacobite invasion.  
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One issue that was less clear to Anglo-Irish elites was what to do regarding the local Protestants 
who had helped secure the victory. There was an acute awareness on the part of local Protestant 
communities of the role that the local Church of Ireland and Presbyterian irregulars and militia 
had played in the conflict. The Protestant auxiliaries had not only been present for the series of 
iconic battles and sieges, but had also suffered the most from the conflict itself. The Protestant 
populace began to mark their participation through festivals and holidays of remembrance that 
highlighted their deliverance from both Popery and despotism.67 It was a deliverance that was 
to be maintained through vigilance. The general disarming of the Catholic population had 
begun as a proclamation by William III in 1690. It was intended to disarm Catholics for the 
duration of the conflict but was not to be applied to non-combatants and the general population. 
This became the legal precedent for additional penal laws after 1695. Besides banning the 
possession of firearms, there were additional measures to prevent access to military grade 
horses and attempts to limit Catholics from traveling to Europe or returning from abroad. The 
process by which a temporary wartime measure became an enduring body of legislation is a 
crucial one in answering our initial question of how the gun served as a symbol of legitimate 
political rule as well as providing security from both an invasion from outside Ireland or a 
domestic uprising. For the historian Charles Ivar McGrath, the penal laws represented ‘the 
logical, formulated conclusion to an amalgam of Irish Protestant attitudes toward Catholics’.68  
One early component of this body of legislation was an act entitled ‘An act for the better 
securing of the government by disarming Papists’. This marked the crucial point where the 
temporary disarming of the Catholic population was made into a permanent statute and a policy 
of the state.69 From 1695 onward, there was increasing clamour for additional penal legislation 
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targeting the Catholic population.70 This initial legislation was further enhanced during the War 
of Spanish Succession in the early years of the eighteenth century. However, the Franco-
Jacobite threat was put on hold in 1713, when France recognised the Protestant succession in 
Britain following the Treaty of Utrecht. The Anglo-French alliance of 1716-31 alleviated the 
threat of an invasion of Ireland from imperial concern, at least temporarily.71 Catholics became 
less of an existential threat to the Hanoverian regime at the very time that territorial expansion 
made Ireland’s population a pool of potential manpower. Shifting imperial alliances meant 
Catholics with firearms were not an immediate existential threat to the British state as the threat 
of invasion lessened. The changing priorities of the British state were not always mirrored in 
Ireland itself. Catholics gaining access to firearms remained an existential threat to local 
Protestants and the restrictions on Catholics having possession of firearms were heavily 
enforced. As the eighteenth century progressed an increasingly multicultural and multi-faith 
Empire drifted from the shared political compact imagined by the Protestant settlers in Ireland 
to have been earned through their contribution to the victory over King James. But these were 
gradual trends taking place over the entirety of the eighteenth century. 
One legacy of the treaty of Limerick that was particularly grating for Anglo-Irish elites in the 
immediate aftermath were the treaty clauses that allowed for a small number of Catholics to 
wear a sword, keep a brace of pistols, and own a gun for defence of property or hunting.72 Any 
Catholic with access to a gun undermined the Protestant monopoly of the right to bear arms. 
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The penal laws that restricted Catholics from gaining access to firearms were a direct result of 
the treaty of Limerick, yet the treaty also enabled Catholics who had surrendered during the 
war to continue to bear arms.  
The legislative proscription of firearms from possession by Catholics was further eroded by 
the presence until the third decade of the eighteenth century of armed Catholic bandits and 
irregulars in the mountainous interior and in western Ireland where the authority of the state 
was weakest. Historians differ as to whether these should be seen as a remnant force of Jacobite 
sympathisers or as the late survival of banditry. S.J. Connolly described the origins of those 
involved in the unrest as being the ‘tough and the desperate’.73 A contemporary described those 
‘infesting’ south Ulster and southwest Munster as being made up of ‘deserters from the army, 
some rogues who came back from the county from beyond the sea in privateers, with the loose 
idle fellows of the county.’74 In terms of being a violation of the sacrosanct principle of a 
monopoly of firearms by the Protestant population, it did not really matter. To be declared tory, 
a robber, or a rapparee they had to be ‘out in arms’.75 
Catholics under arms were a threat, regardless of whether it was political affiliation or social 
maladjustment that motivated them to illegally possess and use firearms.  The real threat was 
that by taking up arms they revealed the weakness of the Protestant powerbase, and just how 
gossamer the ability of the state to govern in Ireland was in practice if Catholics resisted.76 In 
the next section, we examine the creation of an enduring legal framework to disarm Catholics 
in the aftermath of the Williamite wars. 
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This section of the chapter examines the body of legislation designed to prevent Catholics from 
acquiring firearms, and of the tightening of legislation when those measures and their 
enforcement were deemed to be being subverted or ignored. Not all of the measures I examine 
below were made into law, but the sheer volume provides evidence of a feeling of profound 
insecurity on the part of Protestant Ireland. This persistent fear of an insurrection of the Catholic 
population, despite notions of the peasantry as being only fit to ‘hew wood and draw water’ 
shows the schizophrenic confidence and insecurity that characterised Protestant Ascendancy. 
As S.J. Connolly has so well explained, Irish Catholics openly displayed Jacobite symbols, 
exalted in the news of English defeat in battle, and gave assistance to French privateers in 
coastal areas.77 This may in part have been based on the experiences of the small scale conflict 
behind the main lines. The wartime experience of Protestant irregulars of a Catholic populace 
that appeared to be ‘the poorest humblest Slaves in the World’ but who had also been capable 
of hiding arms until those tasked with finding them were ‘weary to find one Gun’ was a lesson 
to be remembered, and may serve to explain the pervasive distrust of the Catholic population 
as being truly disarmed.78 
Distrust, unlike firearms, fodder, and finance, had never been a scarce commodity in Ireland. 
Following the securing of the peace after the Williamite war, the successive governments of 
William III, Queen Anne, and the Hanoverians distrusted the ambitions of the Anglo-Irish elites 
for a greater degree of self-government. The Anglo-Irish ascendancy distrusted the Catholic-
Irish majority and increasingly feared the growing influence of the Irish Presbyterian 
community. The Anglo-Irish experienced exacerbation at the inability of the English to tell the 
difference between themselves and the rest of the Irish as the century progressed.  
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The permanent garrisoning of Ireland highlighted the fact that Ireland was seen by the 
government in England as a reserve of soldiers to be used in other theatres. The creation of the 
Irish establishment, initially of 12,000 soldiers, and later increased to 15,000, represented the 
largest expenditure of Irish finances during the entire period. Throughout the eighteenth 
century, local elites were not made to feel particularly well protected when war broke out and 
local regiments were sent off to other theatres or quartered in centralized locations. Largely 
because this strategy left large sections of the country unprotected. The wartime experience of 
Irish Protestants had been in the countryside against Rapparees and Tories rather than set piece 
battles.  
The absence of an armed garrison did not necessarily result in panic, especially at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century as international attention shifted to continental European theatres and 
the threat of an invasion lessened. Nor were Anglo-Irish feelings of insecurity isolated from 
outside events. There was a range of differing opinions as to how much of a threat Irish 
Catholics represented to Protestant Ireland. As the passage below demonstrates, some 
Protestant elites felt assured of their Ascendancy following the victory secured in the 1690s. 
Richard Cox, writing to a member of government described the remaining Catholic population 
in less than glowing terms and mocked those who for their own purposes overstated the threat: 
Their first & [main] cunning is to represent the Irish as formidable tho[ugh] they 
really despise them, & know that their youth [and] gentry are destroyed in the 
rebellion, or gone to France. That those who are left are destitute of horses, arms 
[and] money, capacity and courage that 5 in 6 of the Irish are poore insignificant 
slaves.79 
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Cox then estimates a proportion of ‘two to one’ in regards to the Catholic population’s ratio to 
the Protestants, which would prove to be overly optimistic. But the idea that the remaining Irish 
were lacking in arms, horses and courage was clear enough. As the century progressed, further 
legislation was brought forward to secure the Protestant interest. By 1700, 27 per cent of the 
population were of English or Scottish descent and Catholic ownership of land fell from 90 per 
cent in 1600 to five per cent by the beginning of the eighteenth century. With the flight of the 
Earls in 1600 and of the Wild Geese by 1693, the Irish who were left behind in Ireland were 
effectively reduced to unarmed peasants. But, as Ian McBride has described, Catholic Ireland 
survived.80 I remind the reader that it is not the position of this work to see this survival in 
terms of a Jacobite survival, but rather to explain the threat that local armed Catholicism 
represented regardless of political affiliation.81 Catholics did not rise up in rebellion in support 
of either Jacobite landing in Scotland, a fact that has attracted several explanations from 
Historians. S.J. Connolly has identified a growing self-awareness of Anglo-Irish strength on 
the part of Protestant Ireland, and the lack of either the resources or the leadership within the 
Irish Catholic community to rebel in support of invasions from a Catholic European power.82 
However, one issue Connolly does not fully address within his argument for Anglo-Irish 
strength was the continuing attempts, even outside moments of crisis, to strengthen the law 
disarming Catholics.83  
The reinforcement of penal legislation was an attempt to keep Irish Catholics from ever 
regaining access to military grade horses, firearms or enough property to be a real threat. The 
                                                          
80 McBride, Eighteenth Century Ireland pp. 215-246. 
81 This is largely as a result of the ambiguity of current scholarship regarding the political motivation of the 
majority of Irish Catholics. Even Irish soldiers serving abroad could have multiple motives, see Connolly, 
Religion, Law and Power, pp. 238-9, 243-4 for examples. That a Gaelic speaking elite supported a Stuart 
restoration is less ambiguous, as Maureen Wall’s The Penal laws 1691-1760: Church and State from the Treaty 
of Limerick to the accession of George III (W. Tempest; Dundalk, 1967), p. 19 demonstrated over forty years ago. 
82 Connolly, Religion, Law and Power, p. 241. 
83 Connolly, Religion, Law and Power, p. 291 briefly mentions the failed reform of penal legislation surrounding 




penal laws can be in part understood as a body of legislation that was intended to serve as a 
coercive measure to promote conversion. However, the penal laws must primarily be seen, 
especially in regards to the statutes regarding firearms, as an attempt to ensure that the Catholic 
population remained powerless. The survival of any armed Catholics was an affront to notions 
of an Anglo-Irish Ascendancy. 
The 98 years between the passages of ‘An act for the better securing the government by 
disarming Papists’ in 1695 and the 1793 ‘Militia Act’ that rearmed Catholic Ireland provide a 
means of understanding how the gun became such a large component of the ascendency 
identity. The arrival of the Lord Deputy Sir Henry Capel into Ireland in 1695 facilitated the 
passage of a number of Irish laws. The passage of ‘An Act for the better securing the 
government by disarming Papists’ made it a crime for Catholics to possess firearms or keep a 
military grade horse. William III c. 5 set out the legal framework for the prevention of Catholics 
from having firearms in their possession, as well as preventing Catholics who would be 
apprenticed in trades where they could learn how to craft weapons. Magistrates, chief Justices 
and other authorities of the state would be permitted to search for arms and in the event of 
being unable to find them, to place the suspect under oath to reveal concealed arms caches. 
Catholics with licenses from the Treaty of Limerick were except from the legislation.  
The first clause is quoted in full below. 
All Papists within this kingdom of Ireland shall before the 1st day of March, 1696, 
deliver up to some justice of the peace or corporation officer where such papist 




the same heretofore granted. And such arms shall be preserved for the use of his 
Majesty.84 
The prohibition of firearms ownership that had been intended to affect only Catholics could 
inadvertently restrict other confessional groups. In 1695, there was a failed attempt to amend 
the ‘disarming Papists’ act to remove a clause that by its wording also prevented Quakers from 
having firearms.85 The disarming act also required sacrificing privacy and sanctioning a degree 
of state tyranny. Earlier protests in 1692 had been careful to make sure that the seizure of 
firearms from Catholics was not used to plunder innocent people. In May of 1692, news of a 
potential French invasion of Ireland led to the confiscation of arms in Catholic hands. 
Instructions were given not to ‘commit any insolency or violence to any of [the Catholics], nor 
make use of this service as a colour for plundering or otherwise injuring any of them, that it 
may not reproach to use that under a specious pretence we break our faith and violate the king's 
word and honour’86 These niceties had vanished by 1695 when arguments about the need to be 
vigilant against the threat armed Catholics had overtaken fears of breaking faith.87  
Attempts to disarm the Catholic majority took place alongside legislation attempting to prevent 
profane cursing and swearing. There were also legislative efforts aimed at the suppression of 
the still active Tories, bandits and rapparrees.88 Dealing with the insecurity and outrages of 
bandits and rebels that infested the remote and isolated areas of Ireland was an on-going process 
                                                          
84 7 Will. III c. 5. ‘For the better securing of the Kingdom by disarming Papists’, The State of Ireland, The statutes 
at large, passed in the Parliaments held in Ireland: from the third year of Edward the Second, A.D. 1310, to the 
first year of George the Third, A.D. 1761 inclusive. With marginal notes, and a compleat index to the whole. 8 
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85 ‘For explaining certain general words in a former act entitled an act for the better securing of the government 
by disarming Papists, that the same do not extend to certain persons commonly called Quakers.’ 1695 session. 
Record destroyed in 1922. 
86 Lord Justices to Nottingham, 14 May 1692 CSPD 1695, pp. 186-187. 
87 Connolly, Divided Kingdom, p. 204. 
88 7 Will. III c.9 ‘An Act to better prevent profane cursing and swearing’. Ireland, The Statutes, Vol. 3 p. 279. , 7 
Will. III c.21 ‘For the better suppressing of  Tories , robbers and rapparees, and for preventing robberies, burglaries 




that continued into the eighteenth century. These Tories, bandits and Rapparrees were largely 
confined to South Ulster, parts of western Connaught and southwest Munster.89 The 
pacification of these areas was still underway into the 1720s. Protestant settlers were at the 
forefront in the extension of law and order to these areas. 90 
Concerns about swearing faded while legislation defining and penalizing robbery and outrages 
were further amended in 1697 and 1703.91 The two years between 1695 and 1697 saw five bills 
regarding property or the conversion of Catholics put forward despite the repeated failure to 
have them passed into law. These laws were in part an attempt to perpetuate the ascendancy of 
the Protestant faith in Ireland. In 1704 the passage of ‘to prevent the further growth of Popery’ 
brought in new statutes covering land ownership, religion, education and employment. It also 
marked the inclusion of the Sacramental test that adversely affected Dissenters.92 Previous 
efforts in 1697 and 1698 had unsuccessfully put forward, but showed a degree of persistence 
in passage of the penal laws in the face of substantial Catholic opposition.   
A number of bills were put forward to strengthen the ‘disarming Papists’ act of 1695 during 
the same period.93 Despite failing to be ratified into law, Protestants showed dogged persistence 
in putting them forward. Other laws contained clauses that impacted Catholic assess to 
firearms. ‘An act for the Preservation of game’ passed in 1698 contained a clause that ‘no papist 
shall be employed as a fowler for any Protestant or under colour thereof keep fire arms, upon 
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roads and passages through the hills on their own initiative, and receiving title to the land as a result of their 
martial fortitude.   
91 9 Will. c. 9. ‘To supply the defects and for the better execution of an act passed in this present session of 
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continuing two acts against Tories , robbers and rapparees.’ Ireland, The Statutes, Vol. 4, p. 144. 
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penalty of seizure of said arms, which will become the property of the informer, even if the 
arms were in fact the property of some Protestant.’94 
 In 1707 ‘An act for explaining and amending an act, intituled an act for the better securing of 
the government by the disarming of Papists’ seems to have been seeking to expand the existing 
legislation.95 Advocating the expansion of the legal exclusion of Catholics from having 
firearms also occurred alongside attempts at further confiscations of property. The removal of 
a landed Catholic gentry was taking place at the same time as the disarming of the Catholic 
population.  In 1715 a bill entitled ‘To subject the estates real and personal of the Papists and 
non-jurors in this kingdom, to make full satisfaction for all losses and damages that Protestants 
shall suffer in case any insurrection, invasion or rebellion shall be fomented, carried on or 
sustained by the Papists and non-jurors of this kingdom’ was intended to deter any attempt at 
a rebellion in support of the Jacobites in Scotland through financial penalties.96  The Protestant 
militia was also to be subsidised through coercive payments levied onto the general Catholic 
population. Catholics were to pay double to subsidize the cost of a militia to prevent them from 
rising in insurrection.97  
Four attempts were made to strengthen the ‘disarming Papists’ act by 1739, alongside other 
penal laws affecting Catholic property rights, intermarriage between confessional groups, 
conversion and restricting the right to take up certain occupations. The failure to pass additional 
measures to prevent Catholics from having access to firearms suggest some degree of success 
by wealthy Catholics in lobbying to prevent further restrictions. In the case of the 1731 bill it 
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Papists’. 1707 session bill number 2072. Further details destroyed in 1922. 
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was due in part to successful Catholic lobbying in London. Privy Council notes reveal that Irish 
Catholics had sent representatives to London to directly make their case against further 
restrictions. The Privy Council heard the protest of an Earl, a Lord Viscount, and the protest of 
a further four gentlemen.98 But such resistance eventually collapsed despite the best efforts of 
the much-diminished Irish Catholic gentry, and in 1739 the ‘disarming Papists’ act was further 
expanded to close additional loopholes.99 Thirty years of lobbying led to a further strengthening 
of ‘disarming Papists’ to penalize Protestants holding arms for Catholics to circumvent the 
law.100  
The disarmament of a majority population on a confessional basis by a confessional minority 
did not have a parallel in Western Europe. The argument could be made that Catholics 
represented a propertied minority as compared to Protestants. Although this observation would 
be correct, it would miss the fact that any Catholic with a gun was a threat to Protestant 
Ascendancy, and not just a Catholic with substantial lands and a serviceable horse. The 
disarming of Irish Catholics secured the removal of a landed elite from a conquered territory. 
Other attempts at a systematic disarming of a subject population were always majorities against 
minorities. In France the Huguenots were a minority compared to the French Catholic 
population, as were the Moriscos of Spain. The restrictions on Gypsies and Jews having 
firearms were also cases of the majority disarming a minority community.  
                                                          
98 ‘Humble petition of Theobald, earl of Carlingford, Thomas, earl of Westmeath, Edward, Lord Viscount 
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100 13 Geo II c. 6., ‘To explain, amend, and make more effectual an act passed in the 7th year of the reign of his 
late majesty King William III, of glorious memory, entitled, an act for the better securing the government by 




It is crucial to emphasize the seriousness with which these laws were enforced. Enforcement 
not only occurred during period of invasion scares, such as when Dublin Castle ordered the 
seizure of privately held stores of gunpowder and firearms from people suspected of supporting 
a Stuart claimant to the throne or dubious loyalty, but also in day to day life.101 Revenue 
officials and magistrates were tasked with maintaining the Protestant Ascendancy in their daily 
duties alongside bringing in the revenue and maintaining law and order. Their ability to do so 
could be compromised by association with Catholics, and they faced constant vigilance by both 
their superiors and their peers. Mr Ashe, a Gauger of the Althone district was dismissed for 
‘being marry’d to a papist’ as well as violent behaviour at the election of ‘parlimeant men’ and 
having ‘concealed arms belonging to Sir John Burke, a papist.’102 Edward Simpson was 
dismissed for a report that he had uttered ‘treasonous words’ in October 1717.103 Another man 
was dismissed for having made a toast in Irish.104 
Revenue officers were also responsible for processing the discoveries of Catholic owned 
properties. They were also called in to search the houses of former Catholic Gentry for 
contraband.105 The vigilance of the state was directed toward disenfranchised Jacobite 
Protestants and non-jurists as well as Catholics. To sustain such a process required vigilance 
and enforcement. This in turn relied on the willingness of magistrates to enforce them, and 
whether the local magistrate was of a choleric enough temperament. To encourage 
enforcement, fiscal rewards were given to informers. Encouragement towards the discovery of 
Catholics with arms was helped with the provision of a £10 reward to those who brought 
forward evidence. Crucially, the cost would be secured through a collective fining of Catholics 
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in the wider community.106 A similar element of collective reprisals was taken against 
communities suspected of harbouring Tories and Rapparees.  
Catholic inhabitants were therefore liable to collective punishment if any Catholic was found 
to be in possession of a gun. Catholics who volunteered information and turned in hidden 
firearms faced no penalty. This is a theme more fully explored in the next chapter of this work. 
The legacy for Catholics with licensed arms from the Treaty of Limerick faded through a 
conversion to the Church of Ireland to secure land rights, and the gradual death of those named 
by the Treaty of Limerick. Through a substantial legal framework and a policy of collective 
enforcement, Protestant Ireland had successfully disarmed the majority of the Catholic 
population and completed one pillar supporting an enduring Protestant Ascendancy. 
The first chapter of this work has chronologically presented the arrival of the gun into Ireland 
and the increasing importance of the weapon as a delineator of political power and legitimacy. 
It then gave an overview of the Williamite wars and argued for a less quiet and settled 
aftermath. The chapter has highlighted the role of disarming Catholics alongside the other 
restrictions on Catholic life in the codification of the penal laws in the closing years of the 
seventeenth century. It also introduces a general overview of confessional conflicts and early 
attempts at enforcing a state monopoly of the gun and provided a theoretical framework for 
understanding the importance of keeping Catholic Ireland disarmed. In the next chapter, we 
look at Catholics and the gun in the aftermath of the passage of the penal laws. 
 
 
                                                          






Chapter 2: Catholics and the Gun 
In this chapter, we look at some of the sources available for uncovering how firearms fit into 
the broader narrative of Catholic experience under the penal laws. The case is made that enough 
evidence exists to offer some significant commentary on the effectiveness of enforcement, and 
the persistence of Protestant fears of a resurgent and armed Catholic Ireland. I begin the chapter 
with an overview of current scholarship on penal laws and why the gun must be included in 
understanding their creation. I then examine the language of the penal laws regarding the 
bearing of arms as well as subsequent proclamations regarding their enforcement. This is 
followed by an examination of lists of licensed Catholics in 1703, 1704 and 1713 to uncover 
the survival of Catholics granted licenses to possess firearms, accompanied with an analysis of 
their geographic distribution and social rank. These lists are a reminder of the legacy of the 
Treaty of Limerick on the first decades of the eighteenth century.1  I then briefly provide 
examples of Catholics illegally holding arms during the period, and closely examine two 
specific incidents where Catholics carrying arms caused controversy to the established order.  
The penal laws are a favoured topic for Irish historians. The continuing discussion on what life 
was like for Irish Catholics living under confessionally based penal legislation has produced 
extensive analysis on the extent of enforcement and its impact on people’s lives.2 When Irish 
historians do talk about firearms, they usually mean those in the hands of either bandits or 
soldiers. Tories, Rapparees   and smugglers used guns while committing crimes or resisting 
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capture by the authorities. Men involved in military or militia service acted as state-sanctioned 
bearers of arms. However, our purpose here is to shed some light on the much larger segment 
of the population who were proscribed the possession of firearms on a confessional basis and 
did not fall into either of the abovementioned groups of criminals or soldiers. 
On one side of the debate, historians like L.M. Cullen and MacCarthy Mór see the penal laws 
as an intrusive and very real aspect of Catholic life regardless of social station. S.J Connolly 
presents a different perspective, arguing that the penal laws were designed primarily to act 
against Catholic landowners rather than Catholics in general, and thus did not have a real 
impact on the lives of the majority of the Catholic population. Others fall somewhere in 
between. There is also some work on what the penal laws meant for Protestant Ireland, largely 
from a theological standpoint.3 Most recently, a collaborative volume has been published that 
combines perspectives on both Catholics and Protestants.4  
It is surprising, then, that discussion of firearms is absent from the existing historiography on 
the penal laws. This lack of engagement is especially glaring given what the implications of 
Catholics under arms meant for Protestant Ireland’s ability to enforce the other aspects of the 
legislation. It may be because of what kind of argument one wants to make about Ireland in the 
eighteenth century, or perhaps due to the larger amounts of surviving sources on other aspects 
of penal legislation. It may also be what questions people are asking about the Irish past.  
Records of financial transactions generated by leases appeal to economic historians and those 
seeking to enter the debate of Ireland as a kingdom or colony. Debates about enforcement of 
the penal laws have also been stymied by the incineration of a large number of judiciary records 
as a result of the destruction at the Four Courts in 1922 which could potentially have served as 
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statistical evidence towards prosecution of a range of crimes, forcing a reliance on       
nineteenth -century historians like W.P Burke.  
This deficiency of evidence can be in part rectified through the use of the Cust1 record series 
at the National Archives at Kew. The Record series itself consists of 460 volumes covering the 
period of 1696-1830, though with substantial gaps in the first 13 volumes. The minutes are 
complemented by 12 volumes of CUST 112. Cust1 consists of entry books with an average of 
200 folio pages that provide summaries of the incoming correspondences to the revenue board, 
the date the letter was sent and a summary of the letter contents, as well as instructions to be 
sent outward to individual officers. The years 1703-13 remain missing at transfer from the 
former London Customs House and Museum. I primarily used the record books from 1691-
1765. The documents reveal a less settled and more violent world than the scholarly consensus 
seems to indicate.5 Obviously, the Revenue officers’ priorities were not to prove or disprove 
the debates of twenty first century historians; however the source can help recreate day-to-day 
life unfolding through letters from all corners of the kingdom, as well as giving the perspectives 
of those who were the front line functionaries of eighteenth-century state-building. This is an 
underused resource, and given a diligent reading of the materials and a full awareness that the 
priorities of the authors of the letters was the revenue, the material still provides a window into 
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day-to-day life on a large scale both chronologically and geographically, and has therefore been 
used throughout this work.6  
i 
Protestant Ireland secured a long held objective with the passage into law of an act entitled ‘For 
the better securing of the government by disarming of Papists’ (1695).7 The bill was approved 
on 26 June, amended a few weeks later, and gained William III's royal assent on 7 September. 
The objective of disarming the Catholic population was to secure not only the government, but 
also the security of a rattled settler community. The following section begins with a close 
reading of 7 William III, as well as related legislation to uncover something of what the 
legislators envisioned as the intent of the law, and how they amended its stipulations. 
The Irish Privy Council with the backing of the resident viceroy secured a legal proscription 
barring Catholics from having access to firearms or other weapons. The law further banned the 
possession of military grade horses and went so far as to ban employment in trades that would 
train a Catholic in the skill to create offensive weapons, such as gunsmithing. Catholics had 
until March 1696 to ‘deliver any arms to a justice of the peace.’ Suspects were required under 
oath to reveal concealed arms. This was ‘notwithstanding any license for keeping the same 
heretofore granted.’8 The licenses in question were those Catholics granted to individuals 
named in the Articles of the Treaty of Limerick in 1691. We examine these individuals in depth 
in the next section. Justices, magistrates, petty officers and majors were empowered to seize 
the arms to be ‘preserved for the use of his Majesty.’9 These powers of seizure were not 
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absolute however, as the second clause specified that searches must take place ‘between sunrise 
and sunset’.10 Nocturnal searches were allowed to take place in market towns and suburbs.  
The penalty outside of seizure of the arms was the levying of a substantial fine. The fine itself 
varied according to rank. Peers faced a £100 fine for the first offense, in the event of a second 
offence the individual would ‘suffer praemunire’.11 This was the punishment of suffering the 
removal from the King’s protection of the delinquent, forfeiture of all goods and property, and 
indefinite imprisonment.12 In terms of severity, praemunire was a punishment second only to 
those guilty of treason.13 It also removed the person from all access to the courts regardless of 
the offense against him. Those of a lower social station faced a fine of £30 and imprisonment 
for a year, and like their social betters, also faced praemunire if they were charged a second 
time.  
The importance of the law was clearly demonstrated with the care taken to make sure there 
were incentives for its enforcement. Informers who turned in Catholics who had guns would 
split the fine with the state. Attention was given in sections 8 and 9 towards the prevention of 
Catholics becoming apprentices of those making ‘fire-arms, swords, knives, or other 
weapons’.14 Enforcement relied in part on a penalty of £20 levied on the Protestant employer, 
once more to be split between the informer and the government. Section 9 also ended any 
existing apprenticeships of individuals that refused to take oaths of allegiance and aberrance as 
well as a declaration against transubstantiation. Failure to do so would result in both the 
apprentice and the master being prosecuted. Those who were publically known to be 
Protestants were excluded from this provision. Section 10 through 12 covered the issue of 
military grade horses. In terms of punishments, horses were considered less of a threat than 
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firearms. Rather than outright seizure, a Catholic with a horse worth over £5 could on demand 
be forced to sell it at a fixed price of £5 and 5 shillings. The impracticality of policing horse-
rearing led to the act being amended in 1709 to allow Catholics to keep stallions and stud-
mares for breeding. However, the horses were liable to be seized if an invasion or ‘intestine 
war’ seemed likely. Furthermore, the horse’s owner was responsible for paying six pence per 
night that the horse was in custody.15 
A provision to ensure magistrates were active in the enforcement of the law was secured in 
section 13. The inclusion of such a clause implied that coercive measurers were deemed 
necessary for the enforcement of a penal law. Magistrates would contended with a fine of £50 
for each instance that they did not act on information of a Catholic reported to have a gun, once 
more split between the informer and the government. The magistrate was also barred from 
serving as a justice of the peace, or continuing as a magistrate. How often this was actually 
enforced is an issue that has faced some debate. Ireland faced a shortage of willing and able 
candidates for office in the magistracy. As Neal Garnham has demonstrated, the enforcement 
of the law often fell on less than ideal individuals, partly as a result of the onerous and 
dangerous nature of the magistrate’s occupation, but also because of a shortage of Protestants 
of the right social station to fill the office.16  
There were other representatives of the Irish state that were also enforcing elements of the 
penal laws. The Revenue minutes record concerns of a range of issues, primarily attempts to 
secure the revenue and prevent the corruption of its officers. There is also enforcement of the 
full range of penal laws against Catholics, with one of the first letters reporting a priest in 
Youghal with vestments being arrested, and Popish books seized after being found hidden in a 
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cargo hold.17 The Revenue board was also vigilant in making sure all the officers were qualified 
as Protestants and were able to provide documentation to prove it.18 On occasion, letters were 
sent to the board voicing concerns over Revenue officers’ religious leanings, as was the case 
when Richard Ireland was reported anonymously as having been abusive to others in the 
community as well as suspicions that he was married to ‘a Papist wife who had not conformed 
in a year and a day, and that Ireland is a new or late convert.’19  
As mentioned earlier in this work, a Mr Ashe, Gauger of the Althone district, was dismissed 
for ‘being marry’d to a papist, violent in his behaviour at the election of parlimeant men, & had 
concealed arms belonging to Sir John Burke, a papist.’20 Other letters reveal discoveries of 
Catholic owned properties, and raids on the house of former Catholic Gentry to recover 
smuggled silver in the house of the Countess of Castlehaven, as well as various reports of 
treasonable oaths or toasts made in Irish.21 In the carrying out of their duties Revenue officers 
could be being assaulted. A coast officer named John Halper  successfully claimed £12  
compensation after ‘having his arm broke, his horse killed, his sword and pistols broken and 
taken away by some unknown Persons in April last as he was in execution of his office, & 
endeavouring to prevent ye said Shipping of Wool to foreign parts.’22 Being a Revenue officer 
was obviously a dangerous profession, whether preventing smuggling or detecting Catholics 
infiltrating the offices of the state. 
At late as 1720 the revenue board received letters asking for clarification as to whether having 
a ‘popish’ wife is enough to disqualify being an officer of the revenue. A letter from the 
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following year reporting on the dismissal of a boatmen  for ‘having a popish wife’ shows that 
this was in fact enough to remove one from the revenue service.23 Fears that the revenue was 
being infiltrated by people of suspect individuals foreshadows a discussion on suspect 
communities in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, there were a number of attempts to 
strengthen the penalties and scope of the proscription of firearms, with failed bills brought 
forward in 1707 and 1731 as well as fears that enforcement was not taking place.24 It a letter to 
the Duke of Newcastle the Lord Primate Hugh Boulter explained that the reason for putting the 
1731 bill forward was the vagueness of the original act. He described how a man in Galway 
had been acquitted at the assizes despite being a known Catholic and clearly having firearms 
in violation of the act because ‘Papists everywhere [argued] that the said act only concerned 
papists then living, and the arms they had in their possession at the time the act was passed.’25 
Boulter also added that the government needed the power to revoke licenses for arms. He feared 
that Catholics would prevent the passage by exerting influence on the committee in London. 
Although the bill failed, attempts at strengthening the act culminated with further proscriptions 
and suggestions for harsher penalties which were debated over the winter of 1739. Royal assent 
was given in the spring of 1740, with the passage into law of 13 George II c. 6. It is interesting 
to note that modifications were specifically directed towards forcing magistrates to ‘make 
yearly searches’26 for firearms in the possession of Catholics. It should be recognized that this 
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was during wartime and this may have encouraged renewed vigilance. Additional clarifications 
required that ‘Papists deliver up all arms, armour, and ammunition which is in their possession 
and power’.27 Another section, demonstrating either optimism or desperation on the part of the 
drafter, required Catholics to deliver up any firearms that came into their possession to local 
authorities within fourteen days. The penalty for those not surrendering firearms was increased 
dramatically. Peers faced a fine of £300, non-peers £50. Following the previous discussed 
practice of remunerating those willing to provide information, this was to be split between the 
informer and the government.28 Although Catholics who voluntarily delivered arms were not 
penalized, those who were unable or unwilling to pay caused the £10 to be levied from the 
local Catholic population and then paid directly to the informer. This collective punishment 
shows that with the possession of firearms, enforcement went beyond selected targeting of 
individual offenders, and instead involved the entire confessional community.29 This can be 
compared to similar laws regarding collective punishment of communities harbouring Tories 
and Rapparees, as well as the coercive payments taken from Catholics to subsidize the 
Protestant militia. What this demonstrates is a willingness to directly target the Catholic 
community as a whole, rather than individual members of that community. 
Attempts to control firearms were not limited to drafting penal legislation specifically about 
firearms. The next section examines other bills that created further barriers towards Catholics 
getting access to firearms. Briefly mentioned in the last chapter, in 1698, an additional 
proscription against Catholics under arms was included in a piece of legislation entitled ‘An 
act for the preservation of the Game’. The bill also gives evidence of the strategies that 
Catholics used that allowed them to maintain possession or access to firearms. Section 4 of the 
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act specifically prohibited the employment of a Catholic ‘as a fowler for any Protestant or under 
colour thereof keeps fire arms.’30 The firearms that were seized would be given to the informant 
‘even if the arms were in fact the property of some Protestant’.31  
In a little over three years, a law passed to disarm Catholics had been reinterpreted to allow for 
the disarming of Protestants in their service. Forty years later, the 1739 Disarming Act also 
addressed suspect Protestants with firearms, adding a clause stipulating that ‘any Protestant 
servant, by the direction or privity of his master, being a Papist, [who] shall carry or keep arms, 
both master and servant shall be subject to the same penalties inflicted by this act.’32  
It was increasingly clear that a Protestant right to the gun was not sacrosanct. Who was counted 
as a Protestant was further reduced in a later clause, with anyone professing the Protestant faith 
that had educated a child under the age of fourteen ‘in the Popish religion’ considered to be 
Catholic under the law regarding firearms. The laws that were intended to disarm Catholic 
Ireland were increasingly being used to define who was a Protestant. One of the litmus tests 
for true Protestant status was whether an individual could be trusted with firearms. Despite a 
large amount of research into the penal laws, Irish historians have not engaged with the 
prohibition of firearms after 1695. In failing to do so, they have missed an important aspect of 
how Protestant Ascendancy defined itself.33 In examining the continual process of 
reinforcement and subsequent revision to enhance the proscription of firearms, we can 
understand one of the major policies of the state of Ireland. 
                                                          
30 10 Will. II c. 8. Ireland, The statutes, Vol. 3, p. 487. 
31 10 Will. II c. 8. Ireland, The statutes, Vol. 3, p. 487. 
32 13 Geo. II c. 6 section 14. Ireland, An act for the better securing the government by disarming Papists, p. 76 
33 John Bergin et al. ‘New Perspectives on the Penal Laws’ a special issue that is the most up to date coverage of 
the topic. The survival of religious practice, economic activity and strategies of wealth maintenance between 




Legislators also clearly thought that the Catholic population should facilitate the arming of 
Protestant Ireland. This was largely by using the majority Catholics as a source of funding for 
the Protestant militia. ‘An Act to Make the Militia in this Kingdom more useful’ of 1715 used 
the past rebellion and majority status of the Catholic inhabitants of Ireland to justify that 
‘Papists should pay double the sum paid by Protestants for the support of the militia.’34 
Furthermore, sections 11 and 12 of the act required Catholics to provide horses to the militia. 
Those Catholics who refused to provide the mounts were to be fined £10. Additionally, if the 
Catholic was found to have hidden arms he would also be liable to a £10 fine. This was to be 
split between the informer and the militia, and was a separate offense to the earlier laws 
examined in this chapter. Section 16 required the substitution of a Protestant to serve in the 
place of a Catholic head of household, meaning he would have to pay a Protestant to take his 
place in the militia. Catholics were to be further charged 20 shillings for each troop of militia 
per day, to be divided equally on the catchment area.35 At the same point that Catholics were 
being disarmed, they faced collective levies that were used to subsidize the arming of their 
former Protestant enemies. 
For nearly a century Ireland was the site of a concerted effort to keep the majority of the 
Catholic population disarmed. It was enforced through a complex legal apparatus of incentives 
for informers, penalties against the entire confessional community, and corrective penalties to 
encourage magistrates who were unwilling or unable to enforce the law. As the eighteenth 
century progressed, the laws against Catholics with possession of arms were strengthened, as 
were penalties for Protestants who gave Catholics firearms. Irish Catholics attempted or were 
suspected of trying to keep firearms through a variety of means, and some of these were more 
successful than others. In the next section, I will examine the survival of Catholics in Ireland 
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legally allowed to bear firearms, and the threat it posed to conceptions of Protestant 
Ascendancy. 
ii 
We have previously introduced the Treaty of Limerick which ended the war in Ireland. An 
understudied aspect of this treaty, found in the contents of clauses 2, 3 and 7, are the stipulations 
over gun ownership. These three clauses applied to a small number of officers and elites and 
allowed them to wear a brace of pistols, a sword and possess a single firelock or rifle. 
Intriguingly, these three sections were honoured at the same time that the civil clauses 
regarding the general Catholic population were ignored.36 As mentioned earlier, laws disarming 
the Catholic population had specifically exempted those covered under the Articles of the treaty 
of Limerick. It is the historian’s good fortune that lists of those individuals have survived. 
Surprisingly, this source has not been fully utilized by Irish historians.  In the section below, I 
examine these sources to reconstruct who these people were, where they lived, and what the 
implications of the toleration of armed Catholics were for Protestant Ireland’s conception of 
itself. The source also provides some understanding of how Irish Catholic elites interacted with 
the gun. While there has been a substantial amount of work on the ‘Wild Geese’ who left for 
service in foreign militaries, little has been written on those that stayed in Ireland.37 The printed 
lists provide a valuable tool for uncovering evidence of the survival of an armed Catholic 
Ireland in the first two decades of the eighteenth century.  
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I will first detail the two sources by looking at where those with exceptions from the Treaty of 
Limerick lived, what rank in society they held, and will then suggest what further work on the 
list could reveal. It concludes with a brief discussion how the next generation reacted 
witnessing the withering of legally sanctioned Catholic arms bearing. The lists of Catholics 
licensed to carry arms are interesting in their own right as a record of a surviving Catholic 
gentry. Moreover, the careful creation and tracking of Catholics who were allowed to carry 
firearms in the beginning of the eighteenth century shows it was a priority for the Irish state. 
One of the reasons for such an interest was the difficulty of identifying which Catholics were 
allowed arms in a time when establishing exact identity could be difficult, and when 
magistrates were troubled by the problem of counterfeit licenses. 
Potential difficulties in establishing who was actually allowed a license to own firearms were 
quickly identified. In 1704 a proclamation was issued which listed some of the problems caused 
by the existence of the licenses. The proclamation declared that ‘several persons not qualified 
by the Laws to carry Arms, have nevertheless in Contempt and Violation of the Laws, [had] 
taken them to ride and go armed.’38 Those individuals had also ‘wholly falsified and 
counterfeited licenses’. In another detail of the creativity of Catholics evading some of the 
provisions of the penal code, others had ‘razed and altered licenses duly grated’ or ‘inserted 
other Christian names than those which were in the licenses.’39 Catholics were circumventing 
the penal laws regarding firearms by a variety of methods, including forgery and counterfeiting.  
Magistrates who had to enforce the proscriptions were being presented with false licenses and 
had no means to check if they were valid. The state response was to recall all existing licenses 
until the problems could be resolved. New licenses were issued and a published list of all 
                                                          
38 ‘Irish Catholics Licensed to Keep Arms (1704)’Archivium Hibernicum, Vol. 4 (1915): 64. 




Catholics licensed to have firearms was printed to help prevent abuse. The list was updated in 
1713.  
Figure I.         Figure II.40 
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These documents are invaluable in providing a means of uncovering where Catholics legally 
sanctioned to keep firearms lived.41 The lists provide the name of the licensee, the place of 
residence, and an enumeration of the arms in their possession. The 112 Catholics on the list in 
1704 were not evenly distributed throughout Ireland. 71 lived in Leister, twenty in Munster, 
twelve in Connaught, and only three were to be found in the entirety of Ulster.  Nine years later 
the general distribution was relatively unchanged.  
Figure III.      Figure IV. 
 
                                                          




The number of individuals listed had increased to 133, of which the majority continued to live 
in Leinster, with twenty five of the license holders residing in Dublin itself and eleven living 
outside Ireland. What this tells us is that Catholics licensed to carry firearms were most likely 
to live in Leinster or Cork, and that the highest concentration of Catholics legally allowed to 
possess firearms was in Dublin, which is not in itself unexpected given this would be the most 
logical location to advocate their position. Ulster was home to only three. What is surprising is 
where they absent from. Connaught, a stronghold of Catholic land ownership, had only twelve 
of those licensed to bear arms.42 Catholics using guns illegally were more likely to be located 
in the areas where the fewest legally sanctioned Catholics under arms resided, a point discussed 
later in the chapter. 
Given that licenses were granted under a provision of the Treaty of Limerick, it is not surprising 
to find many individuals of military rank. There were eight Captains, seventeen Colonels, 
twelve Lieutenant Colonels and five Majors. In terms of titled gentry, the 1704 list contains 
one Earl, one Lord Baron, two Lords, three Lord Viscounts, and three baronets. By 1713, the 
list of licenced Catholics with firearms had grown to include a Cornet and a Countess. In all, 
42 percent of the 1704 licences had either a title or military rank. In 1713 the percentage had 
grown to nearly seventy percent. Those with a military rank or title are nearly identical to the 
1704 list. Some of the individuals on the list are noted as commonly being known as ‘Lord’, 
despite having been stripped of the title. This provides additional evidence of Catholic elites 
maintaining social distinction after losing the lands associated with it. Surnames show an 
uneven distribution by family name, with several surnames having a disproportional 
representation. In the 1704 list there were five Butlers, three Nettlevilles, five Nugents and 3 
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Geoghegans. These corresponded to prominent landholders in pre-Williamite Ireland, and 
match the social standing and military rank already discussed. The 1713 list maintains this 
pattern.  
The list also details what firearms the Catholics actually had. Under the wording of the law, 
those with licenses to bear arms were granted the right to have a brace of pistols, to wear a 
sword, and have a rifle for hunting or home security. However, not every individual had all 
three weapons. In 1704, 110 people had a sword, while only 91 kept a brace of pistols, with 92 
of those allowed possessing a hunting rifle. By 1713, of the 133 listed all possessed at least a 
sword. The number of individuals claiming a brace of pistols rose to 123, with 121 reporting 
possession of a gun. What this shows is that over time the number of Catholics taking advantage 
of their right to bear arms increased. This could have been as a means of marking social status.  
In summary, the lists demonstrate that of the very small minority of those Catholics in Ireland 
allowed to wield firearms legally most were likely to be from a small number of elite families, 
have a military rank or landed title, and live in or around Dublin. Somewhat surprisingly the 
least likely place to find Catholics with legally licensed firearms corresponded to the locations 
where the most Catholics were wielding firearms illegally in the smuggler-and-rapparee 
infested wilds of Connaught or in the Ulster borderlands. A potential line of argument is that 
Catholics in areas where authority to enforce the law was less muscular were able to openly 
bear arms regardless of existing statutes. In Dublin, the capacity of the state to enforce its laws 
was much stronger, and therefore having proper credentials might have been more necessary. 
Catholics who were armed appearing in such high numbers in Dublin can be reasonably 
explained by considering why they would be there. Dublin was a focus point where they could 





The lists themselves were produced to prevent the use of forged documents that Catholics were 
using to circumvent the law in the early years of the eighteenth century, and it seems to have 
been an adequate enough solution. Further work could be done with these list to try and map 
where the property of the men was located, and see where in Dublin the majority of these 
licensed Catholics lived. Having explored the legacy of legal Catholic firearm ownership, the 
next section looks at examples of Catholics who possessed firearms illegally.  
iii. 
In the final section of this chapter, we dissect example cases to see how the legislation we have 
examined was actually applied. We have discussed the survival of a small number of legally 
armed Catholics; we next examine those using firearms outside the law, and the problem of 
enforcement from the 1720s to the 1760s. After we examine a number of incidents, the chapter 
focuses on two specific cases. The two chosen cases bookend the period of this work. The first 
takes place in the 1730s and the other in the 1760s. This is to provide some detail on two 
different generations of Catholic experiences with the gun. The differences in how these 
incidents were resolved also shows how widely the law could be interpreted, and how the threat 
of a Catholic with a gun changed between the 1730s and 1770s. 
To determine if Catholics had firearms illegally I have used the minutes of the Irish Revenue 
Commissioners to provide a brief overview of the type of incidents that occurred. They show 
that Catholics had access to the gun in areas with the weakest amount of governance, a position 
initially proposed in the section of legal Catholic possession of firearms. 
 The issue of the authorities’ ability to enforce the law against Catholics with firearms was 
more difficult in areas where officials were seen as outsiders. The attempted shooting of 
witnesses reporting on Jacobite recruiters, audacious daylight rescues of prisoners from gaols, 




litter the sources of the period. The gun was intimately involved in these kinds of interactions. 
The spectacle of violation of the body of the informer or officer of the state could be especially 
brutal. The minutes of the Irish Revenue commissioners detail numerous incidents that 
illustrates the danger facing those tasked with enforcing the law in areas with weak state 
legitimacy. 
Sometimes this could be threatening language, as was the case in the spring of 1724 when a 
Revenue officer was threatened with being shot like a dog by a tobacco smuggler.43 Six men 
armed with firelocks threatened another Collector named Jeremiah Symes. They emphasized 
the danger to his person if he reported on them, tied the man up and left him in an abandoned 
house.44  Informers faced repercussions that went beyond verbal threats. In the middle of the 
summer of 1724, John Carr enclosed an account of a gruesome incident alongside the official 
memorandum he mailed as a collector in Loughrea, Co. Galway. A letter dated the 22 March 
reported that about twenty eight people were convicted for privately selling ale. The 
convictions were all from the information given by a local man, and all those involved were 
inhabitants of the town of Loughrea. On the night of 17 March, 1723 the man who had so 
actively informed on his neighbours had ‘a fork thrust through his tongue, and half of it cut 
out.’ The man’s name was given as William Dunnagon, a local man from Dungree, Galway. 
His profession was given as a weaver. The Revenue board was very clear that the ‘barbarous 
maiming’ should be punished with ‘ye utmost rigour.’45  
When William Dunnagon was rumoured to have given testimony about what had happened, 
the locals who had administered their own brand of justice returned.46 A letter sent a few days 
later from the collector of Loughrea included two sheets of examinations describing how 
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‘unknown persons of ye number of about 12 forcibly took William Dunnagon from his house 
to a wood near that place’ and ‘cut out his tongue from ye root, putting out his eyes & cut off 
one of his ears.’ The reason was directly related to ‘discovering and convicting a number of 
private brewers.’47 The severely maimed informer’s chances of receiving justice was worsened 
when two Justices of the Peace explained that despite having warrants enclosed against several 
of those thought to be involved in the assault and maiming of William Dunnagon ‘the 
inhabitants of Loughrea are too much inclin’d to favour ye villains & shelter them instead of 
assisting to take them: that without the assistance of ye military power it wil nt be possible to 
take or have them conveyed to ye county gaol.’ They further explained both the local revenue 
collector and the surveyor were being threatened not to pursue the men involved in the crime 
any further. 
Access to firearms for those seeking to threaten government officials seems to have been 
readily available in the west of Ireland. Richard Tonson, a resident of Skibbereen sent a letter 
from Hames Beaty describing the response to a seizure of two hundred ankles of brandy from 
the house of a man named John Murphy. The haul was immediately seized by a ‘great mob 
with firearms’48. Mr. Tonson was forced to admit that it would not be in the power of any 
officer to do his duty in any part of Connaught unless some method was taken to reduce or 
disarm them.49 The inability of the crown to contest western Ireland seems to have persisted 
until at least the 1760s. 
The problems were not just restricted to Connaught however. In the summer of 1736 John 
McAllen reported on the problems facing lone Protestant officers trying to confront large 
numbers of Catholics under arms. A large gathering of people from the Tool family were 
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described as acting ‘in a tumultuous manner’ at the fair at Rathdrum, co. Wicklow. Because 
they could not find the man who was to give evidence against them in a trial they seized his 
brother-in-law instead.  The men were described as being ‘all armed with firearms and other 
weapons.’50 McAllen wanted legal clarification on ‘proving them Papists and directions to 
summon such as are capable of proving they were at mass.’51 He claimed that a local priest 
named Doyle could do it. An attorney named Mr. White was recommended to provide council 
to decide if there was sufficient proof to prosecute the ‘Papists carrying arms.’52 
 A man named John McAllen who was stationed in Dungarvan, Co. Waterford requested that 
the revenue officers be provided with small arms and swivel guns to assist in the prevention of 
frauds as well as to ‘supress the violence of the Papists.’53 He further requested that another 
official named Mr. Sowton make ‘the strictest enquiry concerning Papists carrying arms’54 and 
to prosecute them if any were found. This order seems to have been carried out, as a letter the 
next month elicited surprise from the board. This was not an isolated incident. A man named 
Stephen Sowton wrote from Dungarvan seeking instructions on how to proceed against another 
fellow named Mr. Paye. Specifically, he asked whether or not Paye could be prosecuted under 
the law making it illegal for a Catholic to carry a gun.55 The board responded that he should 
follow the general order to enforce all cases of Catholics with guns. He was instructed to 
prosecute and to apply to the Justices of the Peace to get warrants to search all suspected places 
for firearms. Further incidents occurred into the 1760s.56 
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The implication that a substantial section of western Ireland was effectively off limits for 
officials of the state shows the weakness of enforcement in all of Ireland. However, the officials 
on the ground saw a direct correlation between armed Catholics and their power to enforce the 
law.  Mr. Tonson’s admission that it was not possible for any officer to do his duty in any part 
of Connaught unless the Catholics were dispersed or disarmed revealed the weakness of the 
outnumbered Protestants attempting to make inroads outside of Ulster or the garrisoned towns. 
The response to prosecute anyone found carrying arms despite the difficulty also shows how 
important monopolising the gun was as a statement of Protestant Ascendancy. In a parallel 
message, tearing out a man’s tongue, removing his eyes and cutting off an ear required some 
investment of time. The state would have to contend with a population willing to enforce its 
own bloody code if it was to enforce its edicts effectively, and weigh the cost of prosecution. 
In the next section, we examine two separate cases in the 1730s and 1760s in more detail to 
compare the way the Irish state responded to Catholics violating the ban on having firearms. 
In the early months of 1736, William Cavendish, the third Duke of Devonshire and the recently 
appointed Lord Lieutenant Devonshire met with advisory body to discuss a deeply troubling 
problem. The council sent a memorandum to give advice on an appeal recently sent to the Lord 
Lieutenant by two Catholic gentlemen. In the letter, they discussed an incident that had 
occurred the previous year. The series of events demonstrate how the interactions that took 
place between Catholic gentry and their servants and sanctioned representatives of the state 
could expand from the local to the national. The account also provides an example of the space 




 In February of 1735 Arthur Rochfort, a justice of the peace in co. Meath apprehended a ‘papist 
with arms’. The man in question was a noted poacher by the name of Michael Molloy.57 A 
local man named Thomas Nugent was described in the letter as ‘lately conformed as a covert 
from popery’, though the memorandum was careful to note that his ‘wife [was] a papist’.58 
Nugent attempted to have the charges dismissed because Molloy was his servant. He had a 
convincing case, as when he converted to the established church he gained the right to have 
firearms in his possession despite his former religious status. However, the law disbarred him 
from employing Catholics in a capacity that allowed them the use or access to firearms. In a 
similarity to the O’Leary case thirty years later, it had become an issue of honour. What 
happened next escalated from a local incident into a case that would involve the highest 
echelons of Irish society. Arthur Rochfort denied the request, and in response, Thomas Nugent 
allegedly sent another man in his employ to resolve the issue personally. This man was a 
Catholic known as Captain Hugh Maguire, who was allegedly armed with a sword and a brace 
of pistols. This escalation on the part of Nugent was illegal on several levels.  For the officials 
of the state, the most worrying aspect was that a Catholic had challenged a Protestant official 
engaged in his lawful duty. The officials also stressed that they found that these kinds of 
incidents were becoming ‘very common in these parts’ and so not only supported the 
prosecution of both Thomas Nugent and his servants, but also sent the Solicitor General to 
attend the proceedings in person. However, by the next assizes, the trial was postponed as the 
key witness was out of the country. Captain Hugh Maguire had apparently found pressing 
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business in France, so was unable to attend his own trial. The officials recommended that Hugh 
Maguire be charged for being a ‘papist carrying arms.’59  
In the intervening months both Thomas Nugent and Captain Hugh Maguire had written letters 
in support of their case and were attempting to have the charges dismissed. The officials offered 
several pieces of advice as to how to proceed, and this section of the document has been quoted 
in full below to give the reader the full tone. 
 We take this early occasion to acquaint your Grace, that interpositions to stop the 
common course of law, have not as far as we have experienced, been agreeable to 
the gentlemen of this kingdom; who are apt to complain, that such indulgences 
serve only to animate an interest already too powerful here, and to discourage the 
Magistrate from putting these Laws into execution upon which the quiet and safety 
of the Kingdom depend.60 
The men who were acquainting the incoming Duke of Devonshire were from the highest 
echelons of the Protestant Ascendancy. Hugh Bolton was an Englishman who had passed over 
Archbishop King of Dublin to become Primate and therefore held the highest spiritual authority 
of the Church in Ireland. The second signatory was the Lord Chancellor of Ireland Baron 
Thomas Wyndham. Three years after this incident he would become the only Irish judge to 
sentence a peer to be executed. Both these men had reached the pinnacle of power in Ireland, 
and clearly felt that the non-enforcement of the penal laws against Catholics with firearms 
would be detrimental to Protestant authority. They were also aware that the relationship 
between the crown and with local Anglo-Irish elites was in part dependent on understanding 
the need to support the enforcement of a Protestant monopoly of the gun. This incident and 
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others like it provided the necessary pressure towards the tightening of penal laws about 
firearms in 1739.  
The men advising the course of action to the incoming Lord Lieutenant had been in power a 
long time, and were clearly not willing to endorse an action that would set an example that 
Catholics could circumvent the penal laws. Thirty years later and the balance of opinion had 
shifted. Enforcement of the penal laws was a more local concern, but could still cause far 
reaching consequences. We now look to the case of Art Ó Laoghaire that took place a 
generation later. 
Art Ó Laoghaire has held a certain kind of fascination for Irish historians. It is easy to see why, 
given the admixture of folk memory, tall tales and martyrdom surrounding the incident well 
into the nineteenth century and the mysterious circumstances surrounding his death. L.M. 
Cullen has explored the implications of the Art Ó Laoghaire episode in a number of his works. 
He began his research in The Emergence of Modern Ireland, and in ‘Caoineadh Airt Uí 
Laoghaire: The Contemporary Political Context’ and ‘The Contemporary and Later Politics of 
‘Caoineadh Airt Uí Laoire’.61 Cullen described the episode as being in the aftermath of an 
‘attempted legal pogrom addressing Whiteboy activity’ that had largely died out in the face of 
the falling popularity of anti-Catholic sentiment among Munster elites.62  
Into this fractured political landscape arrived a well-dressed and well-armed Catholic officer 
from the Austrian service named Art Ó Laoghaire. His name is henceforth anglicised as Art 
O’Leary.  Art was characterized by Cullen as ‘an assertive young army officer from 
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overseas.’63 A contemporary Irish poem was written from the perspective of O’Leary’s wife as 
she lamented his death. The style came from a long tradition of keening poems.64 It is 
interesting to note that his widow described him as notable for the dread he caused others:  
‘When  you came  home  from  overseas,  people fled  the  street  before  you and  not  for  love  
of  you,  but  from  sheer  dislike!’ The widow further remarked, ‘the  Saxons  used scrape the 
ground before  you and  not  to  show  you  any  favour,  but  from  sheer  dread  of  you’.65 By 
all accounts, O’ Leary was not a subdued Catholic Irishman. Cullen described the contention 
caused when O’Leary married into a local family in 1766. He then outlined the building 
tensions with a local retired magistrate named Abraham Morris.  
Morris was the former High Sheriff and came from a long family tradition of serving as 
magistrates. Morris was affronted by the presence of an upstart Catholic with too much 
brashness for his liking, and attempted to demand O’Leary’s prized horse for £5.5s in the 
summer of 1771. As described earlier in this work in the section on the formation of the penal 
law, this was legally permissible, although rarely enforced after the middle of the eighteenth 
century.  
The incident reveals much about what was experienced in day-to-day interactions between 
Catholics and Protestants. It also demonstrates that enforcement of the law through the legal 
process or extra-judiciary violence was avoidable if those present were aware of the expected 
role to play in the performance of day-to-day life. Catholics had power in numbers and there 
were areas of Ireland where the law was effectively unenforceable. Protestants could pursue 
laws to the point of harassment towards specific individuals if the individual was deemed worth 
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the trouble and cost such a prosecution could bring, or if leniency would give encouragement 
for worse obstinacy. Most of the time, this could be avoided with a degree of feigned 
subservience on the part of the Catholics, allowing Protestants to maintain an outward show of 
confidence despite their demographic weakness. Most of all it required that they be willing to 
perform the appropriate roles, at least in public. Some Protestants felt that they held the right 
to remind Catholics of their status, and conversely, they occasionally encountered Catholics 
who were willing to remind them this was not an uncontested position.   
Art O’ Leary was a military officer in his early twenties who was not of the disposition to 
acquiesce to Morris’s request to purchase his horse. What exactly happened next is unclear. 
O’Leary's report of events recounts that he was pursued and fired upon by Morris. Art 
responded by taking the gun into custody so that it could be given to the local magistrate.66 
Morris countered this with his own version of events, saying that O’Leary had seized the gun 
and taken flight. In the aftermath of the incident, O’Leary faced legal proceedings.  One of the 
most serious charges facing O’Leary was the claim he had seized a gun from the Protestant 
servant of Morris.   
The differences of these two accounts are in the severity of the crime. As Cullen himself notes, 
O’Leary had already violated a penal statute by having laid his hands on a gun.67 Acquiring a 
firearm by force from a Protestant in the presence of a former magistrate was a much more 
serious affront to notions of Protestant Ascendancy. Morris and assorted local backers, 
including five clergymen of the established church began legal action in the fall of 1771.  
Cullen described the subsequent events as being ‘on the margins of legality.’68 Cullen sees this 
as an abnormality, and goes into depth describing how both parties fell into a legal stalemate. 
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This uncertainty lasted for two years, until in 1773 the twenty six year old O'Leary was shot 
and killed in murky circumstances.69  
As Cullen remarks, folklore preserves a theory that O’Leary had been seeking out Morris to 
kill him, but instead was shot and killed by soldiers accompanying Morris. The record shows 
that Morris stood trial, and during the proceedings had three shots fired at his residence.70 He 
avoided being shot at his home, and was acquitted of a charge of murder following support 
from the Shannon political interest and a campaign to raise funds for his defence.  
The O’Leary episode can be seen as an example of the type of encounter that could occur when 
Catholics were unwilling to show deference to lower ranking Protestants or refused to 
acquiesce to the enforcement of penal statutes. This was especially likely when it involved 
Catholic men with firearms. Violent confrontation was more likely because Catholics with 
firearms were already committing a crime that was considered a threat to the Protestant Interest. 
These incidents could also quickly draw in the surrounding community. Outside of these 
incidents detailed above there is additional evidence that Catholics were brought to trial and 
served sentences for having firearms much later into the eighteenth century than previous work 
has stated.71 Catholics were charged under the penal law for illegal possession of firearms in 
Tipperary, Armagh and other counties into the 1770s.72 Protestant fears of the danger that 
Catholics with firearms represented could lead to periods of increased harassment. Cullen cites 
evidence of a renewed focus on enforcement during periods of agrarian unrest. Crucially, 
Protestant fears were not only against the agrarian protestors themselves, but were also directed 
towards Catholics arming themselves to defend their property and their communities against 
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depredation from the rural rioters.73 The propertied Catholic Interest who were targeted during 
these periods of harassment by authorities should be contrasted to the more assertive outsiders 
from abroad like O’Leary. Young men fresh from overseas service and a military life differed 
greatly from the ‘cautious or wiser locals.’74 The landed Catholics were survivors, although 
Cullen does remark on families that decided to either relocate to France or relocate internally 
if harassment became threatening enough. Beginning with the 1720 execution of a man named 
Cotter and continuing to the executions in peacetime of Irish brigade recruiters, Cullen offers 
a litany of martyrs.75 He further remarks that Munster was not unique in offering such 
examples.76  He is careful to explain that both Catholics and Protestants could escalate these 
confrontations.  
O’Leary himself may have intended to participate in a duel and was subsequently ambushed 
by Morris under false pretences. One issue that I feel Cullen has understated was the wider 
implications of Catholics with a gun for Protestant perceptions of security and their own status, 
especially on the margins.  
The enforcement of the laws restricting Catholics access to the gun can be seen as one method 
of reducing Protestant fears about the Catholic majority regaining the arms, horses and leaders 
that they had lost after 1691. A Catholic with a gun was not just a personal affront, he was a 
very real threat to the basic foundations of the Protestant Ascendancy because he represented 
the uncertainty of Ireland before 1691. The two examples we have looked at highlight that this 
would create further problems for magistrates trying to enforce an already difficult prohibition. 
Both the O’Leary execution and the incident with Thomas Nugent and his servant Captain 
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Hugh Maguire show that the notion of a subdued Catholic Ireland could break down quickly 
in personal interactions.  
When this did occur, the response by local authorities and elites was either to encourage the 
enforcement of existing laws or close loopholes Catholics were using to circumvent them. One 
of the key differences between 1739 and 1773 was the synergy between the British officials 
sent to Dublin to govern and the local Anglo-Irish settlers in the countryside. In 1739 the 
leaders of the Ascendancy were adamant about the danger of leniency in cases of Catholics 
found with arms. By 1773 local elites were struggling to preserve their status against a tide of 
reform initiated by the English state in part because of the need for Catholic soldiers to fight 
abroad. These interactions were played out in many ways between individuals, but these two 
examples clearly show that insolence and a refusal to submit to authority could escalate beyond 
a single encounter.77 A brief glance at the surnames and geographic location also shows that 
the incidents overlap with areas where a minority of licensed Catholic had owned firearms 
legally. In 1713 Leinster had the highest concentration of Catholics with a right to possess 
firearms, though that right was to fade with the men themselves. Twenty years later their 
descendants were in the process of conforming to the established church to preserve landed 
estates, but were not fully trusted by the state to have done so with sincere motives.  
In this period of transition a Protestant magistrate attempting to enforce an existing law was 
targeted for violence by a Catholic who would have been one of the few licensed to have 
firearms a generation before. A nominal convert with a Catholic wife and an armed Catholic 
servant he sent out to settle a score cannot be seen as being the ‘cautious or wiser locals’78 that 
Cullen found clinging to their estates twenty five years later. O’Leary himself shows clear 
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similarities to men like Captain Hugh Maguire. There is more work to be done to try and 
uncover what happened when the shared language of deference and resentment turning into 
direct confrontation, but this chapter has laid the groundwork for reappraising the way that 
Catholics interacted with and around the gun. In time, a more robust understanding of the 
firearm and confessional relations may help historians understand an understudied part of the 
penal laws in Ireland. In the next chapter we look at what motivated men like Art O’Leary and 




Chapter 3. The Nesting Ground of Wild Geese 
‘Had I known the reception I was to meet at Cork, I should have sooner attempted any 
part of the globe but my native country.’1 
Building on the discussion developed in the previous chapter on Catholics and firearms in 
eighteenth-century Ireland and the survival of a small remnant of legally armed Catholics, we 
now look to those who left Ireland to go abroad. These soldiers were a direct contradiction to 
the monopoly of the gun by Protestant Ireland. The flagrant disregard of state authority through 
the sustained recruitment of Irish Catholics was a recurring affront to notions of a Protestant 
victory over Catholic Ireland. The return of Irish Catholics from overseas with military 
experience and training undermined the principal purpose of the penal law restricting firearms, 
which was to curtail the ability of a Catholic uprising. 
This chapter will examine Protestant reactions to Catholics serving abroad, and also how this 
persistent fear of the return of armed Catholic Irishmen revealed the inherent weakness of a 
Protestant monopoly of the gun, in that the ability of Catholics to gain training and firearms 
from abroad undermined the ability to maintain a perpetual peace. First, I provide a summary 
of the debates regarding the recruitment of Irishmen for continental service. Secondly, 
Protestant attitudes towards this recruitment, attempts at legislating the problem, and the issues 
of enforcement are discussed. This is followed by explaining how the presence of Catholic 
Irishmen going abroad to wield the gun or those who sought to return affected perceptions of 
the competency of the magistrates tasked with preventing it. Finally, through an examination 
of Irishmen who served abroad, the work will conclude with some comment on whom those 
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men were, what motivated them to both leave Ireland, and in some cases to return, and their 
interaction and communication with the community they returned to. 
Irishmen seeking military service outside their homeland have been the focus of long standing 
interest for both historians in the academy, as well as those with antiquarian or genealogical 
research interests. There are a variety of possible explanations, not only the interest that 
military related topics seem to generate generally. But for Catholic historians the wild geese 
have been a topic of interest because they served as counterpoint to a narrative of defeated 
Catholics in Ascendancy Ireland.2 One aspect of this scholarship that has been less fully 
developed are the motivations and experiences of those going abroad who decided to return 
home. Catholics going abroad and gaining a skill in the use of firearms whilst serving in the 
army of either the Catholic Kings of Europe or the Stuarts proved to be a recurring thorn in the 
side of Protestant narratives of a disarmed and defeated Catholic Ireland. This chapter uses the 
presence of  Catholic recruiting officers and returning soldiers to show that Protestant 
confidence was adversely affected by not only the large number of Irish going overseas, but 
even more so by the threat that they might return with the intention of contesting the legacy of 
1691. 
i. 
Catholics had a long tradition of seeking opportunity overseas in foreign armies. Irishman of 
all confessional backgrounds had a long history of serving aboard, and had gained a reputation 
for ferocity and barbarousness from those who fought both alongside and against them, a 
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position shared by many colonial troops.3 This chapter focuses on the recruitment of Irishmen 
to replenish the ranks of existing units following the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. This treaty 
negotiated the begrudging acceptance of William III’s claim to the throne of England by his 
Catholic opponents. The justification for this approach is predicated on the presence of strong 
scholarship for the period preceding 1697, and because one of the goals of this chapter is to 
uncover the interaction of returning veterans, a process which was accelerated after drawdown 
of regiments following the end of the conflict in 1697.  
The collective migration of around 19,000 soldiers along with their families following the 
Treaty of Limerick to continental Europe had added to an already extensive network of 
merchants, clergy, diplomats and exiles.4 Irishmen sought to petition the Jacobite court in 
Lorraine, attended the Irish colleges spread throughout Europe, and sailed to the thriving trade 
ports dotted along the Atlantic coast of France and Spain.5 This ‘exiled’ Ireland has been 
increasingly seen as topic worthy of examination, with perhaps the fullest account being Ian 
McBride’s Eighteenth Century Ireland.6  
Éamonn Ó Ciardha, Ian McBride and L.M. Cullen each bring forth different approaches to 
understanding the Irish abroad. Ó Ciardha details the travails of Irish Jacobites and the 
continued utility of contacts with the exiled Stuart claimants, which varied in usefulness from 
healing medals for scrofula to more tangible letters of reference when seeking military 
commissions in overseas armies.7 His exhaustive research has clearly demonstrated the high 
volume of correspondence between Irish Catholic elites and the Stuarts. One of the most 
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interesting aspects is his identification of a profound sense of longing for a return to the 
homeland, which Ó Ciardha claims reveals a ‘strong sense of exile.’8 Ian McBride’s work has 
provided a glimpse of the Irish colleges and seminaries established throughout Europe that 
served as a communication network for Irishmen abroad.9 The literate and well-travelled 
priests, nuns and cardinals connected an Irish priesthood that had been forced underground 
with a thriving Irish clergy abroad.10 The colleges were located in Spain, France, Italy and 
various territories of the Holy Roman Empire, and served as natural stop overs for Irish fellow 
travellers.11  
Irish Priests attempting to return home faced a precarious reception. However, opposition to 
this spiritual threat was not unified; nor was the enforcement unproblematic. McBride has 
identified an uneasy relationship between the central government and local unpaid officials, 
freelance discovers and priest catchers tasked with enforcing the penal laws against Catholic 
clergy. Enforcing measures against Catholics taking up firearms abroad seems to have been a 
much more unifying policy.12 One crucial difference when comparing men heading abroad to 
be soldiers with the priests, labourers or merchants was the fact that the Protestant Interest was 
generally united in agreeing that Catholics with a gun were an immediate threat to the political 
order. This chapter has therefore dedicated itself to examining Irish soldiers abroad both to 
maintain the focus of the work and also to contrast with the ambiguous relationship between 
the state and those tasked with enforcing the penal laws affecting Catholic Priests. This was 
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because Irish soldiers abroad were an immediate threat to security, whereas Irish clergy abroad 
were a threat of a more spiritual nature.  
 Estimating the total number of those who served abroad with any accuracy is a herculean task. 
To attempt to get a rough idea of the scale, a brief survey of recorded instances of Irish soldiers 
abroad who were killed or wounded shows a substantial need for replacements. In 1605 one 
Irish regiment in Flanders claimed to have suffered 12,000 casualties in the Spanish service, 
‘mostly at the point of sword.’13 By the 1650s over 30,000 left Ireland to serve abroad following 
the Cromwellian conquest. Estimates of the number of Irishmen who had served abroad by 
eighteenth-century observers varied widely. In 1729 the Irish Jacobite Sir Charles Wogan 
estimated that 100,000 Irishman had lost their lives in the service of the French crown.14 He 
increased this estimate by another 20,000 when writing three years later in a letter to Swift.15 
Another writer claimed it was as high as 450,000, which the historian Richard Hayes took to 
mean all who had served since records began, with Hayes then arriving at an estimate of 48,000 
total Irish deaths in service of France in the period.16  
In support of the higher end of the estimates are claims that around a 1,000 men were leaving 
annually to serve in the army of France alone.17 Irish soldiers abroad were a part of the shift 
towards permanent standing armies staffed by new recruits and trained by a core cadre of well-
trained veterans. Irish soldiers therefore straddled the line between mercenaries and 
professionals.  Murtagh cites the 30,000 who left under Irish confederate officers in 1650s as 
an example.18 He has also discussed the regional variation within Ireland in terms of which 
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armies the men ended up serving with.19 The precedence of Irish soldiers serving under 
royalists forces dated from the 1630s. Irish regiments formed the fighting core of the English 
Army, as well as forming a smaller contingent in the Scottish army in 1644-5.20  
Regardless of the exact number it was a movement of thousands sustained over generations 
and one that was deeply engrained into the psyche of Protestant Ireland. L.M. Cullen has 
reconstructed the ships and networks that would have facilitated illicit travel and commerce of 
the Irish black economy. Cullen details the complexities of outward migration through an 
examination of such disparate elements as Irish settlement in the Amazon basin, North 
America, the West Indies, and Europe. He also details a surprisingly robust Protestant 
membership in the English East India Company facing off against a similarly dynamic Catholic 
presence in the French East India Company.21 One component of this overarching project was 
Cullen’s estimate that around a 1000 men a year were leaving for military service abroad. He 
also estimated that this migration peaked in the 1730s.22 Cullen also argues that Irish 
Protestants mistakenly assumed that all the men marching past their window, including those 
on their way to work the seasonal fisheries in Newfoundland or help bring in the harvest were 
actually off to serve the Pretender.23 During periods where foreign invasion fears were growing 
or rumours of a Jacobite landings were spreading, suspicions could rise.  
In attempting to create a chronology of the importance of Irish soldiers to continental militaries, 
most historians follow the work of Murtagh, who is careful to note the decline of importance 
of Irish recruits to continental armies by the second half of the Eighteenth century. In 1739 the 
death penalty was introduced for any Irish Catholic found to have served in a foreign army. In 
conjunction with penal legislation regarding the discovery of a Catholic with leases or land, 
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further laws prevented the return of heirs living overseas or contesting land seizures in the 
courts. Those already abroad were barred from returning, the argument being that this deprived 
the local Irish Catholics from being unduly influenced by an influx of experienced veterans 
who would pass their knowledge of tactics and firearms to their religious brethren.24 An on-
going project at Trinity College Dublin is creating a database of 20,000 Irish Soldiers in the 
French service that will no doubt be of great utility in forming more accurate estimates once it 
is completed.25 Spain looms large in any discussion of the Irish abroad, a fact often overlooked 
with France more often attracting the attention of the historian. However, a long and enduring 
community of merchants, soldiers and students thrived in the multicultural trade ports and cities 
of Iberia.26 Although the exact number of recruits going abroad remains a contentious issue, 
there is a consensus that they represented a sustained movement. 
Equally importance and much harder to establish is what the motivation of these men to go 
abroad was. Murtagh finds the motivation for leaving to be due to military defeat in Ireland, as 
well as the legacy of social and economic penalties of the plantation experience.27Scholarship 
surrounding the motives for Catholics serving abroad has largely focussed upon three 
overlapping reasons, but there is some disagreement at to the exact admixture. Éamonn Ó 
Ciardha has identified a much more robust desire to regain lost titles, fortune and prestige 
among Irish Catholics.28 Catholics streaming past the windows of Protestants were heading off 
to serve foreign armies, in part motivated by the desire to regain the money, arms and horses 
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lost a generation before. Herman Murtagh went so far as to remark that Irish regiments abroad 
‘were in a sense the public manifestation of the Jacobite shadowlife of eighteenth-century 
Catholic Ireland.’29 Kevin Whelan’s 'Underground Gentry’ thesis provides another example of 
how often Irish Catholics are described in shadowy terms.30  
One of the more convincing arguments is made by S.J. Connolly. He concludes in Religion, 
Law and Power that a young man from a poor society could be equally motivated by lucre as 
by a deep hearted loyalty to the house of Stuart, while admitting that others may have sought a 
chance to enact personal vengeance on Protestants.31 In terms of the political motivations of 
the Irish going abroad and of the communities they left behind, Éamonn Ó Ciardha’s work 
provides strong evidence of a long standing and sincere attachment to the Jacobite cause.32 S.J. 
Connolly’s scathing review of Ó Ciardha’s Ireland and the Jacobite cause is largely centred 
on the lack of nuance, citing Ó Ciardha’s equating of non-jurors with Jacobites and the lack of 
new material. Connolly never-the-less admits that ‘given the wealth of detail he has assembled, 
historians have no longer any excuse for failing to build into their assessment the attachment 
of such a large section of the population to the cause of the exiled Stuarts.’33  
Perhaps Ó Ciardha’s most important point is in regards to motivation. In a response to 
Connolly’s acerbic review, Ó Ciardha highlighted the danger of overstating economic 
motivation, remarking on the less than absolute confessional barrier to service to the British 
Army, and the legitimate suspicions by British officials of the loyalty of certain recruits within 
the highland regiments to demonstrate that political motives could override fiscal rewards, and 
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that this affected the choice of which army to serve for a martially minded Irishman.34 Cullen 
claimed that motivation was a melange made up of a combination of a desire for dynamism, 
widespread poverty and persistent persecution.35 As with so many discussions on the 
motivations of humanity, the truth of the matter is likely a murky, muddled hodgepodge. A 
Catholic recruit getting a ship to France was motivated as much by a desire for cash, as a sense 
of loyalty to a lost cause, and perhaps some took the path with a desire to confront Protestants 
abroad. 
On a more visceral level, the gruesome realities of eighteenth-century warfare meant ample 
opportunities for hot-blooded men willing to take up the gun, and the risky nature of the 
occupation meant no lack of openings.  By 1701 a third of those who left Ireland following the 
Treaty of Limerick had been killed or wounded in continental conflicts. Despite such a high 
mortality, this still made it a less risky venture than the mortality rates for a sailor heading to 
the West Indies or India in the service of the Royal navy. The remaining 20,000 served in 
Spanish and French service, as well as under Austrian, Dutch, English and German armies. In 
some cases, they served all of the above in the same conflicts, alternatively deserting and 
enlisting as pay, provisions and personal relationships altered with the turning of fortune’s 
wheel.36 Recruits from Ireland were an important source of new bodies to fill out the regiments 
decimated by disease, battles and retirement. Overseas opportunities attracted Irish men from 
all confessional backgrounds. The next section will examine how men were recruited to serve 
in military units and of the response of the authorities tasked to stop them.    
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Having addressed the importance of recruits and posited their motivation above, the next 
section examines the actual recruitment of soldiers from Ireland. Men were recruited for 
continental service by specialists who were tasked with raising conscripts who used existing 
kin networks and social networks. The interaction of those overseas and the much maligned 
‘dastard gentry’ who remained at home following defeat in the 1690s is hard to fully reconstruct 
because of the secretive nature of such communication.37 It is the position of this thesis that 
Catholic Ireland should be seen as a kind of nesting ground for the ‘wild geese’.38 Not only a 
place that Irishmen were recruited from, but also the place they aspired to return to. Overseas 
service to France, Spain or Austria involved recruitment of men from a variety of backgrounds 
and dispositions. We will therefore briefly examine the background of the men who were 
recruited. This section then examines contradictory policies from the imperial centre and the 
administration at Dublin Castle, as well as the evidence of prosecutions of Catholics attempting 
to go abroad to determine motivation. 
Given the financial outlays required for officers, most of the higher ranking men by necessity 
came from the descendants of landowning families, a world where soldiering offered one 
method  of escaping the mentalité of a reduced class of middleman and substantial farmers, a 
concept covered in depth by Kevin Whelan’s ‘Underground Gentry’ thesis.39 Whelan equates 
land as politics, but leaves room for the survival of a large landless émigré population involved 
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with those back at home in Ireland. In a floral passage directed to the classically educated, 
Whelan remarks that the ‘shadow-lords of eighteenth-century Ireland retained its demotic force 
by being rooted, Antaues-like, in the land’40 Furthermore, by refuting J.G. Simms’ estimate of 
a rate of a five percent Catholic land ownership, Whelan provides a much higher estimate of 
twenty percent by including collusive discovery, charitable trusts registered in Protestant 
names, and those covered under the Articles of Limerick. These estates supported extensive 
kin networks in various employments and featured an overwhelmingly Catholic tenancy at very 
low rents.41 This process was ongoing throughout the eighteenth century, and Whelan is keen 
to emphasize that the respect and support of former followers acted as a ‘cushioning of the 
decline’ for former gentry. By maintaining these networks, they replicated their traditional 
status and leadership roles.42 One aspect that is surprisingly undeveloped is how military 
service would have been an important aspect of maintaining the status he discusses.  
Service overseas provided a martial career and a chance for substantial gains. The prospect of 
regaining old estates could also serve as a motivation for those unwilling to eke out a living in 
Ireland on their former lands. The optimism about an eventual reversal of fortune caused 
consternation for some members of the Protestant community. In 1691, twelve years before 
becoming Archbishop of Dublin, the recently appointed Bishop of Derry William King wrote 
at length on the problem of resentful Catholics. 
…they reckon every estate theirs, that either they or their Ancestors had any time 
in their possession, no matter how many years ago. And by [their] pretended title 
and Gentility, they have such an influence on the poor tenants of their own Nation 
and Religion, who live on these lands, that these tenants look [on] them still, 
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tho[ugh] out of possession of their estates, A  kind of landlord; maintain them after 
a fashion of idleness, and entertain them in their choshering manner.43 
Perhaps even more revealing is the closing sentence of the passage. Archbishop King adds ‘The 
Vagabonds reckoned themselves great gentleman, and it would be a great disparagement to 
them to betake themselves any calling, trade or industry.’44 Though perhaps not to the liking 
of Archbishop King, there was one calling they did seem to be willing to take up. Military 
service in foreign armies was one means of securing money in an honourable way. Murtagh 
highlights the prevalence of surnames associated with the south and west of Ireland in 
generations of officers who served in France, Spain and Austria: O’Neills and MacDonnells in 
Spain, Taffee, Lacy and Browne in Austria and dependant territories.45 The Shees of Limerick 
served for three generations in French regiments46  
However much we can trace these lives, the landed gentry were an important minority. At any 
one time there were perhaps 500 Irish officers serving in European armies. For every officer 
leaving a family seat with a letter of recommendation and a coat of arms there were substantial 
numbers of men from further down the social scale seeking their fortunes abroad. Both in terms 
of sheer numbers and as a means of capturing the wider Catholic Irish experience, it is the men 
further down the social ladder that provide the most interesting story to tell, and who this 
chapter is most concerned with recapturing the experience of.47 The recruitment for those of 
the rank and file was in many ways similar to that used by the British military. The process 
began by sending out recruiting officers and men to enlist civilians into the service. However, 
recruitment officers looking for Catholic recruits operated illegally. Periods of enhanced 
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vigilance occurred alongside a general feeling of insecurity among the Protestant population, 
as was the case in 1708, 1715, and 1744. Both those tasked with enlisting men and those they 
recruited faced a much higher chance of prosecution by the governing authorities as the officers 
tasked with enforcing the will of the state mustered their resources together. 
 Even the lessening of official vigilance against recruitment was no guarantee of success or 
safety. The granting of licenses for recruitment in Ireland during periods of Anglo-French 
rapprochement did little to reduce tensions on the ground between local Protestants and 
Catholic recruiters. This further demonstrates that local concerns and reactions could be very 
different from the priorities of the imperial centre. Just how divergent the priorities of the local 
Irish government and London were is highlighted by the repeated periods when Catholics were 
embodied into regiments for service of British allies. This situation presaged the schism 
between the rhetoric of the dangers that Catholics under arms presented for local Protestants, 
with the utility that Irish Catholic soldiers provided to the British Empire.  
Taking in the seriousness with which Catholics under arms were treated by the local Irish 
Protestants, the presence of Catholic Irishmen who were recruited and equipped with firearms 
by the British state marching through England would seem a farcical Jacobite plot. Even more 
ridiculous would be that such a group of men could have proceeded to march through the 
heartland of England not unopposed, but hardly noticed.  This exact scenario played itself out 







The excerpt below is quoted in full to demonstrate that Catholic recruitment was taking place 
in the first decade of the eighteenth century, and that for the imperial heartland did not represent 
a real threat to the Glorious revolution, and the greatest casualty was the recruiting officer’s 
financial reserves.  
According to your leave your majesties has graciously been pleased to grant for the 
raising of 300 soldiers of the Roman Catholic religion in Ireland, the underwritten 
has raised them effectually, and raised them in several drafts, to be transported out 
of your majesties Kingdom into that of Great Britain which having been performed 
without any loss, the said levies with their offices had been marched without the 
least disorder through Great Britain as far as Hardwick Marentree.48 
In the spring of 1708, having gotten three hundred armed Catholic Irishman to the outskirts of 
Oxford, Thomas Kennedy related the difficult and expensive experience. He sent two hundred 
men down the Thames to Tisbury Fort, and kept the remaining hundred men in provisions out 
of his own pocket while waiting for a convoy to Holland, and from Holland onward to Antwerp. 
Clearly in the beginning years of the eighteenth century, there was a possibility for armed 
Catholic Irishman to serve the British state. However, this was a very rare occurrence until the 
demands for manpower grew in the 1760s and 1770s. 
The threat to Irish Protestants was more pronounced. Three years earlier, when questioned 
about whether such recruiting was possible, Chancellor Richard Cox wrote to his friend 
Southwell that ‘There is no doubt but able Papists enough [that] may be had, but sure tis of a 
dangerous consequence to do so.’49 Obviously not so dangerous as to preclude at least some 
instances of this recruitment. However, large scale Catholic recruitment did not take place until 
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the 1770s, despite the obvious advantages of doing so. For Irish Catholics who were either 
unable or unwilling to serve the British state but still desiring a career wielding a gun an 
alternative service was possible. 
One of the most dangerous steps in getting overseas was getting passage aboard a ship to be 
taken to the continent. The Protestant state relied in part on the revenue service to police 
Ireland’s extensive coastline. Revenue officers reported men lurking in their ridings either 
actively seeking passage overseas or reported the seizures of men attempting to do so by local 
magistrates. The revenue officers also served as a natural network for intelligence from 
overseas, as one revenue officer received an account from a shipmaster that he had seen 117 
Irishmen landed from two Dublin ships in France, alongside reports of the seizure of barrels of 
gunpowder from a ship in Cork.50  
The Revenue was also responsible for preventing ships intending to take Irishmen overseas 
from rendezvousing with waiting recruits, and on occasion seized ships that were 
commissioned by the Pretender to bring over recruits.51 In 1720-1, a renewed fear about the 
number of Irishmen seeking service overseas occurred alongside worries that they were seeking 
service with France or the Pretender despite the claim that they were going to serve Spain.52 
An example that illustrated just how proactive Irishmen could be to serve abroad is provided 
in a letter from 1721 that is detailed in the report of Robert Connor and John Dymond. The 
letter’s contents described ‘several persons near Skellicks’ who ‘had a design to seize a vessel 
riding thereabouts, in order to transport themselves to Spain.’53 The men were camping in a 
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riverbank, apparently waiting for a passing ship to seize. Despite being forewarned, Robert 
Connor wrote a letter in October to report that the men had successfully seized a ship off the 
coast of Co. Kerry to transport them to Spain.54 Other accounts filtered in of ships lying in 
creeks and ships seen off the coast picking up men in open boats, and of the successful capture 
and prosecution of men trying to enlist, often with Revenue officers as witnesses. 
We now examine a specific court case to uncover the motivation of some of these men. It also 
reveals the defences given by those accused of the crime.  An intriguing description of a trial 
against men seized on the suspicion of enlisting in foreign service can be found in the papers 
of Sir Charles Spencer, 3rd Earl of Sunderland and briefly Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (1714-
1717). The collected papers provide a description of an on-going trial in the summer of 1714 
of a large party of men accused of entering the Pretender’s service. This incident had coincided 
with Earl Spencer’s appointment to the position of Lord Lieutenant. Spencer was faced with 
attempting to expedite the creaking gears of the of the Irish justice system, which were slow 
moving at the best of times. Irish judicial functionality had screeched to a complete halt during 
the controversy of magistrates and judge appointments that had galvanized Irish opinion from 
1709-1714. Immediately succeeding that debacle was a growing backlog of court cases. The 
translation into French of the trial further indicated that the repercussions were already 
reverberating well outside Ireland itself. Obviously, the intended audience for the trial was 
further afield than just the Irish Privy Council.55 
The case itself provides evidence of who was entering into service of the Pretender, and the 
motivation for doing so. It is important to emphasize that each of the men discussed below 
were under sentence of death for aiding the designs of the Pretender. Francis Callaghan, John 
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Mullally and John Reyly were thought to be recruiters. John was in particular danger, having 
already been charged for the same offence in the past.56 Of the remaining suspects, six of the 
men were from two families with three men of the surname Dillon and three of the surname 
Casey. Butler, Byrne, Cassady, Cavanagh, Cormick, Doway, Eustace, Killmons, Hurley 
Loughlin, and Skilly are a genealogical matrix of Gaelic Irish surnames.57  
Perhaps the most intriguing detail revealed in the record is that two of the men were not 
practicing Catholics. Patrick Archbold and Timothy Rogers both specified they were 
Protestants. In Patrick’s case, he testified that he had lately served in the late Queen Anne’s 
service, and been in the army for several years. Timothy Rogers testified that he was a veteran 
of the Queen’s service in Spain, and had wanted to enlist in a local regiment, but they were not 
requiring men.58 The presence of Irish Protestant military veterans joining regiments either in 
the French or Jacobite service raises some interesting questions, as it demonstrates that both 
Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants denied the ability to gain employment with a gun locally 
were being recruited together to serve abroad. This would support arguments for Ireland 
following larger European patterns where the movement of men between armies took place 
regardless of religious affiliation. Remembering the Catholic Irishmen marching under arms 
through the English countryside discussed earlier, it may be imagined that on a battlefield in 
Western Europe, a Protestant Irishman serving under a Catholic King may have fought an Irish 
Catholic bearing arms in defence of the Protestant succession of the British throne. Despite 
attempts to legislate a clear cut world of a monopoly of the gun for loyal Protestants, the need 
for able bodied men for European battlefields outstripped arguments of legitimacy outside 
Ireland. 
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The other men offered different testimony to defend their presence in a port town near waiting 
ships anchored specifically to offer illicit passage to France. John Hurley swore he was going 
to see a relation in Lorraine who employed with the guards there, and not enlisting himself. 
Edward Dillon claimed he would not go into the Pretender’s service if he could go to his 
relatives in France.59 It must be taken into consideration that these explanations could have 
been invented to avoid execution or transportation. However, even if they were not being 
entirely honest, it still provides examples of the reasons men provided when arrested for 
illegally seeking transport overseas. For those who were suspected of being recruited into the 
foreign service it provides what they believed were plausible excuses. Some of the accused 
men professed purely financial or gastronomic motivation. These men claimed they were 
offered diverse sums of money and were promised meat and drink.  
Getting to the coast was no small matter. The men were marched ‘in arms towards the sea to 
be transported in parts beyond the seas.’60 This was a flagrant disregard for the penal statutes 
regarding the possession of firearms by Catholics and a clear demonstration of the weakness 
of state authority in areas of the Irish countryside. The men were given ‘clothes, arms and 
pay’61 and then dispersed into separate bodies, sent to a place 5 miles from Dublin to a place 
called Howth hill. From there they were to be ferried onto waiting ships of the coast.62 In terms 
of remuneration, they were promised £5 for enlisting, and a wage of 8 or 9 pence a day per 
man when they got into France.63  This level of remuneration was comparable to those ‘taking 
the King’s shilling’ in the British service. In 1714, Thomas Purcell said he had decided to go 
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into foreign service because he was reduced to near nakedness by poverty. He claimed he had 
lost all of his ‘wearing clothes and linens.’64  
Another former soldier named Anthony Dillon took an oath from an officer named John Reilly 
who had made promises that they would be heading to Lorraine to serve James III. The trip 
was promised to be a short one, with a swift return under the leadership of the Pretender or the 
Duke of Benwick.65 The further boons of being reviewed by the queen Dowager and a gold 
coin each provided further incentives.66 As to how many of the promises would have actually 
been kept is unknown. However, it does help us recover what motivated men from further down 
the social scale than those leaving Ireland with a letter of introduction or having a relative 
serving as an officer in a regiment.  
To finalize the recruitment, the men were made to swear oaths of secrecy. Evidence was put 
forward that Callaghan, one of the purported recruiting men, was looked upon as an officer. He 
was reported to have ‘kept a list of those who had signed up, and held some command over the 
party, sold some of his own clothes to entertain the men.’67  
Obviously, recruiting in Ireland was a dangerous and expensive task for those sent to seek 
recruits, especially when getting the men to waiting ships. Most work on recruitment rightly 
focuses on the southern coast of Ireland. However, it is increasingly clear that even at the centre 
of state authority in Ireland ships lay in wait to take armed Irishmen to serve in a foreign army. 
What became of these men is not clear. The papers do not indicate whether the men were 
granted clemency or if the men were executed.  
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However, an existing letter to the Earl does indicate that some of the men were to be 
‘transported to the West Indies, others to be pardoned.’68 It is unclear how many were sent to 
the plantations, which given the conditions was a kind of death sentence in and of itself.  What 
can be recovered is how long they were left waiting for any kind of sentence. The gaol was 
overcrowded with men detained and awaiting trial for attempting to enlist. The passage below 
details why they faced the deteriorating conditions. 
20 still in prison on the same account, which should have been tried last term, but 
the number of malefactors was too great by the stop put to publick justice for a year 
before, occasioned by the want of sheriffs in the city of Dublin, that it was 
impossible for the Court to go through so many trials in one term. We further 
acquaint your excellency that we cannot hope that they will be tryed next term, not 
only on the account of the great multitude of criminals and the causes depending 
in the Kings bench, but also for want of a full bench.69 
Further on in the correspondence the council asked whether the prisoners should continue 
to be held, which meant a second year held without trial for some of the men, or 
alternatively, charged on the King’s Bench.  
A reply was sent two months later, indicating that the Earl of Sunderland recommended 
they be tried for ‘being in the Pretenders service.’70 The threat of a landing by the 
Pretender in the following months and the insecurity of having men loyal to an enemy in 
Ireland led the Lord Lieutenant to send regiments south to secure Ireland from ‘either the 
inhabitants or others, in favour of the Pretender’71  
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Despite the risks, Irishmen were willing to take the risk to serve abroad. Death was a real 
possibility. The historical record indicates that in the case of overseas service clemency 
was not as common as for lesser crimes. The State Papers record three men executed for 
enlisting on the 27 of July 1714.72 A further 36 were found guilty of enlisting in June that 
same year.73  Éamonn Ó Ciardha cautiously links at least some of these men to the twenty 
one men executed in one day in July of 1714.74 
iii. 
Protestant insecurity at the presence of so many Catholic Irishmen seeking 
training in arms or marching on towards ports with them was pronounced.  Existing laws 
were deemed an insufficient deterrent and this led to a concerted effort to improve the 
legal apparatus to prosecute such an affront. In this section, we examine failed attempts 
to improve the quality of men who would serve as magistrates, as well as examine laws 
passed to combat banditry following the treaty of Limerick. The concurrent attempts at 
legislating a less violent society went hand in hand with issues of security surrounding 
Catholics abroad. The lack of an effective magistracy led to a reliance on the military and 
the revenue to enforce laws in a pattern divergent from that experienced in England itself. 
In first 70 years of the eighteenth century there was a sustained attempt to reform the 
qualifications of the men tasked with enforcing the penal laws. Attempts to legislate 
against the problem of the recruitment of Catholics and Jacobites for service overseas 
and dealing with issues of domestic disorder were more successful than attempts at 
creating a more professional magistracy. The breakdown of law and order was partially 
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blamed on a shortage of people qualified or able enough to maintain the healthy spread 
of the capillaries of law and order emanating from Dublin.75  
The first attempt to regulate minimal qualification outside of being an adherent of the 
Protestant faith was in 1703. The proposal ‘For declaring the qualifications of persons to 
be put into the commission of the peace, and for being sheriffs’ was rejected by the Privy 
Council. 2 years later, ‘Declaring the qualifications of persons to be put into the 
commission of the peace and for being made sheriffs’ was also rejected, though surviving 
evidence does not indicate on what grounds. The issue of wanting to enforce further 
requirements was recurrent enough that it warranted the proposal of additional bills. In 
1707, ‘For the better regulation of justices of the peace’ passed the Irish Privy council, 
and was reviewed in England, but was rejected at this stage. This lack of success seems 
to have been as a result of lobbying by existing Irish magistrates arguing against minimal 
qualifications.76 The bill was rejected because of recommendations in a report by the 
Solicitor General, in part influenced by evidence sent in by the affected magistrates.77 
The master of the Chancellery bluntly stated that in regards to the bill that it was ‘neither 
necessary nor proper to agree with it.’78  
This commentary did not deter Irish legislators from attempting the same again. In 1711, 
‘For qualifying persons to be justices of the peace in this kingdom’ was again rejected 
by Privy Council. 12 years later the ‘better qualifying persons to be justices of the peace’ 
was rejected in 1723. A decade later in 1733 ‘For better qualifying persons to be justices 
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of the peace’ was again tossed out even before reaching the Privy Council. Concerns 
about religious qualifications were a different matter, and swiftly were dealt with in other 
bills, as was the case when Catholic converts to Protestantism were barred from being 
magistrates in separate penal laws.79  
In 1759 ‘For the qualification of justices of the peace, and to empower his majesty to 
appoint justices of the peace in cities and towns which are counties of themselves’ and 
later retitled to the shorter ‘Relative to the Justices of the peace’ once again languished 
in the lower house. The insertion of a clause regarding property qualifications for 
magistrates likely caused the failure of the bill on the grounds it would reduce the pool 
of those qualified to serve.80 The persistence on the part of legislators to strengthen the 
entry requirements was met with equal stamina by the efforts to rejects them on the part 
of the government at various stages of the Irish legislative process. In 1766 ‘For fixing a 
qualification for the office of a justice of the peace in this kingdom’ was rejected at the 
Privy Council stage.  
Following a long hiatus during the last thirty years of the eighteenth century, in 1800 
‘For ascertaining the proper qualifications of sheriffs and for magistrates in the kingdom 
of Ireland’ was about to be ratified into law concurrent with the Act of Union which made 
law-making by the Irish parliament obsolescent. In total 11 attempts were made 
throughout the eighteenth century to address perceived deficiencies in the quality of those 
who could became Irish magistrates. The failure to pass minimal qualifications provides 
some ammunition to the critique that there was a lack of suitable candidates in 
comparison to England. The deficiency in the professional magistrates that were 
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increasingly the norm in England resulted in a further reliance in Ireland upon other 
means to maintain law and order. Ireland faced another challenge to the maintenance of 
law and order through the late survival of banditry. 
Following the end of the Williamite War, large scale operations to supress remaining 
armed groups of Catholics took place from 1692-1696. In the year 1700 William 
Montgomery said that the two types of robbers could be classified based on their primary 
means of transport. If they were on foot, they were Tories, if they were mounted they 
were Rapparees.81 What Connolly describes as a vigorous campaign supported by 
soldiers had cleared Eastern Ireland of these openly armed groups, which had reportedly 
been able to assemble in groups of up to thirty to engage in robbery, humiliation and in 
some cases murder.82  
Cork and Kerry saw Tory violence in 1702-1704, 1707, and 1711. In the North, Ulster 
experienced prolonged unrest until the 1720s. Historians provide different narratives as 
to the motivations for the armed groups that survived the end of the Williamite war in 
Ireland. Éamonn Ó Ciardha sees the Tories and Rapparees as having a political 
motivation to the Stuart cause, a position criticised by S.J. Connolly. This positon was 
founded on earlier arguments he developed in Religion, Law and Power.83 Connolly sees 
the Tories and Rapparees as being primarily motivated by profit over politics, and cites 
their attacks on both Catholics and Protestants.84 Connolly is also careful to place the 
Irish experience within a narrative of European norms, citing Corsica and southern Italy 
as other areas where banditry remained a problem outside of the context of conquest and 
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conflict. Iar Connaught and the Armagh plateau are cited alongside the cattle raiding 
culture of the Scottish Highlands and the smugglers of the Sussex downs.85 His overall 
conclusion is that Ireland, although relying on a ramshackle system of law and order and 
areas where rule of law was not enforced or popularly supported, was not a society held 
down by force. Connolly is entirely correct, but I think he underplays not only the 
violence underlying the interaction between the governing state and the wider society 
when this system of law broke down, but Connolly also leaves unaddressed the issue that 
what law was enforceable was predicated on a largely disarmed society. When the 
delicate peace broke down, the Protestant state was reliant on the use of military or 
paramilitary force to supplement a stillborn magistracy. We now look at the body of 
legislation attempting to address the problem of armed banditry following the Treaty of 
Limerick. 
Eleven bills adding to or modifying the penalties on Tories and Rapparees   took place in 
the first thirty years after 1691. The initial law was passed in 1695, entitled ‘For the better 
suppressing of Tories, robbers and Rapparees, and for preventing robberies, burglaries 
and other heinous crimes.’86 Two years later ‘To supply the defects and for the better 
execution of an act passed in this present session of parliament entitled an act for the 
better suppressing of  Tories, robbers and Rapparees, and for the preventing robberies 
and burglaries and other heinous crimes’ added to the legislation.87 1698 saw another 
attempted amendment of the bill fail, but the law’s usefulness was deemed important 
enough for it to be extended in 1703.88 Further clauses and attempts to extend the reach 
of the law took place in 1703, 1705, and 1707. Only one of which, ‘For explaining and 
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amending two several acts against Tories, robbers and Rapparees’ was successful.89 The 
resurgence of agrarian unrest in 1711 under the outbreak of the Houghers led to the 
augmentation of existing laws with the passage of ‘For amending two several acts against 
Tories, robbers and Rapparees in 1713’. The state increasingly relied on the 
transportation of offenders in the second decade of the eighteenth century. The 
codification of penalties in 1719 with ‘For the better and more effectual apprehending 
and transporting of felons and others, and for continuing and amending several laws made 
in this kingdom for suppressing  Tories, robbers and Rapparees.’ secured transportation 
as a viable means of exiling offenders.90 In 1721, the mutual threats presented by 
Catholics seeking service overseas or wielding firearms through banditry at home were 
combined into one piece of legislation, entitled ‘For amending an act, entitled, for the 
better and more effectual apprehending and transporting felons and others, and for 
continuing and amending several laws for suppressing  Tories, robbers, and Rapparees  , 
and also to prevent the enlisting of his majesty's subjects to serve as soldiers in foreign 
service, without his majesty's licence.’91  
The success of passing laws targeting armed Catholics relied on magistrates enforcing 
them. When they lacked the ability to operate alone, they called on the assistance of local 
armed Protestants or the garrisoned soldiers of the British state. The lack of successful 
bills regulating qualifications and recurring criticisms towards a lack of commitment to 
enforcement in cases of other crimes makes for a complex environment to gauge 
Protestant confidence in the ability of laws to be enforced. We now examine specific 
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examples of how some Protestants viewed the non-enforcement of the laws and the 
detrimental effect on Protestant security such a state of affairs would create. 
A failure to enforce laws made one contemporary commentator remark on a dangerous 
pattern of Irish rebellions. ‘History tells that a great body of  Tories  in arms went before 
the body of the Irish appeared in open rebellion, in time a knot of robbers became an 
army of rebels which would be prevented for the future by this excellent law.’92  The 
commentator also described how the law lost legitimacy when people did not properly 
enforce it or give proper presentments. Even when the law was clearly worded, there was 
the danger that criminals could appeal to a higher authority to avoid prosecution. We 
examine one such incident below.  
In Kinsdale in the spring of 1708 a Spanish Bishop stepped onto the quay at Cork. Reports 
started to circulate that he was trying to ordain a priest, and so a local magistrate quickly 
responded. However, things quickly were reduced to farce when not only could the 
Spaniard not be found for three days, but was later discovered to have been staying in a 
known address.93 Once he was ‘captured’ he produced a pass written in Spanish, which 
the beleaguered magistrate could not read. The Bishop, disgraced at his treatment 
promised to inform Queen Anne directly of his treatment.94 The magistrate had attempted 
to enforce the law and now was fearful that he would face royal censure. The lack of 
effectiveness of law enforcement using existing laws was placed firmly at the door of 
Lord Chancellor Constantine Phipps. The author went on to state that it was down to ‘not 
being able to find not one proclamation of any kind in that time either in the council 
books at y[ea] King’s Printers.’95, showing that at least one outspoken member of the 
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Protestant community was optimistic enough to declare that printing and displaying a 
law would assist in the enforcement of it. To add to the problems of enforcement, neither 
badly worded laws or a deficiency of skill in romance languages could compare to the 
more serious problem of corporeal violence, as the incidents listed earlier demonstrate. 
The revenue officers seem to have been a much more professional and effective means 
of enforcing law and order in areas where state authority was weakest. 
Existing legislation facing Irishmen attempting to serve overseas were chiefly concerned 
with those serving the Pretender, and were not as concerned with those in service to the 
shifting alliances with Catholic powers that Britain found itself a part of. The first of 
these was entitled ‘To hinder the reversal of several outlawries and attainders, and to 
prevent the return of subjects of this kingdom who have gone into the dominions of the 
French king in Europe.’96 Attempts were made in 1715 to pass an Act entitled ‘To prevent 
his majesty's subjects listing themselves in foreign service’ but this was laid aside as 
unnecessary.  
There being an act passed in Great Britain in the 12 [sic] year of her late majesty 
in which Ireland is named. And therefore an exemplification of the said act under 
the great seal of Great Britain to be transmitted hither will be sufficient.97  
The fact that it was not being enforced did not seem to warrant a mention. Seven years 
later and as part of a series of changes to existing laws resulted in an Act entitled ‘For 
amending an act, entitled, for the better and more effectual apprehending and transporting 
felons and others, and for continuing and amending several laws for suppressing Tories, 
robbers, and rapparrees, and also to prevent the enlisting of his majesty's subjects to serve 
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as soldiers in foreign service, without his majesty's licence’ was successfully passed into 
law.98  
In 1738, once again the act was strengthened with the addition of ‘For the more effectual 
preventing the enlisting of his majesty's subjects to serve as soldiers in foreign service 
without his majesty's licence.’99 Even fifty years after the first law passed restricting their 
return those trying to go home were being deemed a great enough threat to bring about a 
new prohibition entitled ‘To prohibit the return into this kingdom of such of his majesty's 
subjects, as now are, or at any time hereafter shall be, in the service of the French king.’100 
Not everyone saw Catholics trained in the use of firearms abroad as dangerous enough 
to warrant so many restrictions on their return. Some Irish Protestants saw the recruitment 
of the young, ambitious and pugnacious men as a necessary evil, acting as a less bloody 
form of the Spartan Krypteia.101 Protestants were not unanimously opposed to this 
recruitment as it served to remove the potentially dangerous elements among the Gaelic 
peasantry. The actual destination of the men who chose to enlist likewise was a topic of 
debate, with several members of the Privy Council in 1715 of the opinion that the 
recruiting agents were falsely claiming to recruits that they would enter into the service 
of the Pretender when in actuality they were taking the men into the service of the King 
of France.102 This argument should be balanced against a persistent fear of being 
outnumbered on the ground by a hostile and tenacious people. Writing from Dublin in 
1705, the Earl of Warton pontificated on the issue in an address to Irish citizens printed 
in the London Gazette. 
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 Inequality there is, in respect to the numbers, between the Protestants and Papist 
in this Kingdom, and of the Melancholy experience you have had of the good nature 
of these sort of men, you have had, whenever they had had the power to distress 
and destroy you.103 
Returning Irishmen trained in arms would be greeted by Catholics who had so recently 
forced the Protestants to ‘with aberrance call to mind satisfaction which to visibly 
appear’d in the faces, and by the insolent behaviour of the generality of them, when the 
late attempt was made by the pretender on the North part of Britain.’104 Richard Cox 
wrote to a friend in England and remarked that ‘the Irish really do expect an invasion, 
though I believe tis is what their Priests conjole them with, rather than that there is 
anything to the matter.’105 In light of the differing options of the threat of recruitment, 
the next section make some remarks on the motivation for return by examining the 
experiences of those who came back to Ireland, both legally and illegally after soldiering 
abroad.  
iv. 
Major Michael Shauley, Aid-De-Camp to the late Prince of Hesse Darmstadt, returned 
to Ireland in 1709 after a military career abroad. His case provides some insight into the 
reason an Irishman would wish to return home. He had served for twenty four years, and 
claimed to have received thirty six wounds in the King’s service.106 His conversion to the 
Church of England, along with his family and other Catholic gentleman had been 
rewarded with £50 and the promise of either military or civil employment. Foreign 
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military service did not disbar an individual from returning to Ireland permanently, as 
long as they were willing to conform to the established church. In addition, his age and 
state of health could also have been factors in granting him clemency. 
Men like Michael were a minority however. Lord Chancellor Richard Cox wrote to a 
good friend one chill evening in the fall about the issue of old soldiers seeking to return 
to their place of birth, but also was careful to state that too many men from abroad would 
change his view on the matter. 
It may not be of any consequence that a few silly old fellows may be suffered to 
eat Potatoes & spend their money in their native country but indeed if a number 
were considerable it might be otherwise but this is no more than the fourth or fifth 
that had licenses in my time.107 
In the case of Richard Aylmer, the old man who Cox had speculated wanted to eat 
potatoes, the dotage was long indeed. Aylmer seems to have lived to be 105. While this 
example of a methuselah like constitution was not typical of returning soldiers, it does 
have implications for understanding what constituted living memory. The fluidity of 
individual lived experience, of these separate experiences of exile and of return, meant 
that reminders of the defeats of the seventeenth century endured into at least the middle 
of the eighteenth century. The old men living in the communities who had experienced 
the life-defining events of a previous generation served as a conduit of past glories and 
experiences. 
A new generation of young men were coming of age and taking the example of their 
elders. Keane Mahoni and Richard Mac Keadagh Donavan provide two such cases. Both 
men were found in Ireland carrying firearms when they were apprehended buying goods 
                                                          




from a French privateer. It was further claimed they had had been ‘offering French 
commissions to some persons of the country declaring her Majesty the Queen Anne had 
no right to the Crown of England’108 The testimony revealed that the men had ‘received 
eminent men and conveyed them out of the country, where it is thought by some 
neighbours one of them was the Pretender’109 A more plausible explanation was the claim 
that there was an agent who had been operating for four months before being taken out 
of the country in a French vessel. It was further claimed that this was done with the 
assistance of local Catholic elites. The account was a written record of John Condone 
and his brother’s testimony to local justices during their trial proceeding. A warning at 
the end of the letter reveals fear about the porous nature of the coastline when officials 
of the state failed to act on the information. ‘You all will find as strong a French faction 
as ever was in the nation.’110  
Sustained contact between Ireland and continental Europe provided opportunities for 
smuggling and illicit transportation of people and ideas. In the testimony given above, 
rumour and fact convened together. The evidence that clandestine networks existed is 
not contested, although the level of knowledge and acceptance of the wider Catholic 
community must have varied.  
Richard Cox was a prominent member of the Irish court. His advice to contemporary 
policy makers provides some view of the official response towards those attempting to 
enter service overseas. In his letters to Robert Southwell in the spring of 1704, he 
explained that when dealing with overseas recruits ‘the law ought to take its course unless 
you have a very good reason to the contrary’.111 In another letter written that same month, 
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Cox explained that granting leniency to a large number of captured men caught on their 
way to enlisting overseas would set a very dangerous precedence. Referencing the large 
number of men in the gaols caught for attempting to enlist overseas, Cox was of the 
opinion that the men should receive the death sentence. Cox wrote ‘As to the Trim 
prisoners the whole country will mutiny if they are not executed’112 Cox was careful to 
defer to the right of the English appointed official to make the final decision, but was 
clear to emphasize that if the Lord Lieutenant did not want them to proceed with a verdict 
of execution, they would have to prepare for ‘mutiny’. By the beginning of May, the 
execution date had been set. 
Our Trim prisoners will be executed 27 May, and I think he best let them go, for 
the judges of the country are satisfied they are guilty, and when I say country, I 
mean those who are clamouring for justice, (as they call it) in the execution of these 
roughs as they say.113 
Despite repeated recommendations by local Protestants that the men be killed, Richard 
Cox finally reported that ‘the Prisoners must be transported since he ordered it so’ in 
reference to the Lord Lieutenant’s final decision. This removed the men from the local 
gaols, and served a useful purpose in bolstering the imperial presence abroad. It was a 
pragmatic decision that benefited the Empire as a whole, at the expense of angering local 
settlers. This exchange of letters gives us not only a reminder of the dangers for those 
attempting to bear arms overseas, which ranged from punishments such as the 
transportation to the Caribbean or the American colonies or even execution, it also 
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demonstrates the difficulties in navigating the law in a way that would prevent local 
Protestant outrage as well as deter men from going abroad seeking military service. 
Our final example looks to an individual account of the experience of being one of the 
wild geese. By looking to an individual experience, we can hope to recapture what 
motivated men to go abroad as well as return in a more personal way. The chief source 
for this section is the autobiography of Peter Drake, described by one commentator as 
being ‘A handsome, garrulous Irish soldier, swordsman, gambler, and small time 
Casanova’114 whose lament heralded the beginning of this chapter. ‘Had I known the 
reception I was to meet at Cork, I should have sooner attempted any part of the globe but 
my native country’.115 The autobiography of an old rake in his eighty second year was 
entirely too honest for his family, who attempted to buy and burn all copies of his 
memoirs on the day of the printing. It is the fortune of the historian trying to recover the 
experience of being a solider abroad in the eighteenth century that they were not entirely 
successful. 
Although the biography highlights the entirely of his soldiering and gambling career, this 
work examines his experience on returning to Ireland after serving abroad. He interacted 
with different elements of society, and used his social capital to travel extensively with 
very little money. Drake foreshadowed the dangers of returning to a calmer life after a 
period soldiering and gambling throughout Western Europe, remarking that, ‘I soon had 
reason to reflect that it is not always to a person's advantage to be in good company; and, 
in a few Months after, that Bad company proves sometimes more advantage, as shall be 
seen by the sequel of this story.’116  
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Drake’s experience provided an intersection of the several themes discussed in this 
chapter. Drake had absconded from a French regiment he was serving in and taken a ship 
to Ireland in 1699 only to be captured when the ship landed in Cork. However, it was not 
his status of being a soldier that caused suspicion, but rather that he, like his fellow 
passengers, was a Friar attempting to illegally enter Ireland.117 Drake was fortunate that 
he was suspected of being a friar rather than a returning soldier as a fellow passenger 
named Captain Barrett was sentenced to death for returning from France without the 
King's permission alongside rumours of being a known Jacobite.  
Drake languished in prison, where he fabricated a backstory to convince a local 
publican’s daughter to feed him and bring him ale with the help of a bribed gaol official. 
Drake eventually had the good fortune to meet a local career criminal recently locked up 
for cow stealing.118 The disreputable Arthur Kise ‘knew very well (being an old offender) 
how to evade the punishment due to his crimes.’119 Kise’s wife smuggled in a saw, and 
the two men soon were free of their chains. They knocked over the guard and fled into 
the night, Powers avoiding being shot by a musket on his way out of town.  
What happened afterwards provides one of the only full surviving accounts of the kind 
of network of strangers, friends and family throughout Ireland that a man on the run could 
rely on. Drake fled into the countywide and came to an isolated farm house. ‘Arriving at 
the place, I listened at the door, and hearing them speaking Irish, I knocked.’120 The 
woman recognized Drake from his childhood, and woke her husband. After some 
refreshing milk, Drake was directed to the next village, and provided with a name and a 
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description of the next dwelling he could seek refuge in. At the next house, he was given 
more milk and potatoes and a straw bed for the night. The following day Drake was given 
two pence for the ferry and directions to the house of a wealthy local Catholic named 
Charles Valee.121 Valee was not at home, but his servants provided clothing and other 
supplies. Drake then stayed with another poor Irish family and survived off their 
willingness to give him food and lodging. Drake described how ‘the poor people indeed 
made me very welcome to such course fare as they had, Potatoes and buttermilk.’122  
Drake relied on past associations and tenuous gentry contacts to travel across Ireland to 
a region where he had a closer family network. After being taken into the house of a local 
wealthy family, Drake encountered a room of well-to-do local men and women, one of 
whom caused him some worry. Drake wrote that he felt ‘apprehension on seeing Mr. 
Remons, [a] Protestant gentleman who had seen me in the Prison some time before.’123 
However, rather than turning him over to the authorities, the Protestant gentleman instead 
took him into his home for the evening, plied him with food and drink, as well as 
providing him with shirts, breeches and a waistcoat and a fair bit of money. Afterwards 
Drake received additional funds from a Parish priest, and was now secure enough to go 
from being a ‘Mumpter at cottages to a guest at the best Inns.’124  
The rest of Drake’s journey saw him being  handed from one local family to another and 
generally being kept in a back cabin or outbuilding of an estate, being given small sums 
of money and meeting acquaintances either from his military service background or from 
family connections. He crisscrossed Ireland, going from Cork to Dublin, and from Dublin 
to Kells. Drake described the lost estates of his ancestors as a type of knowledge that was  
                                                          
121 Drake, The memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake, p. 22. 
122 Drake, The memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake, p. 22. 
123 Drake, The memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake, p. 25, 




passed down from generation to generation.  He described how his ancestors, were in 
possession of a plentiful fortune until forfeited in ‘the Rebellion of forty-one.’125  
He eventually made his way to Dublin, where he stayed until he ran out of money. A 
large part of his savings went to a man named Captain Butler to teach him sword-fighting. 
After roughly a year spent living off of the charity of others and moving from one 
household to another, Drake once more returned to the continent, joining a Dutch 
regiment recruiting in the city. 
Drake’s experience presents an Ireland that was less divided by faith than would appear 
through looking at the penal laws alone. Ireland was a place where confessional 
allegiances existed alongside permeable social borders, and the parlour rooms of country 
houses were inhabited by people a lot less murky and shrouded than expected. It was also 
an Ireland that had less than a decade before been torn apart by war. He had escaped from 
prison in Cork, making his way through a combination of charm, the charity of Gaelic 
speaking families, and the ability to use networks of friends, associates and Catholic 
gentry who provided him with both food, clothing, and enough money to live tolerably 
well. When he had spent his last shilling, he joined a regiment bound for Holland to fight 
against France, having been in the French service the year before. Drake’s encounter with 
a sympathetic Protestant could have been as a result of personal relationships overriding 
sectarian divide, or perhaps the Protestant man’s political allegiance to the Jacobite cause. 
Perhaps he just saw a charismatic young man in need of assistance. The fact he spent 
most of this time clandestinely and was arrested when he stepped off the boat also 
demonstrates an effective and sustained vigilance against Catholic Irish soldiers who had 
served abroad from returning.  
                                                          




The chapter set out to look at the recruitment of Irishman serving abroad. We have examined 
Protestant attitudes towards this recruitment, attempts at legislating against the problem when 
enforcement was difficult and how the return of Irishmen trained in the use of firearms was 
tied with Protestant fears about the survival of an Irish elite in exile. Most importantly this 
chapter has recovered who those men were, what motivated them to both leave Ireland, and in 
some cases to return. 
 Integrating a fluid and changing legal environment, the ebbs and flows of mobilization, 
demobilization and retirement, and the shifting priorities and confidence of a minority 
settlement population with the individual experiences of the men and women who lived 
amongst these changes and whose lives are the specifics of larger patterns and experiences is a 
near impossible task. If anything can be taken from the lives examined, it is of the sheer variety 
of experiences, from old men converting to the Church of England in their dotage, to Protestant 
men in the company of Catholics caught before they boarded ships for France. It is a story of 
Irishmen coming laden with the loot of French privateer vessels and commissions from the 
Stuart court in Lorraine as well as young men cast adrift after the wars of the 1690s living off 
the charity of those who had stayed behind. In the next chapter we discuss who could be trusted 





Chapter 4: Suspect Communities  
‘The great number of Papists in this kingdom, and the obstinacy with which they adhere to 
their own religion, occasions our trying what may be done with their children to bring them 
over to our church.’1 
This chapter begins with a reflection on failure. By 1730 Primate Boulter - the Englishman at 
the very heart of British government in Ireland - accepted that attempts to convert Ireland’s 
Catholics had come to nothing, and advocated targeting their children instead. The lack of 
success in converting the Irish Catholic population since the victory of William of Orange’s 
forces and local auxiliaries three decades before was evident to everyone. This was made all 
the more clear after the findings of the 1731 inquiry into the state of Popery.2 As S.J. Connolly 
has aptly remarked, contemporary observers on both sides of the confessional divide thought 
the number of Catholic ecclesiastic officials had not only failed to decrease since the penal 
laws were instituted, but proportionally exceeded the ratio found in strongholds of Catholicism 
such as Spain and Italy.3  
The passage of penal laws during the twenty year period between 1695 and 1715 had been, in 
part, a coercive measure to encourage conversion, as well as secure the Protestant possession 
of office and property through the disenfranchisement, land confiscation and disarming of the 
Catholic majority. Landholders who would provide the military and political leadership 
necessary for a peasant revolt to become a revolution had been removed or driven down to 
other social groups. The remaining Catholics were effectively ‘unarmed slaves’ and 
theoretically would come from the wider social base needed for a truly Protestant Ireland. The 
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penal laws were designed to prevent or mitigate the conditions that would be favourable for 
any future armed insurrection by the Catholic majority as well as secure Protestant land tenure 
and political monopoly. 
The transient allegiance of individuals of suspect loyalty had been a consistent theme in 
transfers of power in the preceding 300 years of Irish history. Up to this point in the thesis we 
have focused on those excluded from the right to bear arms in Ireland following the end of the 
Williamite war. We also explored what motivated the predominantly Catholic ‘Wild Geese’ to 
return to Ireland after serving in foreign armies. We now examine the changing perception of 
who exactly could be trusted within the community of Protestants to bear arms. The precarious 
security situation in Ireland, threatened both from external invasion and internal revolt, 
necessitated the expansion of the circle of legitimacy outward from Protestant elites to a much 
wider proportion of the Protestant population. Irish elites were forced to concede some 
legitimate displays of political or coercive power to those tasked with their defence. Poorer 
Protestants and Presbyterians were granted the privilege to assemble together and bear arms in 
certain periods, on select days and to have a symbolic place in the preservation of a Protestant 
victory narrative, a distinct social privilege denied to the Catholic majority.  
This chapter explores the persistent worry about how to judge the loyalty of individuals granted 
partial legitimacy, who remained suspected of harbouring other loyalties. In the first section of 
this chapter we vivisect the legal corpus of eighteenth-century Ireland to determine who was 
legally judged to be a Protestant. Understanding how these perceptions were formed requires 
an examination of the response to changing definitions from two different populations, the 
newly resurgent Catholic coverts and the Presbyterian communities. The chapter then looks at 
how Imperial officials who were sent into Ireland attempted to maintain control over an 
increasingly assertive ‘Irish’ interest. This Irish interest did not always line up with imperial 




universally on both sides of the Irish Sea. Questions related to whom was to be deemed a 
Protestant were essentially questions about who could be trusted with state issued firearms and 
to impartially maintain the legal framework surrounding Protestant Ascendancy through state 
service.  
It is perhaps easiest to understand that the question of who could be trusted to be issued state 
firearms was dependent on the wider security situation. In times of duress, the boundaries could 
shift unevenly.4 These boundaries were especially fluid in relation to those deemed to be of 
especially suspect loyalty within the social framework of eighteenth-century Ireland. Both 
Presbyterians and Converts faced similar suspicions towards their motives, and it was made 
clear to those tasked with securing Ireland’s security over the course of the century that former 
Catholics should be suspected the most. How these communities came under suspicion 
differed.5 Converts raised fears of infiltration and were accused of retaining partiality towards 
their former co-religionists in matters of law and order, whereas Presbyterians raised the 
hackles of those who saw them as offering conditional loyalty and appeared to be seeking 
extortionary freedoms when serving as armed retainers of the Episcopalian confessional state. 
We examine the two suspect communities in turn below. 
Irish historians have not been kind to converts, especially after Ireland achieved independence 
in the twentieth century. Recent work has rectified some of these deficiencies. In their edited 
collection Converts and Conversion in Ireland, 1650-1850 Michael Brown, Charles Ivar 
McGrath and Thomas Power address conversion over a period of nearly 200 years. A special 
issue of Eighteenth Century Ireland Society has also added new perspectives. These two new 
                                                          
4 Mark Goldie, ‘The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England’ in T. Harris ed. The 
Politics of the Excluded, 1500-1850 (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp.153-194. 
5 ‘Suspect communities’ has been used in recent studies to compare the Muslim and Irish experience in Britain in 
the last thirty years. See Sean Campbell ‘Policing the Irish: Whiteness, ‘race’ and British cultural studies.’ 




volumes build on earlier accounts that tend to be focused on the relative success of Catholics 
in securing possession of land, inheritance, and positions of influence in the face of the penal 
code and periodic state sponsored harassment.6 The question we must ask is how Irish converts 
influenced confidence or concern about Protestant security. This question is directly linked to 
the maintenance of a monopoly of the gun. Conversion to the established church initially 
entailed the legal right to the possession and use of firearms and the ability to participate in 
civic life in the form of militia service. This was the first step to gaining access to patronage, 
military pensions and sinecures radiating from the court in London and the administrative 
centre of Dublin Castle and an important symbolic ceremony of armed Protestantism. This is 
an aspect of eighteenth-century Irish life that has yet to be fully unearthed by scholars. 
Converts were dangerous members of the Protestant community, but also had the potential to 
be valuable loyal citizens and act as intermediaries between the Catholic and Protestant world. 
Converts provide the historian with a group that straddled the boundaries of the two major 
confessional communities. Pursuing the wider theme of this work in trying to shed some light 
on the chaotic and shifting day-to-day experience of Irish society through a study of the way 
people interacted with the gun, these gatekeepers between two confessional worlds provide a 
key to unlocking an opaque period and opening it up to closer scrutiny. Converts’ fortunes 
shifted throughout the eighteenth century. When the Irish state attempted to regulate whether 
Converts were legally deemed Protestants, they were also effectively regulating whether 
Converts would be allowed to be sanctioned bearers of the gun, and therefore dwell inside the 
circle of legitimacy. This conveyed the boons of being allowed to participate in civic life, own 
land and serve in government office. We now examine how the law regarding Converts shifted 
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as a means of gauging whether converts could be trusted or were to forever be branded as 
Nicodemites. 
Conversion from the Protestant faith to Catholicism had been attempted to be banned in 1697. 
The act, entitled ‘To prevent Protestants turning Papists, and Converts from being reconciled 
to the Church of Rome’ also wanted to prevent the recusal convert from re-joining Catholicism. 
In 1703 the Irish lords justices included a bill entitled ‘for preventing Protestants from turning 
Papists and for any estate of Protestants to descend or come to any papist and to prevent Papists 
from disinheriting Protestants.’7 The 1704 act ‘To prevent the growth of Popery’ added the 
rejected clauses from the earlier act. After 1704 Converts were required to show proof of 
conformity to the established church. Before this time there was no legal requirement.8 After 
the passage of 2 Anne c. 6, a registration of a conversion was required and cost six pence. The 
inclusion of the sacramental test, though controversial, was approved by England against some 
very vocal objections.9 From the earliest years of the eighteenth century, barriers were made to 
both prevent Converts from having a change of heart, and at the same time placing barriers into 
the entry of more Catholics into the Protestant fold. We examine the surviving records to assess 
how many Converts survive in the historical record.  
A total of 5,870 names of Converts exist to 1832.10 Of particular interest is that only 700 
enrolled from 1703-1731. Within this 28 year period conversion rates varied. From 1703-09 
only 36 individuals survive in the record as having officially converted. The majority of the 
remaining conversions took place from 1709-1731, with a rise in conversions taking place in 
the 1720s.  
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By the middle of the eighteenth century 1,870 names were entered into the convert rolls.11 The 
editors of the most recent printed edition of the primary resources for these numbers as part of 
the Irish Manuscript Commission came to the conclusion that this was evidence that ‘Catholics 
managed to evade the operation of these acts.’12 Despite these small numbers, converts had a 
much larger impact on the mentality of those tasked with the governance and security of 
eighteenth-century Ireland. It is our task to recover what that was. It is likely that there were 
Converts who have entered into the historical record. We have to rely on the numbers we have.  
One potential way to recapture what contemporary views of Converts is to examine how those 
living in the time attempted to explain why conversion was not taking place. In the ensuing 
chapter, the way in which converts were viewed is arranged specifically to show how it 
connects to the wider objectives of this work. Coverts straddle the ambiguous inter-relationship 
between coercive legitimacy, the right to wield firearms, and the fear of uncertainty over 
distributing firearms to the wider population.  The chapter has briefly revisited the period of 
the formation of the penal laws in the closing years of the seventeenth century and opening 
years of the eighteenth. We now trace the discussion of Coverts into the middle years of the 
eighteenth when the uncertainties as to who was entitled to bear arms were becoming more 
pronounced. The expansion of the circle of legitimate members of the Protestant community 
meant also identifying what I have referred to as ‘suspect communities’. Once these 
communities had been clarified, restrictions were codified into additional penal statutes and the 
active opposition of attempts to appeal existing laws. Despite the broad time period covered, 
the discussion is limited to how converts were viewed within a larger discussion of the penal 
laws and in access to participation in the enforcement of a Protestant Ascendancy. Converts 
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are compared throughout this work alongside a much larger suspect community in the form of 
Presbyterians.  
Despite their status as fellow Protestants, Presbyterians can be seen as a suspect community 
within Ascendancy Ireland. Although relative latecomers to Ireland, they left a legacy on the 
language, landscape and the politics from that point onward.13 They have generated a large 
number of surviving textual sources, as well as leaving an enduring mark on the early modern 
world through outward migration of Presbyterians from Scotland into Ulster, and from Ulster, 
further outward to the American Colonies and India.14 The study of Presbyterians in Ireland 
tends to fit into several broad categories. A.T.Q. Stewart has looked at the obfuscated history 
of Presbyterians during the Williamite war, perhaps most notably in unveiling that the role of 
Presbyterians in the siege of Derry was less than clear cut, demonstrating that there were 
Presbyterians in the army of James II besieging Londonderry as well as on the walls opposing 
defending it.15 Ian McBride has provided an analysis of the theological splits taking place in 
the Presbyterian community itself.16 Patrick Griffin has succinctly summarized the 
historiography of Presbyterians in eighteenth-century Ireland as ‘mainly attract[ing] church 
historians interested in theological disputes, social historians charting the rise of the linen 
industry, and students of the ‘98 rebellion exploring ways in which a latent Presbyterian 
radicalism contributed to the formation of the United Irish movement.’17 However, historians 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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interested in Presbyterians during the first half of the eighteenth century find themselves 
approaching ground less well tilled. This is especially true when asking questions about 
Protestant confidence and security. What made Presbyterians a ‘suspect community’ was the 
fact that in times of uncertainty or insecurity the need to rely on them as armed retainers of the 
state exposed the weakness of the established church and the Anglo-Irish settlers’ in Ireland. 
The localized settlement of the majority of Presbyterians in the province of Ulster did not end 
the fear that their motives were to dominate the rest of Ireland.  Presbyterians had the 
paradoxical ability of not only being a threat when they first arrived in large numbers in the 
1640s and 1690s, but also weakening Protestant security when they began leaving Ireland in 
the 1720s. Presbyterians were also willing to engage with their critics through the pen, an 
option much less available to Catholics.18 The pamphlet wars were oftentimes targeting the 
clergy of the established church rather than the government directly. However, in a 
confessional state, an attack on the established church was an attack on the government. Clergy 
could use the dangers of Dissenters to prevent the repeal of penal legislation. Four failed bills 
intended to mitigate penal penalties affecting Dissenters were submitted and subsequently 
defeated in 1692, 1695, and 1719.19 
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19 See ‘Ease of Protestant Dissenters’ (1692), ‘Exempting Protestant Dissenters from the penalty of certain 
laws‘(1692) ‘Ease of Protestant Dissenters’ (1695) and ‘Qualifications of office holders under act to prevent the 




Officials’ views of members of suspect communities, whether Protestant Dissenters or Catholic 
converts, were obviously affected in part by how secure churchmen and gentlemen felt towards 
the threat posed by the Catholic Irish majority. The rest of this chapter will address the themes 
introduced above. First, as a means of recapturing a contemporary view of both these 
communities we begin with the correspondences of Richard Cox. His letters and speeches 
provide an impression of how these two suspect communities were seen by a member of the 
Anglican elite and can provoke thoughts on broader questions of who could be seen as loyal 
and who was not.20 Secondly we examine the changing perceptions towards the role of converts 
to the established church and how much Presbyterians in Ireland could be included into the 
fold in the face of renewed concerns about rising Irish Catholic confidence, fears of invasion 
from abroad, and a growing fracture between Irish expectations of the need for garrisoning and 
imperial priorities to send soldiers abroad. The chapter briefly examines legislative approaches 
to the problem of converts in the legal profession. By controlling who was allowed into the 
minority community of those sanctioned to bear arms, they were by default maintaining a strict 
monopoly on legitimate bearers of state and private arms. By defining who could practice the 
law, they ring-fenced a law code that had to be relied on despite its deficiencies. In controlling 
how some of those in the Protestant community could bear arms, the churchmen and gentry 
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S.J. Connolly has claimed that Catholics were attempting a counter-revolution against the 
already ascendant Protestant elite, and that the Protestant gentry’s status as an elite was not a 
recent development. Protestants in Ireland were, even before 1691, the majority holders of 
property, and thus of power. The failure of a Catholic counter-revolution meant that the 
‘Williamite victories of 1690-1 were less a triumph of a new order than the re-establishment of 
one that had already existed for more than thirty years.’21 Connolly also emphasizes the higher 
importance of churchmen in Irish governance than in England, and the more opportunities for 
upward mobility into the higher ranks of the gentry. This contributes to an overall assessment 
of the Anglo-Irish elites as a powerful and confident power.22  
Éamonn Ó Cíardha and the late Breandán Ó Buachalla provide evidence for the much longer 
survival of a credible and resilient Catholic and Jacobite challenge to a Protestant power in 
Ireland.23 Others have examined the survival of Catholics regionally and strategies of 
maintaining land holding through proxies.24 What is less contentious in this debate is that 
Protestants reinforced their possession of land and positions in government and the judiciary 
as well as security through the drafting of a number of penal statutes designed to extirpate Irish 
Catholics as both a political and military threat, which we have examined earlier in this work.25 
Irish historians, when writing about the penal laws and Protestant perceptions of Catholics in 
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the eighteenth century will invariably seek out the papers of Richard Cox. His voluminous 
correspondences are held in repositories in the UK and Ireland, as well as specialist and private 
collections.26 In this section we look to the opinions of those who were considered of suspect 
loyalty in the correspondence of Richard Cox. This was an individual with a confident 
assessment of the strength of Protestant Ireland, and gives a differing view of whom was a 
greater threat to a lasting Protestant Ascendancy. 
Richard Cox’s family had settled in Munster in the early seventeenth century, and he provides 
a Protestant perspective on events of his time. Cox himself would rise to the heights of the 
judiciary as Lord Chief Justice, as well as maintaining a number of elite connections in 
England. Despite this wide array of materials, one quote in particular is often used to support 
the portrayal of Anglo-Ireland flush with victory after the ‘shipwreck’ of Catholic power in the 
1690s. A people looming triumphant after the flight of the Catholic landed gentry, churchmen 
and soldiers, following their defeat.  
The letter below was written by Richard Cox to his friend Lord Edward Southwell who was 
then in Whitehall. It is here truncated in the form that it is most often cited. He writes referring 
to Presbyterians’ cunning inflation of the threat of the native Irish Catholics to the Established 
Church. 
Their first & [main] cunning is to represent the Irish as formidable tho[ugh] they 
really despise them, & know that their youth [and] gentry are destroyed in the 
rebellion, or gone to France. That those who are left are destitute of horses, arms 
[and] money, capacity and courage that 5 in 6 of the Irish are poore insignificant 
slaves. 27    
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This is generally used as evidence that Cox, as a prominent and rising beneficiary of post-
Williamite Ireland, was clearly aware of the deficiency of those remaining Catholics in Ireland. 
Likewise, the Presbyterians knew this to be true as well, despite claims of an enduring threat. 
Even more telling is the next sentence which described the Irish that were left in Ireland as 
lacking the primary characteristics of being a credible threat; citing deficiencies in finances, 
military grade horses, and the weapons and training required to win in a sustained conflict. The 
demographic fact of the severely outnumbered Protestant elite was also mitigated by the 
wording of the letter. 
Fit for nothing but to hew wood [and] draw water lastly that even their number that 
is not above 2 to 1, viz 800,000 [Irish] & 400000 British in Ireland, but perhaps I 
think not so much, for the English [and] especially Scots increase faster in 
proportion by newcomers, [and] the Irish lessened by converts, which I compute at 
least 10,000 every year which turn Protestant to get service.28  
The biblical reference is found in Joshua 9: 23 and compares the ancient Gibeonites to the 
Irish. Through their labour, they were fit to be only those who would ‘hew wood’ and ‘draw 
water’. This was combined with a rosy estimate of Irish demographics which provided 
further security to the outnumbered elites.29 That the fecund Protestant population’s’ growth 
took place alongside the conversion of some of their enemies further eroded the numerical 
strength of the defeated Catholics. It is clear why this particular letter, out of the voluminous 
correspondence of Cox is so often cited. Cox’s confident assessment was also embraced by 
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Jonathan Swift and Henry Maxwell, who produced optimistic estimates of the Protestant 
population of Ireland in comparison to the Catholic majority.30   
However, reading the full letter reveals that the intent of the writer is often overlooked by 
those trotting out the above quotes to bolster an argument for Protestant confidence. Of the 
three pages of the letter, Catholics feature only in the preamble. The real thrust of the letter 
is a repudiation of Presbyterian claims of loyalty and military competency during the siege 
of Derry as a justification for having a part in governing Ireland. This can be read as 
ascribing to them the attributes given to Catholics in the sections quoted above. Cox is keen 
to refute them because they are claiming a status that is not their own, committing the sin of 
vainglory.  
In a mixture of tongue in cheek humour and biting political commentary, Cox writes: 
‘Everyone go[es] to heaven in their own way, but when it comes to governance, tis necessary 
that the dissenters be saints, but tis not so that they should be magistrates.’31 Cox also refutes 
the claims of loyalty to the Protestant Interest at the siege of Derry, based on conversations 
he had with those who had survived it.32 He writes that ‘of the first six companies raised in 
Derry upon shutting the gates, 5 captaincies were viz. Norman, Cocker, Jemmet, Tomkins 
[and] Moncreif, and but 1 viz. Lecky, a [D]issenter.’33 Cox has thus deprived Presbyterians 
of the capacity and courage earlier remarked as being so lacking in Catholics. Cox goes on 
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to claim that ‘The Irish love me as their least cruel enemy, and some others called me a 
Papist.’34  
Taking the letter in full, alongside the wider volume of correspondence, it seems that 
scholars may be missing the point of the letter by examining only the opening paragraph. 
Cox is not setting out a manifesto of Protestant superiority over a nation of slaves or 
bondsman, he is removing the threat of a Catholic uprising to deflect arguments for 
bolstering Presbyterian participation in the governance of Ireland, whilst at the same time 
removing a claim of service during the Williamite war by showing the minor role that they 
played in the siege of Derry gained through the eye witness reports from those who were 
present.35 By this trick of transformation, the Presbyterians were not only deprived of the 
position of being loyal armed retainers crucial to the security of the Anglican confessional 
state, but also reduced to the outer fringes of legitimacy. They could be trusted to serve as 
temporary mercenaries, but should not be allowed into the administration of the peace.36 
This has important implications for understanding the interplay of confidence, conversion 
and armed loyalty, as well as for the reaction by Anglo-Irish elites towards the passage of 
additional penal legislation. Cox was willing to allow Presbyterians to practice their faith; 
however, it was the governance of Ireland that was restricted to those of the established 
church. Cox described the existing laws as not actually effecting Presbyterians overly 
harshly. 
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I have the favour of [yours] of 31 Oct [and] 2 instant. And first for the Dissenters, 
you will be surprised when I assure you, that there is no penal law against them in 
Ireland at all. Except the act of uniformity, which imposes G[o]d [and] Sunday by 
not coming to church and tho[ugh] designed ag[ainst] Papist, yes the expressions 
being general may comprehend them, but was never put in execution ag[ainst] 
them, that ever I heard.37 
Although Presbyterians may have disagreed, Cox was under the impression that 
enforcement was restricted towards Catholics in practice, and that ‘that they may [go] to 
heaven from Ireland without any danger of any penal law as by the test act against Popery 
excluded from government, unless they conform to it.’38 Richard Cox was clearly not of the 
disposition to assign Presbyterians to hell for an errant belief, but rather intending to 
demonstrate that by not taking an oath under the Test act, they were excluding themselves 
from a place in governing this world, and more specifically, the part of it made up by Ireland. 
Conforming to the established faith, including the retrospectively ludicrous estimate of 
10,000 Catholic converts a year referenced in an earlier letter, was a clear enough act by 
which to judge loyalty and trustworthiness to the state.  
In the case of Catholic Converts, Cox himself took a special pride in his own role as a 
missionary.39 Cox’s own correspondence shows a number of examples. He used his 
connections to assist recent converts to access patronage, as was the case of the military 
officer Florence Carthy. ‘There is one Florence Carthy, was a [captain] in D. Donovan’s 
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Reg[iment]. He is a one convert of mine [and] would make a very good captain.’40 Another 
letter of a similar tone from the same year also highlights Cox’s support of conversion.  
‘Enclosed is a Petition of [Sir] Arthur Shaen, which pray you promote, that is to get a 
Reference upon it: He is a Convert [and] our friend, [and] the thing is for publique 
advantage.’41 Another instance has Cox remarking on his own views on sincerity. ‘I have 
no regards to shibboleth or siboleth in matters of justice.’42 Cox closed the letter saying he 
had a similar respect for the ‘sincere convert’. Given the acknowledgement of the dangers 
of the conversion of insincere coverts who were motivated by the perceived benefit such a 
condition brought shows that even for someone as confident of the gradual mass conversion 
of Catholics as Cox saw degrees of sincerity in the act of conversion. For Cox, it was the 
‘sincere convert’ who was to be most respected and given access to patronage, largesse and 
the opportunity to bear arms in defence of the state. Perhaps the reason for such a focus on 
motivation was the degree of reliance on formalized oaths. 
The longest letter on the topic of the conversion of Catholics to the established church 
reveals the reason for this faith in the sincerity of the conversion, and of the value of an oath 
being made.  
You sent me a petition of one Cap[tain] Florence M’Carthy who was one of my 
converts [and] so sincere a one that being Mortally wounded in a –illegible-  his 
friend called for a’ priest, but he refused [and] said he was no hypocrite [and] sent 
for a minister, he brought in a company of Irish just before the surrender of 
Limerick of which service my Lord Romney was so sen[s]ible that he promise him 
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a captain’s commission in capt[ain] Houek’s Reg[iment], but I think it went to the 
west Indyes: he was also serviceable in a point of intelligence.43 
The ignominy of false oaths was a great character flaw for Cox, and he respected those 
who made sincere commitments. His enduring personal friendship with recent converts, 
many of whom changed sides during the period of uncertainty between the landing of 
William of Orange into Ireland and the ratification of the Treaty of Limerick was based 
on individual relationships cultivated during the conflict. However, the greatest danger 
that conversion represented was that it provided a means of re-entering the patronage of 
the state for those with less sincere convictions. By conforming to the established church 
Catholics were granted rights akin to those granted through negotiated surrender at 
Galway and Limerick. The men who converted were not the vast Catholic peasantry. 
Instead, conversion provided a means of disposed propertied Catholics to retain or regain 
their ‘horses, arms [and] money.’44 
Cox was not unaware of the dangers of recusant converts, remarking on it during the 
reign of James II. In 1688, when writing to Robert Townshend he reported that he and 
others were aghast at marriages across the confessional divide. Cox wrote that he was 
‘alarmed to report that Sir John Senior is married to a Papist lady, tho[ough] I hope such 
a match will not less his integrity yet it will wound his Protestant reputation.’45  
The issue of integrity of conversion is a recurrent themes of Cox’s letters and public 
speeches. In a speech given as a judge of the court during the Court of Claims in 1699 
Cox made a clear comparison with the issue of integrity and the wrath of god when people 
broke oaths. Cox first began by using the opening words of his letter to ‘indicate the 
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honest of the English nation, and the sincerity of the Protestant religion, to assert the 
King’s honour, & rescue faith from violation.’46 Cox then alludes to the fate of oath 
breakers from scripture and the history record, noting that Catholics were notorious in 
the practice. Cox then explains that he would give ‘due right [to] an Irish papist when 
ever [he] comes before me in judicature or elsewhere.’47 The motivation for this in part 
was the conviction that this even handedness would ‘convert as many of those Papists as 
have a good understanding’48 of theology. 
Despite the comfort of a vengeful God striking down oath breakers, insincere conversion 
presented immediate concerns about security, especially as it allowed access to positions 
of power or security. Cox epitomizes the debates surrounding the changing perception 
towards how to balance the necessity of recent Converts and Dissenters in the defence of 
Ireland from external and internal conquest or rebellion with the high cost of granting 
them legitimacy beyond periods of increased threat.  
Unlike Cox, not all Protestants were so bellicose in their view of the strength of Converts’ 
convictions. Cox’s argument on Presbyterians effectively disarmed the central arguments 
put forth to allow them access to positions of power in exchange for military service. The 
reinforcement of the central role of the Church of Ireland in the iconic siege of Derry, 
despite not being grounded in historical truth bolstered argument of Episcopalian loyalty. 
The repeated attempts on the part of members of the Presbyterian community to justify 
a place in the governance of Ireland was based on the threat of another rebellion and seen 
as not only iniquitous, but based on falsehood. Cox blunted the perceived threat of a 
Catholic uprising to remove the momentum of the Presbyterians’ most potent argument. 
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In a generations time this sleight of hand would not be so easy to perform. Protestant 
confidence began wavering. We examine those fears in the next section by looking at the 
growing awareness of the enduring disparity in population between Protestants and 
Catholics.  
ii. 
Protestant fears about security were tied to two different but equally dangerous scenarios. One 
was the spectre of insurrection by the Irish Catholic majority, aided by insincere converts or 
Jacobites corrupting the apparatus of governance and law and order from the inside. This 
coexisted alongside Protestant fears of the threat of an invasion from abroad from a shifting 
roster of European enemies. What linked the fear of domestic invasion with foreign landings 
was the suspicion that a foreign invading force would be spearheaded by armed Irishmen 
returning home well-armed and with new list of grievances. They would link up with a restive 
Catholic majority waiting for a chance to rise in rebellion. The fact that such a rebellion did 
not materialize failed to remove the fear that of another 1641 from influencing contemporary 
domestic and foreign policy. 
These fears were coupled with doubts as to the reliability and likewise the danger of relying on 
the Presbyterians to secure the Protestant Interest, as well as the cost to be paid in doing so, 
both fiscally and politically. Providing the Presbyterians with firearms and military rank, or 
allowing them a place in the shifting narrative of the successful defeat of King James and the 
Pretender were issues present on the minds of those tasked with securing the growing and far 
flung British military commitments. In the 1720s this problem was to be exasperated because 
of the Presbyterian population’s mass emigration to New England and the West Indies. This 
was just one of a number of crucial generational and demographic shifts taking place in the 
first three decades of the eighteenth century between those who had lived through, and been 




of confessional backgrounds could said to have been unified together in one respect. A group 
of young Irishmen were growing to maturity outside of the shared turmoil of rebellion and war 
that so influenced the generation before. 
It is this interaction, between failed expectations of the extirpation of Catholicism envisioned 
by the creators of the penal laws and the newly resurgent expectations of a new generation of 
Irishman that provides such fertile material for understanding how the Irish experience 
changed. S.J. Connolly ends the first chapter of Religion, Law and Power entitled ‘A New 
Ireland’ by proclaiming that ‘For better or worse, the Protestant elite, in town and country alike, 
would from now on have to live with the Catholic lower classes, as they were or as they might 
be made’.49 We opened the chapter with a member of the Irish Protestant elite’s arguments of 
the strength of the established church in Ireland against both Popery and challenges from 
Protestant Dissenters. It was about a man who personally converted armed Catholics into 
stalwart allies. By the 1720s renowned fears of invasion and insurrection led to a period of 
legislative uncertainty and fears as to the stability of the local Protestant regime and the loyalty 
of the Irish towards England’s interest. This was in part because of the demographic realities 
more and more apparent to contemporary observers. It was also influenced by the failure of 
widespread conversion and the uncertainty of the loyalty of those who did convert. This fear 
was especially intense in regards to practitioners of law. These three fears are examined in turn 
below. 
Bishop Nicolson’s letters to Archbishop Wake in Canterbury are placed alongside the 
correspondence of Hugh Boulter to form a valuable source base for attempting to place 
Protestant confidence of their position vis-à-vis the Catholic majority, predominately 
Presbyterian Scots in Ulster, and the increasingly independent English settler population. Both 
                                                          




of these groups were outsiders, and as such provide an insight to changes taking place. This 
section uses this correspondence to examine incidents of ‘insolence’ to establish where 
Protestant confidence in their own security was wavering, and when suspect communities 
became increasing topics of discussion. ‘Insolence’ as a descriptive term of the behaviour of 
the Catholic and Presbyterian population was intimately related to Anglican elite views of their 
own security. Defining what constituted an insolent act to someone two hundred and eighty 
years ago is a daunting task, but one made easier by relying on the words of the people 
themselves. In letters from the period, descriptions of insolent acts ranged from broader 
descriptions of the flaunting of religious services taking place before the eyes of the established 
clergy to more specific descriptions of individual behaviours or obstinacy and direct threats.  
For our purposes, the moment that insolence became a credible threat to Protestant Ascendancy 
was when such incidences involved Converts who would be lax in enforcing the law in 
prosecuting their former co-religionists for violating the penal laws regarding firearms or 
seeking service overseas. To put it bluntly, large groups of Irish Catholics in the countryside 
were a nuisance but not an existential threat given the military garrison securing the countryside 
and the robust legal architecture of the penal laws. However, the threat of non-enforcement or 
the presence of compromised magistrates taking place alongside growing overseas military 
commitments for regular regiments created an alarming opportunity for the re-arming of 
Catholics. Such night terrors were potent portents of the bloodbaths and horrors of 1641 or the 
rampant insecurity of 1688.  
Obviously conversion was also crucial in preserving Catholic land tenure and the maintenance 
of estates through Protestant intermediaries or conversions of convenience rather than 
conscience. This was a persistent bugbear to Protestant thought. Catholic strategies for 




Whelan, who find convincing evidence that Catholics maintained possession either through 
collective family strategies or by acting as intermediaries.50 
Equally insolent were Presbyterian militia members who could use their temporary status as 
armed defenders of the state to harass those who they were in theory protecting. These 
complaints came in the wake of discussion following the invasion fears and insecurity of 1715, 
sharing a general displeasure at the prospect of Presbyterians becoming officers in the militia 
and the regular army.51 This caused an outcry from the clergy of the Church of Ireland that the 
Presbyterians were becoming ‘insolent in the highest degree’.52 The Archbishop of Armagh 
observed that if the government allowed Presbyterians to become officers it would ‘raise some 
men's imaginations so high as to make them think that on occasion they might be able to act 
independently of England.’53 A full account of the formation of the militia legislation which 
prefigures our discussion can be found in Neal Garnham’s recent work on the militia and is 
engaged with later on in this work.54  
One particular incident that occurred a few years before the arrival of Bishop Nicolson provides 
an example of how firearms, insolence and insecurity could all come together in personal 
interactions. In 1715 clergy and members of the Church of Ireland brought a case to the county 
assizes complaining of the behaviour they had been forced to endure from local Dissenters 
during searches for arms or hidden supporters of the Jacobite pretender.  
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The pamphlet starts with a list of grievances, stating that:  
[They] have of late suffered great hardships, by having [their] houses searched as 
disaffected persons, and those arms they kept for [their] necessary defence taken 
away from them; and in some cases by such who seem not to have any lawful 
authority so to do; and that the Dissenters, who have always been treated with much 
tenderness by us, have been very active in carrying on, and chiefly concerned with, 
these practices.55 
The proceedings and testimony at the assizes centred on a search for arms by a local 
Presbyterian schoolteacher and ‘about thirty armed men, all Presbyterians’56 The list of  
incidents that had been supposedly perpetrated by these local men had  caused so much distress 
that it made ‘people terrified from coming to publick prayers and service’.57 It was the ‘the 
intollerable insolence of Dissenters,’ which had ‘almost frighten them from owning themselves 
Churchmen’58 This was not a display on the part of members of the established church of their 
power and confidence. That loyal members of the established church could so easily be 
disarmed by supposed allies was not to be dismissed lightly, especially given the concentration 
of Presbyterians into the northern part of Ireland. 
In another deposition, a member of the established church was asked to get fodder for some 
horses by one of the Presbyterian militiamen and he subsequently agreed to do so. However, 
another member of the same group demanded he do so faster, and this caused the man to refuse. 
The reported reply from the armed and mounted Presbyterian was that ‘if he did not go, he 
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would make him, for the Day has turned.’59 Justifications for this search for arms were varied. 
In some cases the men had sheriffs with them, and in others they claimed they had orders to do 
so. In one case, seven men without any proof of authority seized the one fowling piece they 
found, and refused to return it.60 One of the more esoteric was the claim that the presence of a 
dead seagull was a secret signal that arms were hidden in the house.61 Others testified that there 
were reliable reports of people of suspect loyalties being hidden inside local residences. During 
the assizes itself, several members of the grand jury expressed surprise that such events could 
have taken place without them being aware, and attested that in their neighbourhood Dissenters 
were ‘very quiet and peaceful.’62 Further testimony claimed that other acts of spiteful behaviour 
had taken place. A servant described how Dissenters had ransacked the carefully folded linen, 
the men doing the searching alleging that ‘they did not know but Pocket-Pistols might be hid 
in trucks.’63  
At the end of the trial, it was decided that the Dissenters, as sanctioned members of the militia, 
had been following orders to secure the firearms of suspect persons. These orders had been 
issued by the High-Constable to the Justices of the Peace, in reaction to reports that local 
Anglican clergy had been overheard given traitorous toasts. After some deliberations, the grand 
jury found the Dissenters to have been acting within their orders, had done so courteously, and 
given that the area these searches took place in was near the seacoast and bordering Scotland 
during a time of rebellion, was totally justified. They were also at pains to remark that ‘the 
Established Church in this County and Diocese is a safe, peaceful and flourishing condition.’64 
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The contents of the letters of an outside observer sent to the region do not seem to portray the 
same confident assessment.  
In May of 1718, Bishop Nicholson received orders to begin residence in Londonderry. In a 
telling description of how ‘safe’ the countryside was scarcely three years after the trial 
discussed above, Bishop Nicholson wrote to his ecclesiastical superior to explain that ‘the roads 
thither are, somewhat unaccountable, much infested with several gangs of Rapparees   who 
have lately commited two or three barbarous murders; and their chief ring-leaders are thefore 
outlaw’d &ct’65 The Bishop had to be escorted to his new post under escort of ten armed 
Dragoons to secure his person and the accompanying Dean.66 This is a stark reminder of the 
insecurity of Irish roads between the comparative security of its fortified and garrisoned towns 
that endured into the middle of the eighteenth century. 
He also discovered how ‘flourishing’ the church was in Ulster. Travelling from Dublin and 
through the drumlins of south Ulster, he described the state of the established church in less 
than glowing terms. Bishop Nicolson was dismayed to see that ‘The churches are wholy 
demolish’d in many of their parishes’67 and that the clergy mostly resided in Dublin, leaving 
‘the conduct of their popish parishioners to priest of their own persuasion’.68 This was despite 
persistent attempts to legislate on the problem of clergy arriving from abroad, and supports 
Connolly’s assessment of the large number of priests remaining in Ireland.69 
In terms of being ‘flourishing’ it was perhaps the stark poverty of the countryside which 
surprised the Bishop the most as he exclaimed that he  ‘never beheld even in Picardy 
Whespalia, or Scotland such dismal marks of Hunger and want as appeared in the countance 
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of most of the poor creatures that I met on the road.’70 He further described how ‘these sorry 
slaves plow the ground to the very top of the mountains’ to support a landlord, a wife, and 
‘commonly ten or twelve bear legged children.’71 What was the most worrying of all was that 
‘to complete the misery, these animals are bigoted Papists, and we frequently met them 
trudging to some ruin’d church or chapel either to mass, a funeral, or a wedding, with a priest 
in the same Habit with themselves.’72 The fecundity of the Catholic lower orders despite such 
abject poverty was worrying in its own right from a demographic perspective. Despite a robust 
effort on the part of local Protestants to present an idyllic and peaceful land, in the hills and to 
the west there remained Catholic Irishmen with a dogged determination to survive, and there 
were ‘twelve bear legged children’ to every Protestant gentleman tipping his hat to his 
Presbyterian neighbour. 
After arriving in Derry itself, just how outnumbered the established clergy were was made 
clear. On the first day of August Nicolson gave a warning that it was prudent to give some 
respect to the Presbyterians who he estimated had 800 families to the 400 conformist and 400 
Catholic families in Londonderry.73 He described how in some parts of Ulster, the ratio was 
more like 40 to 1. The matter was bluntly addressed when Nicolson explained that if the 
government were to ‘withdraw its protection and the Test-Act; I know or rather every man 
must know & see what would become of us.’74 Rather than the stark poverty and armed 
militancy of south Armagh, Nicolson was struck by how much power would have to be 
acknowledged to the Presbyterians. Bishop Nicholson lamented that the ‘present insolence of 
our Popish clergy is unspeakable; which shows they are animated by some secret abetters.’75 
In another letter, Bishop Nicholson linked the Catholic clergy directly to encouraging young 
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men to go overseas, writing that a new law against Irish Catholics attempting to serve under 
arms abroad would hopefully ‘curb the bold and traitorous practices of our (numerous) popish 
adventurers; who are spirited on, & encouraged in their treason by the daily-increasing sholes 
of Priests and Fryors from abroad.’76 To make matters worse, Nicolson remarked that ‘not only 
our People but our magistrates seem to desire and love it so.’77 This reiterated a sentiment he 
had earlier held in regards to Scotland in 1708.78 
Taking up arms abroad was seen as the most ‘open insolence’ of all.79 The increasing reports 
of Irish Catholics attempting to join the armies of France and Spain filled the letters of the 
period. Lord Primate Boulter sent word in the spring of 1724 of reports that ‘lusty young 
fellows are quitting the country, or pretending to go to England for work.’80 He further 
remarked that nobody questioned that they were all ‘really going into Foreign Service.’81  The 
destination of the men was either France or Spain, both frequent enemies of Britain, but the 
repercussions were much more localized.  
Boulter wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury that ‘By the Laws here, it is Capital to list or be 
listed in any foreign service, without leave of the Crown.’82 This issue was partially addressed 
through the successful passage of additional legislation towards suppressing Tories, Rapparees   
and preventing soldiers from enlisting in the foreign service, a topic addressed more fully in 
the third chapter of this work.83 The response to the increasingly concerned tone of these reports 
was to consider the possibility of handing out state and personal firearms to the local, loyal and 
Protestant population against both the threat of insurrection by the Catholic majority and a 
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foreign invasion force led by a vanguard of armed Catholic Irishmen with military experience 
from their service overseas.  
The archbishop Hugh Boulter in 1726 gave voice to further fears: 
As accounts from all hands seem to forbode some mischievous designs among the 
Papists, I am appreciative that before some months are past, it will be necessary of putting 
the militia in good order, to prevent any surprize, especially since six regiments have 
been drawn from hence.84 
The lack of a garrison of regular soldiers necessitated the arming of the population as a militia. 
This was always a weapon of last resort however, as in the North that would necessitate giving 
arms to Presbyterians. Lord Primate Boulter was clear to stress that the Irish government would 
wait until they had a proper representation of the resources available, and what the will of King 
George I would be.  
He wrote much the same in a letter to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland Lord Carteret a few days 
later. Interestingly, in the letter to the Lord Lieutenant, Boulter stressed that there were 
‘likewise accounts from several parts that unusual fasting and devotions are set on foot among 
the Papists, and very seditious sermons preached among them.’85 These unusual displays of 
religious devotion, as well as the increasingly frequent disappearance of lusty fellows led to 
the instructions to customhouse officers to be more watchful of who was attempting to leave 
the country.  
Protestant fears of insurrection and the dangers of Irishman leaving to join foreign armies were 
not absolute. After noticing the lack of any action by the Lord Lieutenant despite the concerns 
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raised by members of Parliament, Bishop Nicolson suspected that Catholics going abroad were 
actually intended for ‘Spanish service against the Moors’86 and furthermore, that they were 
being raised with the permission of the English Monarch.  He went even further when 
describing an additional benefit assuming that the Irish were actually intended to be used 
against Muslims in North Africa. ‘If this be the case, we have reason to wish that whatever the 
number may be that are already shipped over, they might be doubly increased’: those that had 
left were ‘bigoted Papists’.87 He went on further to conclude that although they might wish to 
come back to Ireland as invaders, the chances were unlikely. 
In 1721, confidence was fluctuating, and not just for members of the Church of Ireland. 
Nicolson described how ‘Our Papists on one hand and Presbyterians on the other, seem 
chearfully to expect some speedy turn in their favour; whilst the members of the established 
church look Sullen and discontent.’88 Scarcely four years later, on a warm summer night and 
at the epicentre of English power in Ireland men were assembling onto St. Stephen’s Green.  
Several concerned locals sent word to the Lord Mayor of a ‘numerous rabble’ that were 
continuing to gather there. The Lord Mayor, the Sheriffs, and a few attendant aldermen and a 
number of magistrates went to disperse them and were quickly sent running from volleys of 
stones, bricks and clods of dirt.89  
The failure of the local representatives of law and order resulted in the sending in of a military 
detachment of 40 infantry and an additional 40 Soldiers on horseback. The soldiers fired into 
the crowd, wounding several and thirty were subsequently taken into custody.90 Boulter 
suspected that they were not a real threat, but rather that because of the war, ‘Papist[s] are better 
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at heart, and so might come in greater numbers.’91 Clearly, insolence was influenced by British 
fortune abroad. The spirits of local Catholics were also perceived to be fluctuating alongside 
election results, with Boulter writing to Lord Carteret in late June of 1729 ‘ …that anything 
which looks like bringing the  Tories  in power here, must cause  the utmost uneasiness in this 
kingdom, by raising the spirits of the Papists of this country’.92 
In the following spring, Boulter reported on a discussion that had suggested the recruitment of 
local men into army detachments. This emergency measure was deemed necessary because of 
the great difficulty of getting recruits in England or Scotland as a result of heavy recruitment 
by English regiments. He proposed that they could address this deficiency by relying on the 
local Irish Protestant population for recruits. This would require being given permission to 
temporarily be allowed to do so given restrictions intended to preserve the Protestant 
population’s numbers in Ireland. He assured the Duke of Newcastle that they would stipulate 
that no recruit would be allowed to enlist unless they could prove that they were Protestants 
with a certificate, and that both their parents were also Protestants. Ulster was described as 
being full of men who were ‘hearty and zealous for his Majesty and family.’93  
The small number of battalions stationed in Ireland, sufficiently augmented by recruitment of 
local Irish Protestants, was thought  necessary to ‘discourage Papists from too hastily listening 
to the emissaries of Spain, who are no doubt at present very busy amongst them, and given 
them hopes of some disturbance here.’94 In a further sign of what quality of persons were going 
to be needed on such short notice there was also to be a suspension of a minimum height 
requirement.95The combination of men leaving for overseas service, and the prospect of 
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Spanish agents or seditious words by Priest and Friars were especially troubling in an 
environment where Catholics could be observed by their neighbours to be avidly following 
news of British defeats or setbacks abroad. However, local Catholics were unarmed and poor. 
They were not to be feared as long as no foreign Monarch was willing to back them.96  
It was considered fact that that ‘the inhabitants of those places being Papists [sic] will have 
greater regard to the interest of France and Spain than to that of England and Ireland.’97 This 
in and of itself is not especially surprising. What is noteworthy was that even in the centre of 
English power in Ireland troops had to be called in to disperse an unruly crowd and that a high 
ranking member of the Church needed to be escorted by ten armed and mounted men to travel 
from Dublin to Londonderry. The marked confidence of the arguments of men like Cox was 
eroded by the increasingly visible endurance of Presbyterians lobbying for a more equal share 
of power and a profoundly enduring Catholic Irish population whose perhaps most insolent act 
was not only to continue to exist, but to grow.  
iii. 
Marmaduke Coghill was aging gracefully between bouts of gout as ‘one of the pillars of the 
Irish Protestant establishment’.98 He had served in parliament for Armagh and Trinity College 
Dublin from 1692 until his death in 1739. His letter below was written at the peak of his power 
in 1731, then secure in the sinecure position of chancellor of the Irish exchequer. In the third 
decade of the eighteenth century, a different threat to Protestant power was increasingly 
apparent. 
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the Scotch of the North are mad for goeing to the West Indies, and really most of them 
who are gone, which are about 4500, have had no other reason, but the hopes given them 
of being great men and getting great estates as soon as they land in America.99 
Presbyterians, excluded by the Test act from participating in local government, and facing a 
subsistence crisis in the cruel winters and abysmal harvests of the late 1720s were leaving 
Ireland in droves.100 Landlords relied on local intermediaries to inform them of the day to day 
running of their estates, as well as the impact of departing Presbyterians.101  
To make matters worse as the Dissenters were leaving Ireland as Catholics from abroad were 
returning. Marmaduke Coghill had suspicions as to what was the cause of all this turmoil, as 
he explained in a letter to Edward Southwell in the spring of 1728. 
I am sorry to find that every Session of Parliament, some bill or other is 
constantly brought in to the Prejudice of the Protestant interest of this 
Kingdom, it looks as if the Policy of England is to keep this a popish country, 
what else can be the meaning of this bill in favour of Genll. Dillons sons.102 
More worrying was a bill originating in the English House of Commons enabling the son of 
an outlawed Irish Jacobite to succeed his cousin as Viscount Dillon, despite serving as a 
Colonel in the French service, which had a dangerous precedence on wider fears of 
Presbyterian emigration and Catholic return.103 In the same letter, Coghill went on to express 
fears of larger number of people returning from Europe. 
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...We can’t but be under uneasiness at these proceedings, especially when we 
see every day numbers of people comeing hither from France, and some of 
them commencing law suits on old deeds and morgages, what we can think 
of our selves when the Protestants are running to America, and the Papists 
returning from France hither…104 
At the very point when Protestant demographic strength was perceived to be weakening 
Catholic elites from abroad were returning with claims on old titles. Boulter’s letter to the 
Archbishop in Canterbury highlighted the dangers presented to the established church. 
‘There are probably in this Kingdom five Papists at least to one Protestant: we have 
incuments and curates to the number of 800, whilst there are near 3000 popish priest of all 
sorts here.’105 He also noted the uselessness of the threat of excommunication in a kingdom 
where the majority of religious adherents were Dissenters and Papists, and the reluctance 
and difficulty in getting Dissenters to pay the tithe for the upkeep of the established church.  
Perhaps the most telling admission of the demographic problem was revealed in a letter to 
the Duke of Newcastle in the spring of 1727. Boulter wrote that instead of gaining ground  
‘on the Papists, we must lose to them.’ 106  He then declared that the descendants of many 
of Cromwell’s officers and soldiers had ‘gone off to popery.’107 Whether this was a historical 
truth or a manifestation of the fears of conversion to Catholicism is not clear. Boulter 
referenced the same problem when writing to the Bishop of London in early April 1730. He 
explained that instead of converting Catholics when they were adults, the established church 
instead faced the daily loss of parishioners as the ‘meaner people’ converted to ‘Popery’.108 
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The confidence of men like Cox and Archbishop King of the widespread conversion of the 
Catholic population to Protestantism was a thing of the past.  
Even if successful, a converted Ireland created problems in its own right. One of the things 
that made converts so dangerous was the fact that they avoided the penalties that their 
Catholic brethren faced and were taken into the Protestant fold. A gradual erosion of the 
former enthusiasm for converting the Catholic population was not completely absent by the 
third decade of the eighteenth century, as Hugh Boulter’s proposed solution in the opening 
of this chapter demonstrates. However the number of adherents to a strategy of widespread 
conversion was on the decline.109 In the closing section of this chapter we briefly examine 
one area where conversion of Catholics was successful, and of the response by those 
threatened by this conversion by looking at some of the arguments used to pass legislation 
restricting the rights of converts during this period. 
In 1697 a failed bill entitled ‘To prevent Protestants turning Papists, and converts from being 
reconciled to the Church of Rome’ did not make it past conception in Ireland. Attempts to 
prevent Converts from re-joining the Catholic Church were attempted. However, by 1725, 
a renewed push for penalties and security for the children of Converts resulted in sending 
the English Privy Council a bill entitled ‘For the securing and strengthening the Protestant 
interest in this kingdom, and to oblige converts to breed their children Protestants, and to 
prevent the occasional conformity of Papists.’ The bill was rejected in England, perhaps in 
part because of a petition sent from Ireland by Catholics.110 Another attempt in 1732 to pass 
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a bill entitled ‘For the better putting in execution the several laws and statutes made in this 
kingdom for banishing regulars and Papists exercising ecclesiastical jurisdictions and for 
preventing the growth of Popery and for the more effectual obliging converts and guardians 
to educate children in the Protestant religion’ was also rejected for much the same reason.111   
The problem with Converts was that while they might be reconciled to the established 
church, their wives and children were suspected of still practicing the Catholic faith. Even 
worse, they could petition against legal proscriptions because they were for all intents and 
purposes Protestants. In the next section, we examine first vigilance in preventing men who 
had married Catholics or were suspected of being secret Catholics from serving in the 
revenue service, then look to fears about converts serving in the legal profession. 
Vigilance against intermarriage in the revenue service and a careful scrutiny of religious 
conviction fills the pages of the Revenue minutes. In the spring of 1713, a general order was 
sent out seeking written confirmation that all officers of the revenue had qualified 
themselves as Protestants.112 Outside of the officers’ own religious convictions, marriage to 
a Catholic woman was considered to compromise a man’s loyalty. In 1717, John Ashe was 
dismissed for ‘being marry’d to a papist, violent in his behaviour at the election of 
parlimeant men, & had[sic] concealed arms belonging to John Burke, a Papist.’113 
Obviously, being violent towards political opponents and concealing weapons for a Catholic 
were factors in his dismissal, but his wife’s religion was a key factor in the litany of his 
crimes. However, it was not clear if being married to a Catholic was enough to get a man 
dismissed if he had not committed other crimes. In 1718, reports came in that a superior 
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tidewait named Christopher Bickford’s wife was a ‘reputed papist’114 and requested the legal 
advice on whether having a papist wife was enough for the disqualification of a revenue 
officer. Unfortunately, the minutes do not disclose what advice was given. By 1721, it 
seemed that the legal framework was more absolute, as a boatmen named James Lafferty 
was dismissed for being married to Catholic woman.115 Edward Nearny was dismissed after 
John Carlance said that he had seen him at an outdoor mass at a place called six mile bridge 
near Kisdale, despite the fact that John had ‘passed for a Protestant’.116 A few months later 
instructions were sent that Edward Nearly, a boatsmen in Kisdale, should be looked into, 
‘especially in regards to his religion’ as well as that of another local man whose daughter he 
had married.117 It was not only a matter of dismissing men of suspect loyalty, it was also the 
case that men who were especially vigilant in preventing Catholics from infiltrating the state 
were rewarded for their efforts by appointment to the revenue. In 1722, a man by the name 
of Maurice Hayes was recommended by Lord Cadogan for reporting ‘several Roman 
Catholicks who has[sic] listed in ye regiments of guards’118 The revenue was instructed to 
find a post with a salary of around £30 a year in a section of the service that would fit 
Maurice’s inclination. 
Hugh Boulter was much more concerned with the fact that many of those tasked with 
enforcing the laws and securing the Protestant Interest were Converts. In 1727, he wrote to 
Lord Lieutenant Carteret to explain why the indemnifying bill was needed. Boulter 
explained that the bill would require ‘some years conversion in Papists before practicing the 
law’119 The bill was so specifically worded because ‘nothing can be moved about papist or 
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conversion in either house but what is at last so clogged as to come to nothing’120. Writing 
to the Duke of Newcastle Boulter explained in detail the dominance of the legal profession 
with converts. 
The practice of law, from the top, is at present mostly in the hands of new 
converts, who give no further security to this account than a certificate of 
their having received the sacrament in the Church of England or Ireland 
which several of them who were Papists at London obtained on the road 
hither, and demanded to be admitted barrister in virtue of it, at their arrival: 
and several of them have popish wives and mass said in their houses, and 
breed up their children Papists.121 
Nominal converts attempting to avoid the penal laws were seen as a ‘growing evil’.122 The 
solution was to require the convert to prove the sincerity of their convictions by making a 
declaration against popery and waiting five years before being allowed to work as a barrister 
or sheriff. Furthermore, any child under the convert’s care who was under the age of 
fourteen would have to be raised as a Protestant. If any of these were violated, the convert 
would ‘incur the penalties and disabilities to which those relapsing from the Protestant 
religion to popery are liable.’123  
What does this show us about converts? It may be that perhaps that the reason Converts 
were ‘suspect communities’ is because of what they represented. We return to the enigmatic 
statement made by S.J. Connolly; ‘For better or worse, the Protestant elite, in town and 
country alike, would from now on have to live with the Catholic lower classes, as they were 
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or as they might be made.’124 The Catholic lower classes were not converting, and the 
historical record seems to indicate that in terms of marriages, it was Protestants who were 
marrying into Catholic families. The conversions that did take place were not the poor, but 
rather families of a high enough station to threaten the Protestant elite. The eroding 
demographics of the broader population base that supported the Protestant elite in Ireland 
was more and more apparent. In the army and the revenue service, loyalty had to be 
constantly reassessed to prevent infiltration of men of suspect loyalty. Attempts to remake 
them had failed. 
This chapter has attempted to recapture shifting views on two different suspect 
communities. We examined the changing perceptions towards the role of Converts and 
Presbyterians in Ireland and of the shifting triumvirate of expectation, fear and reliance that 
Protestant elites felt towards both Converts and Presbyterians. ‘Insolence’ was used to 
highlight moments when the illusion of the power and confidence of Protestant elites broke 
down. Thirty armed Presbyterians ransacking a clergyman’s linen chest in Ulster were not 
signs of a confident ascendancy, nor was the extreme vigilance towards the loyalties of 
those men checking the incoming ships for weapons, seditious writing and priests. The fact 
that so many men of suspect loyalty were able to find employment itself demonstrates the 
problem of finding enough Protestants to defend the state from the other. Deciding who 
was loyal was especially important when handing out arms.  The acquisition of enough 
firearms to arm Protestant Ireland is a topic taken up in the next chapter.  
                                                          




  Chapter 5. Arming Ireland: Confessional and Conditional Loyalty 
In the previous chapter I examined the complexities surrounding fears about who could be 
trusted to be loyal enough to be armed by the state during periods of heightened insecurity. As 
the eighteenth century progressed the British empire’s enemies were proliferated. Previously 
this discussion has concentrated on Protestant responses to the phantasm of invasion or fears 
of a local uprising. The lack of an uprising in Ireland during the landings in Scotland during 
1715 or in 1745 did not banish Protestant fears.1 Recurrent rumours of French or Spanish 
backed Jacobite invasions in 1717, 1719, 1721-2, 1743-44 reignited nightmares and made for 
sleepless nights for the less bucolic members of the Protestant minority.2 In the late 1750s 
Britain became entangled in another war with its recurrent enemy France. Ireland faced the 
greatest call on its resources- both fiscal and military- as one participant within the wider 
struggle between the Hanoverian Dynasty in Britain against the Bourbons of France and Spain.      
The conflict was expensive in lives and treasure in the core British dominions and colonial 
territories further afield. The Treaty of Paris would result in the acquisition of substantial new 
territories for the growing British Empire at the cost of incurring a massive debt. Perhaps most 
crucially for our purposes, securing Ireland meant a discussion of who would or should have 
the gun. With new territories came a growing reliance on the Irish establishment to secure these 
gains with contributions. Britain’s increasingly ravenous appetite for manpower steadily 
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eroded the already crumbling cornerstone of the founding myth of the Protestant ascendancy. 
Namely: the absolute monopoly of the right to bear arms by a Protestant minority over a 
Catholic majority. 
As this work has repeatedly argued, Protestant power in Ireland was maintained in part on the 
maintenance a monopolization of the right to wield the gun that had been secured through 
victory on the battlefield. Despite the presence of small numbers of armed Catholics in British 
armed forces, there was persistence vigilance against what was seen as an existential challenge 
to Protestant power in Ireland. The monopoly of the right to bear arms was increasingly 
untenable in the face of arguments to allow Catholic recruitment into the armed forces. This 
does not mean that it was absolutely abandoned in the face of changing times.  
A phrase Charles Ivar McGrath used when describing the supposed demise of Catholic land 
ownership in eighteenth-century Ireland can be equally used to describe the health of the 
foundation myth of Protestant Ireland. The maintenance of the Protestant monopoly of the gun 
was akin to Catholic land ownership in that ‘the slow death was indeed very, very slow, and 
possibly misdiagnosed.’3 In this chapter, we will examine the surprisingly robust health of 
Protestant efforts to maintain their monopoly on firearms despite repeated attempts to legislate 
catholic recruitment to the armed forces. Afterwards, I examine the outbreak of sustained rural 
unrest in two different geographic communities and the impact that this had on Protestant 
attempts to maintain both a monopoly on the gun as well as arguments for a reform of the penal 
laws in a time of increasing security obligations abroad.  
The chapter begins with a brief look at Ireland in comparison to other parts of the British 
dominions in the middle of the eighteenth century and continues with a discussion about 
population. This is followed by an interpretation of Charles Ivar McGrath’s recent work in 
                                                          




Ireland and Empire dealing with the background to changes in recruitment and garrisoning in 
the 1750s and 1760s and of Ireland’s active role as a participant of empire through fiscal and 
military contributions. Of particular use is his discussion regarding changes in imperial policy 
throughout the empire that made Ireland the successful model to be imposed on other British 
possessions. The decision to maintain a standing army of 10,000 in the American colonies after 
the 1763 Treaty of Paris raised a great furore in the colonies.4 However, this must be put in 
perspective. This establishment of 10,000 men stood at this level until 1764, slowly decreasing 
to 7,500 by 1770.5 Estimated to cost £225,000 a year, the actually cost ballooned to an average 
of £384,000 a year. Although the expectation was that the colonies would pay for their own 
defence after the first year, the total customs intake for the entire thirteen colonies by the excise 
commission was a mere £1,800.6 
 The garrison in North America was still lower than the 12,000 men being paid for on the Irish 
establishment, a figure later increased under the tutelage of Lord Lieutenant Townshend 
through an additional augmentation to a total of 15,256.7 Ireland also increasingly beckoned as 
a source for recruits to meet these ballooning requirements. Unlike the growing discord against 
the dangers of standing armies, Neal Garnham summarizes Irish Protestant views on the 
standing army as being one of an expensive but necessary deterrent to a Catholic uprising 
alongside Irish political writings arguing for the establishment of the Militia.8 Robert 
Molesworth’s An Account of Denmark as it was in the Year 1692 provides a criticism of the 
dangers to government from standing armies. However, as Garnham highlights, he did not 
seem so deterred as to avoid taking residency and an active interest in Ireland, the place in the 
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British kingdom where the largest standing army was to be found. Although pamphlets such as 
John Trenchard’s History of Standing Armies and John Toland’s The Militia Reformed were 
printed in Ireland and written by Irish-born authors, Garnham persuasively argues that the 
pamphlets may have been destined for export, and if one goes by time spent in Ireland, the 
Irishness of the authors is found wanting.9 He cites the only two pamphlets produced in the 
1740s to discuss standing armies, both of which advocated putting firearms into the hands of 
Irish Protestants, but had little to say on the dangers of a standing army.10 
At the very time demands for soldiers were growing military recruiters faced an increasingly 
tepid enthusiasm by the Protestant inhabitants of Ulster towards enlisting in Britain’s armed 
forces for service abroad. This need for men meant that from 1756, the formerly suspect 
Dissenters were able to legally hold commissions in the Militia and gained a small political 
standing by being involved with the commissions of the Militia array.11 A careful scrutiny of 
the increasingly strained correspondence between William Pitt and the Duke of Bedford is 
undertaken to gauge imperial concerns about security, manpower and Irish enthusiasm for 
Imperial projects. Manuscript collections from several sources will augment these particular 
letters to give a broader view. The correspondence reveals a conflicting desire to recruit 
Catholics into the armed forces of the Empire for service abroad while still distrusting them at 
home, and the need to defend not only the strategic but the fiscal security of Ireland without 
relying on a standing military force to defend it. This coincided with the dispersal of a large 
number of firearms into regional centres, a reversal of a policy of centralized stockpiles in 
Dublin, and crucially was a catalyst for the long period of failure to control arms in Ireland.  
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Recent scholarship has looked to the acquiescence of Hanoverian viceroys towards a policy of 
allowing Catholics to serve in the armed forces of Great Britain and Ireland. This work has also 
demonstrated the apparent willingness of Irish Catholics to pay revenue taxes without the kind 
of tax revolts or protests that were seen across the Irish Sea in Britain itself throughout the 
eighteenth century. We can perhaps understand some of the strange co-habitations of loyalty 
between the different confessional communities in Ireland increasingly apparent in the middle 
of the eighteenth century. The claim could be made that it is often not seen as either a 
confessional state or a fiscal military state. Ian McBride concludes that none of the four typical 
assessments, dependent kingdom, composite monarchy, colony or ancien régime , are mutually 
exclusive. He rightly notes that no other European kingdom or province was subject to as 
extensive or sustained a colonization, citing the atlanticist approach of Nicholas Canny, but 
finds the parallels at times ‘obscures as much as it illuminates’ by making simple polarities 
between Irish resistance and English colonialism.12 S.J. Connolly concludes that Ireland in the 
eighteenth century was a dependent Kingdom.13 Despite acknowledging Jonathan Swift’s 
eloquence, Connolly saw claims of Ireland as an autonomous Kingdom as a meaningless 
archaism. Connolly lays out the post 1689 Irish political landscape as one of English 
parliamentary authority made manifest after periods of ambiguity in the preceding centuries.14 
The dependency began first with the executive power of the Lord Lieutenant, and patronage 
flowed downward through the civil, military and ecclesiastical establishment. Following a 
series of setbacks in the first three decades of the eighteenth century, most notably the Wood’s 
Half pence crisis, Irish Protestant elites maintained their status in the governing apparatus, 
especially in the case of judges and the excise office. 
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Connolly therefore argues that Ireland was effectively a dependent Kingdom. He is less 
forgiving of arguments that Ireland was a colony akin to Jamaica or Virginia. He dissects the 
arguments of the colonial argument, based on a litmus test of racial difference, geographical 
distance, and the ability to directly project military power. He concedes his argument of 
opportunities and a world view influenced on the metropolis as being firmly centred on English 
norms as largely affecting the 25 percent of the population that was Protestant.15 For the 
remaining 75 percent, we are left with the statement that instances of ‘quiet assimilation or co-
existence’ of Irish Catholics in the wider empire was hidden. Often cited sources of Catholics 
facing distrust was a result of the nature of the sources, made up of court records and other 
records of individuals breaking the laws.16 However, for our purposes the question that is not 
addressed sufficiently in these characterizations is who could be relied upon to defend the state 
from outward invasion or internal revolt.  
It is because of this question of loyalty that I have used access to firearms to determine 
legitimacy. I attempt to demonstrate that the right to bear arms for the state came to replace the 
narrative of confessional notions of loyalty in this period. In the aftermath of the Seven years’ 
war the growth of agrarian unrest led by illegal gangs such as the predominantly Catholic White 
boys and the Protestant  Hearts of Oak are used to explore how the divided narrative of firearms 
ownership resulted in a world turned upside down. In the 1760s Catholics were being armed 
by the Protestant state for service abroad, and local forces of law and order faced turmoil when 
tasked with disarming Protestant subjects who had so recently been granted the status of being 
fully sanctioned bearers of arms. Questions also began to be asked about how to prosecute the 
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combinations of cottiers and manufactures if the traditional methods of gentry defusing the 
situation or the use of exemplary punishment and the courts resulted in failure. 
In summary, the objectives of the chapter are to show that a fracturing of the political and social 
controls on violence at the local and national level were already present forty years before 
Vinegar Hill or Wexford. Firearms were the locus of power for the competing narratives of 
legitimacy, loyalty and legacy. The dispersal of caches of weapons served as a fulcrum to tear 
theoretical differences between confessional communities wide open, and exacerbated long 
standing grievances. A common thread of this entire work has been to shed some light on why 
the bearing of arms was so important to the identity of Irish people from all confessional 
backgrounds. The survival of a vestige of the former Catholic elite after the Williamite war as 
legal bearers of arms, widespread networks facilitating predominantly Catholic soldiering in 
Europe in the face of prescriptions on service at home, and the theatrics of Protestant armed 
volunteer associations all serve as evidence of the gun’s importance towards identity.17 
Charles Tilly has influenced the approach to understanding the increase in violence after the 
1750s in Ireland. In the 1970’s Tilly had a view on violence that refuted the notion of collective 
violence as being a causally coherent domain. However, he did find that most collective 
violence was a by-product of negotiations that were not intrinsically violent. In the last decade, 
Tilly has come to find that there are far fewer causal mechanisms and processes recurrent in all 
collective violence, ranging from brawls to opportunism, now labelled by Tilly as ‘scattered 
attacks and broken negotiation’.18 The monopolization of legitimacy through restrictive laws 
on the ownership and the use of firearms must be seen as one of these fulcrums. In the 1760s 
these competing cultures of the gun that had been simmering beneath the veneer of everyday 
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life reached a boiling point precisely because there were more people allowed to bear arms, 
more arms to bear, and increasing resistance to the polite fictions that had served to secure 
relatively peaceful if resentful co-existence between Ireland’s confessional communities.19  
i. 
We begin with a brief look at Ireland and its changing status in the British imperial portfolio. 
Ireland in the eighteenth century served a similar utility to Great Britain as Sicily offered Spain 
in the sixteenth. It provided a place to garrison an experienced cadre of men in a relatively safe 
environment until needed, as well as to provide a place for new recruits to be trained in the art 
of soldiering. It also served as a font of patronage to secure loyalty.20 Ireland also served a 
means to have a standing army without it having to do the standing in England.  
Ireland also fiscally contributed a substantial part of the upkeep of the army within Ireland, a 
topic increasingly being taken up by those interested in the ever burgeoning studies of Britain 
as a fiscal military state, the neologism coined by John Brewer.21 Stationing a large body of 
men in barracks during peacetime and parcelled out into smaller detachments was not without 
its pitfalls, or any surety that they would not vanish into the countryside if an unhealthy or 
unpopular location like the West Indies was to be their next port of call.  
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Outside of the dangers of outright desertion were persistent reports of drunkenness, corruption 
and intermittent conflict with the locals.22 Neal Garnham has rightly reiterated that these 
concerns were not limited to Ireland, and that desertion rates and unprofessional conduct were 
endemic to early modern armies and was to be found later in the century in the armies formed 
by the levée en masse of the French Republic. Crucially, Ireland was more than a garrison 
outside the Home Counties; it served as a largely untapped source of manpower. The relative 
size of this resource, the reluctance to utilize it, and the pressures to do so are explored below. 
Ireland had somewhere in the range of 3,000,000 inhabitants by 1760.23 Estimating exactly 
when the population entered a period of sustained upward growth has been revised from the 
tentative date of 1780 proposed 70 years ago by Kenneth Connel. As a result of the scholarship 
of L.M. Cullen and the triumvirate of David Dickson, Cormac Ó Gráda and Stuart Daultrey the 
date has been revised thirty years backwards to 1750.24 This substantial population growth 
occurred despite suffering two severe periods of famine in the 1700s and a number of smaller 
subsistence crises. James Kelly's pronouncement that the early eighteenth century was the most 
famine prone five decades in Irish history has garnered further support since he first made the 
claim in the early 1990s.25  The subsistence  crisis  in  1725  and  1726,  and  famine  conditions  
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in  1727, 1728  and  early  1729 and the more severe food crisis of 1740-1 may have precipitated 
the death of 20 percent of the population.26  
This demographic crisis occurred during, and perhaps precipitated, a sustained period of out-
migration. The mass migration of more than 100,000 Ulster Scots to the eastern American 
seaboard during the period also adversely affected population growth.27 This number may be 
an underestimate, and even if an underestimate provides evidence that one in fifteen of the 
inhabitants of the thirteen colonies were Scots-Irish migrants from Ulster. The migrations of 
these men and women had coincided with periods of food scarcity or economic dearth in 
Ireland and Scotland.  
Despite all of these anti-Malthusian factors, Ireland remained home to a burgeoning number of 
inhabitants.  To put that number in comparison, the following section will consider Ireland’s 
population with the other major areas in the British Atlantic Empire below. I have devoted 
space to this to clarify what I consider to be a lack of perspective on the importance of Ireland 
in terms of the entire British empire’s population in the middle of the eighteenth century. 
These population estimates exclude the indigenous Amerindian population for the American 
Colonies and Quebec. Jamaica’s population was much higher than that listed below, but the 
estimate presented below excludes slaves and the Maroon population. I have excluded those 
populations because of the lack of widespread recruiting of either population into the British 
empire’s military during the eighteenth century. My estimates of total population on 
recruitment also exclude the roughly 10 percent of the armed forces made up of foreign 
nationals, largely from small German political entities such as Hesse-Kassel. Hesse-Kassel 
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landgraves served the British government alongside other German regiments and the soldiers 
raised in the Electorate of Hanover.   
 
Scotland had an estimated 1,265,000 by 1755. The entire population of the thirteen colonies in 
1760 was approximately 1,594,000. England and Wales together amounted to 6,736,000 in 
1760.  By 1763, a further 70,000 French settlers were added to this total, with the acquisition 
of Quebec representing less than one percent increase in population. Ireland was a juggernaut 
with approximately 3,000,000 people in an area smaller than the colony of Pennsylvania.28  
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Ireland represented roughly a third of the population available to the British state by the middle 
of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, the population was thought to be robust and healthier 
than that of England, if height is any measure.29 Ireland thus provided a largely untapped 
resource in terms of potential soldiers. Based on proscriptions on recruitment into the rank and 
file of both Catholics and Protestants the majority of it was unavailable. The recruitment of 
Protestants was also proscribed but this was less strictly enforced in times of need, despite 
criticisms that this further exacerbated the demographics of Ireland towards Catholics. One 
crucial argument for banning the recruitment of Catholics was to prevent them from gaining 
knowledge in the use of firearms and military training, a topic examined in depth in a previous 
chapter of this work. Outside of the concerns regarding Catholics with the knowledge of how 
to use firearms was a growing fear that Catholics could be used to enslave or disarm Protestants, 
recalling older Whig fears of a tyrannical government and of standing armies, and Tyrconnel’s 
disarming of Protestants in the lead up to the Williamite war. The fact that resistance to Catholic 
recruitment was so strong in Ireland is not surprising. The fact that it was so successfully 
resisted is, especially given the numbers of men needed in a century of sustained war. 
Charles Ivar McGrath’s recent book on Ireland and Empire provides a strong argument that 
Ireland was not a testing ground for colonial or military innovation, but rather an active and 
enthusiastic participant in empire building.30 McGrath bolsters this thesis by focusing on two 
of the crucial aspects of the rising fiscal-military state, a neologism first coined by John Brewer 
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in The Sinews of Power but a concept with a much longer genealogy.31 Historians have looked 
into the changing nature and cost of conflict long before the late 1980s, as the work of Tilly 
and others clearly demonstrates.32 Much like the battered but still pervasively accepted idea of 
a military revolution, the fiscal-military state endures and has entered into the accepted canon 
of European state formation.33 Patrick Walsh and others have continued to expand our 
understanding of the Irish Revenue and the growth of the fiscal state within Ireland. Issues of 
what to do with the Catholic population also proved to be an issue that led to vastly different 
Protestant opinion, a point explored in the broader British Atlantic context by Stephen Conway 
and others.34 This is an area where work continues to be done, especially in understanding 
regional contribution to empire building, from the gun makers of Birmingham’s influence on 
the slave trade to the importance of saltpetre manufacturing.35 
Ireland would face the greatest call on its resources in generations during the Seven Years’ 
war, and would in parts be found wanting. In a struggle between two very different concepts 
of loyalty local settlers with an adherence to a confessional state faced the pressures of the 
rising demands of a fiscal-military state’s need for manpower and money. Ireland in the 1750s 
and 1760s was approaching a period of crisis when fundamental questions of loyalty, service 
and expectation would be decided largely on the needs for security, both internal and external. 
In the next section of this chapter, we examine why. 
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In 1754, a brushfire war on the edge of the Atlantic Colonies was spreading up the St. Lawrence 
Valley and across the Appalachian mountains. Commercial companies with a writ for plunder 
and profit were conspiring under separate flags and marshalling resources to determine who 
would dominate the Indian subcontinent in the Third Carnatic War. In 1756, Minorca fell to 
French troops fighting an Irish Protestant commanding the British garrison and a British 
Admiral was executed for the disaster. Obligations to protect the territorial integrity of Hanover 
required further commitments of soldiers to secure the Electorate. As 1757’s bloody spring 
sped forward the ruling elites received reports of running battles with no clear victor and 
Hanover overrun. Prussian advances were offset by a series of protracted stalemates in the 
Caribbean. The simmering conflict on the bleeding wild edge of the American colonies led to 
the collapse of two successive British governments. By the end of the year, the news that Berlin 
itself had been overrun and ransomed for 200,000 thalers added to the woes. As the war dragged 
on the cost in lives and promissory notes kept growing. Most ominously by 1759 reports began 
to arrive in Britain and Ireland of French troops being massed along the river Loire and rumours 
of invasions.  By the middle of the summer months hundreds of troop transports and 100,000 
soldiers were being concentrated at a huge cost of 30,000,000 Livres. To put that level of 
expenditure in perspective, the entire French naval department’s yearly budget for that year 
was 57,000,000 Livres.36 Although later in the year Pitt would refer to 1759 as England’s annus 
mirabilis in the early months of the year Fortuna offered so such assurances for the future.37 
Even miracles came at a high cost as Britain’s national debt would rise from £74,600,000 to 
£132,600,000.  
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Britain and Ireland were emptying of soldiers sent to bolster the Electorate of Hanover in a 
marked break from the previous administration’s policy of a focus on French colonies 
supported by naval strategy. Britain was already spending twenty percent of the funds for the 
Army on subsiding the pay of foreign troops, in addition to direct cash subsidies of allied 
governments.38 The conquest of Quebec in 1760 and the securing of the Atlantic colonies also 
drew additional resources from Britain and Ireland. Less than 10,000 soldiers remained in 
England and Scotland to repel the anticipated invasion. As John Brewer emphasized, this was 
a substantial drawdown from the 39,000 men in south Britain in the period of 1756-7. This 
included 20 battalions of German mercenaries.39 
In London plans were being formulated, and decisions discussed that would require more men 
and more money. Ireland’s potential for providing troops was obvious, and the affection of 
Ulster for the Protestant cause relied upon to recruit the necessary numbers. As the following 
section of this chapter will reveal, that hope was soon dashed when facing an uncomfortable 
reality.40 As Protestant Ireland’s willingness to serve decreased, the incentive to recruit from 
the Catholic population grew.  
Ireland’s military establishment was in theory capped at 12,000 men. In times of acute 
manpower shortages, such as 1716-17, 1745-7, and 1757-63, the restrictions on the recruitment 
of Irish Protestants could be relaxed or ignored. The reason this process was only done in times 
of duress came from fear of infiltration by people of suspect loyalty. If Irish Protestants were 
allowed into military units, it became a near impossibility to prevent Irish Catholics from 
joining because of the difficulty of distinguishing someone’s confessional allegiance. In the 
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drawdown following the outbreak of peace, Irish soldiers were removed from the ranks and 
replaced by men recruited from Scotland or England.41 From 1757 the number of men on the 
Irish establishment rose from 17,000 to a peak after 1761 of 24,000 in 1761, of which 8,000 
were to see service overseas.42 This increase was done with a degree of subterfuge on the part 
of the British government as to overall numbers being supported, as the Irish establishment 
was funded through additional loans.43The men to fill those new levies were harder to come 
by. 
The Duke of Bedford, then serving as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, began a series of 
correspondences with William Pitt to express his reservations about new orders being issued 
removing further regiments from Ireland at the same time as calls to raise more were being 
issued. He saw this as having a direct impact on the overall security of Protestant Ireland based 
on the large number of Catholics in the towns of Munster and Connaught., and perhaps more 
so in terms of maintaining internal peace and security44 Even worse, the regiments being sent 
out of Ireland for service abroad were made up of Scotch and English recruits, whilst the ones 
being left in Ireland were being raised locally, and many suspected that they were full of 
Catholics.  
Bedford admitted that the Irish were excellent soldiers in foreign countries, but were not to be 
depended on in their own, a view he put into practice when in advocating the recruitment of 
Catholics for service in the Navy. Bedford also described a threat that loomed much larger on 
his mind than that posed by the unarmed multitude of Catholics. He explained that in Ireland a 
much more dangerous type of Catholic existed. He estimated that ‘there are above 16,000 
Papists in Ireland who have the Knowledge of arms by having it in the Foreign Service.’ Given 
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the level of overseas service by Catholics from Ireland in preceding years, this estimate could 
very well have been credible. Even if an overestimate, there would have been a population of 
military veterans in residence who could have quickly passed on their experience to others in 
the community.’45 
From Pitt’s perspective, Ireland was once more at risk of becoming ‘a scene of massacre and 
bloodshed.’46 More bad news was to follow. Recruitment in Ulster was going very slowly, and 
the local nobility were not helping. The southern ports of Ireland were nearly empty of 
Protestant troops, and the Duke of Bedford was even more worried about the danger to the 
revenue if Cork were to fall, emphasizing that this was more than just a strategic concern.47 He 
then laid out what the likely invasion targets would be, and explained that in most cases, the 
Catholics would assist in the landings. His concern of the linked dangers of the military security 
of Ireland and the fiscal security of Ireland were further linked in a letter at the end of 
November. 
The regiments of Horse in Ireland can be spared as it is basically useless. However, 
Dragoons and light Calvary are fittest, as well in time of peace as war, by their [illegible], 
aiding the Officers of the revenue, and assisting the civil magistrates in the execution of 
the laws, in most parts, cannot be done without a military force, and no less fit to harass 
the enemy.48 
William Pitt’s response was less parochial. He needed soldiers, and he expected to get them. 
‘The deficiency of 1666 men to complete the infantry to the present establishment is a matter 
of some disappointment.’49 Pitt pointedly expressed chagrin at the fact that the burghers from 
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the city of London had at their own expense raised more men that the entirety of Ireland. Pitt 
was careful to re-emphasize that he was not doubting the sincerity of Irish Protestants, ‘but its 
total inefficacy in a conjuction like the present, and with incredulity and supineness  [illegible], 
after so frequent warnings of danger, give just grounds for wonder and concern.’50  
William Pitt was not happy. His letter to the Duke of Bedford expressed his frustration at the 
complaints coming out of Ireland of the emptying of regiments and the effect of its own security 
by suggesting they not rely on rescue from across the Irish Sea. Pitt wrote: 
Ireland, if it will but exert its resources, but its wealth, and by the number and courage of its 
Protestant subjects, will be able to expel and defeat, Propio Morte, any attempts of the 
enemy-imprudent, and for their own sake, in such a critical juncture, to sit still til a descent  
is made upon them unprepared, trusting to reinforcements from Gr. Britain, where troops 
may be no less wanted for their own defence.51 
Pitt went on to encourage the Irish Protestants to follow the example of England, where 18,000 
men had armed themselves to defend the kingdom, headed by the ‘gentlemen of the best 
families and Properties in the Kingdom.’52 Pitt also emphasized once again his trust in Irish 
Protestants’ enthusiasm for the armed forces.53 Ireland had only recently rescinded an order in 
1745 on the recruitment of Irish Protestant into the lower ranks: 
it is expected, from the known zeal of the Protestants in Ireland, that many thousand men, 
before this time, have been put to arms for the defense of their country.- The King will 
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be impatient to know what further steps have been made, in consequences of the Loyalty 
and Spirit supposed by Parliament towards raising additional forces, &c.54   
One month later, and in response to troubling accounts of riots in Dublin that had been 
precipitated by rumours of an impending act of union between England and Ireland, came a 
decision of great importance to subsequent Irish history. William Pitt began dispersing arms. 
Acting, on the King George II’s orders, Pitt ordered the arming of Irish Protestants with 
firearms from the State’s stockpile in Dublin Castle. Pitt stressed that ‘in the precarious & 
shaken state of Ireland, his grace is desired to arm as great a number of Protestant subjects 
as, in conjunction with the King’s forces, shall [be] adequate for the preservation of the 
King’s peace, and to quell any attempt from without.’55  
Why they were being armed, and in what order is revealing. The Protestants were being 
armed first to secure the domestic peace, and only secondly, to stymy foreign invasion. The 
threat to Irish security was not to be found internally with the collapse of the Jacobite threat 
and British defeat of French naval power in 1759 and 1760. These armed paramilitaries 
would go on to perform a similar role to that of the military garrisons they were 
supplementing. In Ireland, armed soldiers were used in capacities beyond security from 
foreign enemies.56 The fiscal and military arms of the British Leviathan were intertwined in 
a very literal way, with the officers of the revenue and the magistrates requiring a military 
force to carry out their duties in large swathes of the Irish countryside.57 With the 
concentration of soldiers into large military encampments in central Ireland or the sending 
of regiments overseas, other armed individuals would have to found. 1759 presents the 
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historian with a surprising change of policy when compared to earlier periods where the 
firearms were not dispersed, even during periods of sustained unrest.58 
The machinery of the state began to work almost immediately. The Duke of Bedford, 
following the instructions from Whitehall ‘ordered out 1400 stands of arms, out of stores, 
for the county of Down, and 1200 for that of Armagh, the strength of the Protestants in the 
North lying in those two counties.’59 Further requests were coming in from Kerry, and some 
of the landed gentry were dispersing their own caches of arms, as was the case with a 1000 
stands of arms in the possession of Lord Lanesborough.60 The Protestants of the town of 
Bandon in Cork had also been provided with firearms. Further applications for guns were 
coming into Dublin from the Protestant inhabitants of Waterford and Munster. The lack of 
any mechanism in place for getting them back would be a much harder task. 
At a time when Protestants were showing a reluctance to join the Military but an enthusiasm 
at the prospect of gaining access to firearms locally, another approach was being taken 
towards the much larger Catholic population. Concurrent to the dispersal of state guns into 
private hands was the beginning of the first large scale recruitment of Catholics in living 
memory that had begun because of the need for recruits. Marine officers in the end of 1758 
had been ‘permitted to recruit in Munster and Connaught, with Directions, not to be overnice 
about their religion.’61 This proposal, by Bedford, was pursued because it would prevent 
men who were not able to join the infantry because of their religion a means to bear arms, 
and prevent them from ‘seeking their bread abroad in the service of our enemies.’62 In a 
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stark contrast to recruitment efforts in Ulster, Major Mason was able to raise around 1200 
men in Munster and Connaught by the end of 1759.  
William Pitt’s frustration that the city of London was able to raise more men in three months 
than the entire Province of Ulster had in a year occurred at the same time as the successful 
recruitment in western Ireland of Catholics showing a potential solution.63 One 
correspondent was confident enough to state that ‘if the religion of the men being out of the 
case, thinks a body of 2000 may be raised by the end of May.’64 By 1760, one of the primary 
pillars on which Protestant security was based was being badly shaken. Thomas Bartlett has 
persuasively looked to this period as the beginning of a courtship between the British State 
and the Irish Catholic population. Despite a penal code that in theory would have made the 
possibility of Catholic service in the armed forces illegal, larger objectives meant a further 
schism between local Protestant ideas of security and interest with those at the imperial 
level. Bartlett also emphasized the willingness to offer Catholic relief if Catholic men would 
be willing to wield the gun for the empire.65 The failure of Protestants to show an appropriate 
zeal for bearing arms abroad would have implications of who would be wielding them closer 
to home.  
In 1761, the Catholic Lord Trimleston offered to provide to recruit six regiments for service 
in either Hanover or Portugal. This ‘offer’ was in Bartlett’s view conceived and enacted by 
the crown, using a Catholic lord as a proxy. The proposal was put forward to the Irish 
Parliament, and promptly rejected.66 The idea of arming Catholics and having them being 
led by an Irish Catholic Lord was a step too far in 1760. By 1771, the need for the use of 
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local proxies were done with, and the large scale recruitment of Irish Catholics for service 
abroad was made standard policy by the state despite vocal Irish Protestant opposition. 
By 1763, the war was winding down, and with it the threat of a French invasion of Ireland. 
The Treaty of Paris resulted in the securing of Canada and additional territories at the price 
of a massive debt and the need for a much larger military establishment to secure the peace. 
The awareness of the untapped reserves of men that Catholic Ireland offered and the 
dispersal of firearms into local hands were to have much wider implications. With the 
fracturing of Protestant opinion came questions of loyalty and obligation. Questions of who 
should be trusted to wield the gun and for what reasons gained a new immediacy as peace 
was fitfully settled. It was in this relative peace abroad that discord of a new sort appeared. 
The Irish Military establishment after 1763 rotated out the best men and officers and was 
understrength, and for the remaining years of the 1760s fluctuated from between 6,000-
7,000 men.67 All the guns sent out to the countryside still remained. It would not be long 
before they would once again appear. As overseas commitments increased, the agrarian 
unrest which had slumbered since the end of the Houghers outbreak in 1711-3 returned. 
  iii. 
In 1759, Edward Willes wrote to the strongly anti-Catholic Earl of Warrick on what he 
described as ‘the greatest evil within Ireland’. Willes emphasized that it was ‘a disobedience 
and resistance to the laws.’68 He clarified that he meant resistance quite literally. ‘I do not mean 
breaches of particular law’s, as theft etc. But a resistance with armed force of the civil process 
and the magistrates. And the taking or keeping of possessions by armed force.’69 A little over 
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three years later, and he and other critics of law and order in Ireland would have more specific 
examples to look towards.  
In 1761 the Buachaillí Bána emerged on the Tipperary side of the Knockmealdown 
Mountains.70 In English parlance those involved were called White-boys, and eventually gave 
their name to a century of agrarian secret societies in the form of Whiteboyism. The movement 
has attracted the attention of a number of scholars of Irish history. I will briefly summarize the 
positions that scholars have taken, and outline afterwards what I consider to be a neglected area 
within the research on this area. I then discuss specific incidents, and legislation that was passed 
to attempt to deal with the new problem. Finally, I end with some observations written in the 
margins of a book by the soon to be Lord Lieutenant, George Townshend on a tour of Ireland 
to assess the fortifications and defensibility of areas likely to be invaded. His observations 
further add to our understanding of the rifts between the bearing of arms in Ireland and the 
bearing of arms outside Ireland for the Empire, adding more weight to my central argument 
that we need to consider these two different types of loyalty separately. 
Buachaillí Bána activities ranged from the release of prisoners from gaols, attacking garrisons, 
releasing apprentices, maiming cattle and perhaps the common activity, the removal of fences 
and walls of those who attempted enclosures. To encourage compliance with their activities 
they used oaths, threatening letters and ritualized punishments, claiming authority from a 
mythical fairy Queen. The Buachaillí Bána gained their moniker from the white shirts worn 
both to conceal their identities and for the banners they marched under; as one local describing 
how they ‘assembled in the night with their shirts over their clothes, which caused them to be 
called whiteboys.’71  
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In the spring of 1762, they forcefully levelled fences of two wealthy Catholic farmers and 
opposed tithes on staple potatoes and turf that provided the broad base of Irish subsistence for 
the cottiers and small farmers. The group had first appeared in Co. Tipperary, and the unrest 
spread to Cos. Limerick, Waterford, and Cork. At the furthest extent of the outrages, 
Whiteboyism made inroads into Co. Kilkenny by 1765.72 It seems their victims were the 
members of the ‘underground gentry’ of the nascent Catholic landowning class, as well as 
towns with garrisons of substantial populations of Protestants. 
Agrarian unrest has attracted substantial interest since the publication of Maureen Wall’s ‘The 
White boys’ led the vanguard on the studies of Irish agrarian secret societies.73 Wall made the 
claim that the agrarian societies in Ireland prevented the kind of wide scale clearances 
experienced by Scotland in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.74 S.J. Connolly’s 
‘Varieties of disaffection in eighteenth-century Ireland’ takes a longer view and sees the 
Whiteboys as one of a number of disaffected groups that had to be untangled from those with 
Jacobite or Republican sympathies, and should be seen as primarily conservative in objectives 
and goals. Vincent Morley’s ‘The Continuity of disaffection in eighteenth-century Ireland’ was 
in part a response to this approach and has cautioned against an overreliance on English 
language sources in pursuit of new British history that ignores Gaelic poetry and particularly 
Irish dimensions. More recently there have been studies with a narrower focus, such as Thomas 
P. Powers ‘Publishing and Sectarian Tensions in South Munster in 1760s’, which looks towards 
print culture in Cork to unveil the relationship between the reprinting of Irish historical works 
and unrest.75  
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My own contribution to this body of work is to place additional emphasis upon what I consider 
to be something overlooked in the process. The body of surviving accounts and materials is 
large enough to allow for the addressing of Hanoverian loyalty alongside discontent towards 
at the local confessional level. A question asked throughout this work is why these historians 
all too often mention the gun only in passing in the discussion of these groups, rather than 
considering what being armed in Ireland meant for the wider legitimacy of society. It is hoped 
this section can shed some light on this neglected aspect of agrarian unrest in Ireland. 
The Whiteboys were comparatively well-equipped with firearms in a society where owning a 
firearm was proscribed from the majority of the population, and that they were also able to 
procure ammunition and powder to fire these guns on a regular basis demonstrates some ability. 
They also sought out horses and used horses as stand-ins for local authorities. To me this 
suggest a ritualized flouting of the penal laws, a calculated theatre of embarrassment and 
ridicule towards local elites. It was a behaviour of calculated insolence flouting the existence 
of a Protestant Ascendancy.  
However, it was the British military that was the best armed group on the island in terms of 
access to military equipment. The 200 soldiers garrisoned at Carrickfergus to guard 100 French 
of war were largely made up of new recruits in 1760. They were quickly forced to offer terms 
because of a lack of ammunition after the landing of French troops under the privateer François 
Thurot forced them to retreat into a local crumbling castle.76 Despite having a sufficient number 
of firearms, the shortage of lead shot and gunpowder to actually be able to face a siege caused 
the capitulation.77 The French troops managed to successfully capture the garrison with 
minimal losses and held the town to ransom for five days before escaping fast approaching 
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local militia and the appearance of British naval assets offshore. The French taskforce was 
defeated in a brief naval battle on the leeward side of the Isle of Man after a week of causing 
chaos in the one area deemed least likely to see a French landing by most Irish military 
strategists, who assumed that it  was a feint to make Cork more vulnerable to a large invasion. 
In an environment where there were panicked reports of French troops in the north other 
dangers to peace were occurring in the south. 
Neal Garnham’s superb account of the service of the Protestant militia demonstrates that they 
were assembled into service to defend Belfast despite being underequipped and lacking in 
training. His work provides a more favourable accounting of their performance than many other 
historians’ assessments. As Garnham notes, J.A. Froude saw the failure of the militia to prevent 
the French landing as showing that ‘Protestantism had spent its force in Ireland’.78 Stephen 
Conway remarks on the poorly equipped state of the Irish Protestant Militia, a claim supported 
by Alan Guy.79 However, perhaps the most revealing evidence of the level of skill in the 
Protestant levies was to be found in local accounts of their performance in contemporary 
newspapers. Of the 42 volunteers who headed to defend Belfast from Broughshane, nine were 
described as armed with ‘scythes fixed on poles.80 Garnham also describes the incompetence 
of two men, one who managed to have his weapon stolen from a local inn, and another who 
left his firearm in Lord Donegall’s office.81 However, perhaps the best example of the danger 
of arms in untrained hands is the case of one unfortunate Lurgan militiaman from Lurgan, who 
died from a wound received from mishandling his musket.82 However, the presence of the 
militia did influence French attempts to scout the road leading to Belfast. Having given an 
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overview of the performance of Irish Protestant Militia in the North during an armed incursion, 
we now turn to the unrest taking place in southern Ireland. 
In March of 1762 in a striking degree of showmanship and obstinacy, several columns of 
Whiteboys paraded at night into Coppoquin, Co Waterford. The town was host to a garrison of 
light horse at a local barracks. The Whiteboys drew up past the green near the barracks, fired 
several shots, and marched past the sentry with their piper playing the Jacobite song ‘the lad 
with the white cockade.’83 Later in the month another group of several hundred Whiteboys lit 
a large bonfire outside of Youghal, Co Cork. They then discharged their guns before 
threatening to pull down houses suspected of being built on public wasteland.84 The Whiteboys 
were not only bearing firearms, which was in and of itself illegal under the penal laws, they 
were also performing a more severe affront to Protestant privilege. The Whiteboys engaged in 
direct armed confrontations with dragoons and local magistrates.85 The largest reported group 
was 600 men, who were described as being well armed and having a military bearing. 
Protestant anxiety in nearby areas such as Waterford was pronounced.86 However, other 
commentators further away from the spreading violence dismissed it as ‘an insurrection of 
some cottagers in a few counties in Munster.’87 In a more scathing summary, a wealthy Catholic 
from Tipperary commented that ‘when the dawn of day peeped upon them and their actions 
these heroes skulked and dwindled into swineherds or cowboys… the scum and rabble of three 
or four baronies.’88 
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For individuals closer to where the outrages were taking place things were more visceral. The 
spectacle of ritualized violence reached its peak in the auto-da-fé of a white gelding horse 
owned by a local magistrate named James Grove of Ballyhimock.89 The Whiteboys put the 
horse on trial, and the poor animal was found guilty. The horse was then tortured and was 
subsequently shot during a formal execution for its crimes. It seems clear that the deliberate 
mockery of the proscriptions of the penal laws was taking place. The demand for horses to be 
provided by the inhabitants, the deliberate killing of a horse of a local magistrate as a kind of 
scapegoat, and the descent in large bodies into towns throughout southern Ireland was a clear 
affront to claims of ascendancy, especially in the period of 1761-2. Obviously, traditional 
economic grievances were a large issue, but the flouting of penal legislation cannot be ignored 
as an element of this unrest. 
The state’s response was equally dramatic. Executions were public and used in areas of strong 
sympathy for the Whiteboys. In 1763 two Whiteboys were executed in the village of 
Borrisoleigh rather than in the normal location of Clomel because of the village’s reputation as 
being a known place of meetings.90 The local newspapers estimated 14,000 men marching 
together in the Irish countryside, a number that is not far removed from the estimated 18,000 
who had gained a familiarity with firearms from overseas service.91 In terms of overall 
objectives, it seems that intimidating those who infringed on local ideas seemed to be 
paramount. The issue of tithes and land fits wider patterns of similar protest occurring 
throughout the eighteenth century, the details of which have been presented in depth by those 
interested in the economic motivations of this unrest.92  
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The destruction of pleasure grounds and ornate gardens was both intimidation and a statement 
of the proper use of arable ground. What is noteworthy and in my view neglected is the 
concurrent calculated flouting of the penal laws and the use of ridicule to enforce the message. 
The Whiteboys attempts at intimidation were very local, and because of the low social standing 
of the groups who were targeted, the official response was initially to view the attacks as an 
‘insurrection of some of the cottagers of a few counties of Munster.’93  
Despite attempts to implicate wealthier Catholics, the movement seems to have been largely 
made up of people from the bottom of a society of orders, and with one exception did not have 
clerical support. Five priests were presented to grand juries in 1762 as being ‘unregistered’, 
and although they were not convicted this could well have been an example of local Protestants 
using the law to remind  local Catholics of the possibility of legalized harrasment.94 Higher 
ranking members of the Catholic hierarchy urged a local priest that ‘if any levellers should 
appear in his parish he should exert himself as much as possible to supress them.’95There was 
also the trial and execution of Friar Sheehy. In a demonstration of the long memory of the 
inhabitants of the area, his executioner was stoned to death by a mob in Philipstown in 1770.96  
However, despite a military bearing and fears by the authorities, the use of firearms by the 
southern protestors was primarily a symbolic flouting of the existing order and the penal laws 
surrounding the bearing of arms. The weapons of choice were the sickle or the stone, alongside 
mock proclamations and threats of dismemberment. Unrest sputtered along into the middle of 
the 1760s, despite a series of executions and the passage of new legislation to combat the 
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movements. In 1762, a military sweep of the affected regions resulted in large numbers of 
arrests. These acts of protests and violence in the 1760s have increasingly been discussed 
beyond a simple dichotomy of confessional violence. In part, this is because the confessional 
identity of the membership of these groups has been notoriously hard to establish with any 
certainty. As Martyn Powell rightly cautions, historians need to be ‘wary of applying religious 
labels’ to protest groups, and he reiterates the point with the reminder that ‘there were Catholic 
Peep of Day Boys, just as there were Protestant White boys.’97 In was in the northern part of 
Ireland, in Ulster and parts of Connaught that a different tradition of armed unrest was 
emerging. Despite the distinctions noted by Arthur Young in his Tour of Ireland on the 
differences between the Whiteboy ‘catholic labourers’ and the ‘manufacturing Protestants’ that 
made up the Oakboys and Steelboys movements of the North, by the time reports reached 
Britain the boundaries between the two were bled together. However, in the north the protest 
groups were largely made up of Protestants, and these men were legally allowed to bear 
firearms. They also seem to have been more willing to get into direct confrontation with the 
state. It seemed that those who could be deemed to be ‘suspect communities’ was growing. 
Letters reached London later in the month of the spread of disturbances. In late September of 
1764 The London Evening Post described a direct armed confrontation between 200 ‘White 
boys’ and a company of Dragoons in Dungannon, Co. Tyrone. The ‘Whiteboys’ had been 
attempting to extort money from the local Mayor. The paper described how a local Justice, 
Knox, attempted to read the riot act, but was forced to stop because otherwise ‘he would have 
been murdered.’98 The dragoons managed to get the ‘Whiteboys’ to flee the area, with an 
estimated eighteen casualties and twenty five prisoners taken. Though the article does not 
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explicitly state whether the ‘Whiteboys’ were armed, the casualties seem to suggest,  that they 
were given the fear expressed by the Justice Knox for his life.99  
In at least these cases, outright confrontation seemed to be more likely with armed Protestants 
than bodies of armed Catholics in the South. A few weeks later reports arrived that another 
incident had taken place in Dungannon. The paper reported that ‘diverse acts of violence 
committed by straggeling party of White boys, at Dunganner(sic) in the County of Tyrone.’100 
The group of around 40 had stolen several head of livestock from a local Farmer by the name 
of Hatten. Once reports of this theft reached the surrounding community, Justice Knox and 
some neighbouring justices rounded up a posse of local men. After getting sufficient numbers 
to feel confident, they chased down the cattle rustlers and seized ten of the forty without any 
reported deaths. This administration of local justice in the face of obstinacy seems to suggest a 
breakdown of law and order in two very different areas of Ireland. However, to outside 
observers on the British Isles, these separate groups might as well have been the same. This 
would have implications for attempts to deal with the unrest from an imperial perspective. 
The ‘whiteboys’ in both the incidents referenced above were in fact Oakboys. The Oakboys 
had formed in 1763 in Co. Armagh, and spread to Co. Tyrone, Derry, Fermanagh and 
Monaghan. Both the Whiteboys of Munster and Connaught and the Oakboys of Ulster have 
been seen by scholars as part of a wider European tradition of protesters engaged in expressing 
‘moral economy’ grievances involving rents and prevention of evictions.101  While the 
incidents in the south can be seen in part to be a symbolic flouting of the penal laws, the 
incidents in the north require a different approach. Taking into account the comment of Edward 
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Wiles in the 1750’s, a contempt for law and order seemed to be endemic to Ireland generally. 
What I hope can be taken from these two different outbreaks of unrest is that the expression of 
this contempt took the form of a specific type of insolent behaviour that was formulated on a 
different basis depending on the region of Ireland and the religious affiliation of those involved. 
In the south, the protest seem to have been of a more traditional European moral economy 
performance of role reversals and mock trials or humiliation.  
The northern unrest appeared to lack this element, and was more in keeping with journeyman 
associations and combinations of a more urban setting. There was one incident in the south 
where a combination of weavers on strike were forcefully put down through the deployment 
of troops.102 The Government response to the unrest in Munster was to dispatch Dragoons 
previously tasked with enforcing the revenue in hunting illegal distillers and smugglers in 
Dublin and Down. The men were recruited largely in Ulster and were under the command of 
the Earl of Drogeda.103 They were reinforced by Sir James Caldwell’s light horse, who had 
worked with revenue officers to seize stills and prevent smuggling in Co. Donegal.104 James S. 
Donnelly Jr. has looked to their effectiveness in pacification as being the result of assistance 
from local magistrates. These men would have assisting these regiments in identifying local 
men. The two regiments had also gained experience in searching for and apprehending 
smugglers and distillers mentioned above.105  
Word of their arrival seems to have preceded them. The troops sent into Munster found it empty 
of men of military age, and in Clogheen discovered that ‘the houses of many [were] locked up 
or inhabited by women and old men only.’106 In the end over 500 men were arrested and sent 
to gaols, and commentators differed on whether this was to be seen as a French plot or instead 
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just local people with regional grievances. The view from the imperial centre seemed to have 
been conservative. The Whiteboys were not initially seen as being disaffected to the 
government. Richard Aston, the English chief Justice of the Court of Common appeals 
consistently saw the unrest as not being in any way as a  result of ‘a disaffection to his majesty, 
his government, or the laws in general.’107 However, in a statement stressed by the historian 
Donnelly in his own analysis of the situation, an intervention by any foreign power would have 
changed everything.  Intriguingly, the missing element in the invasion of a foreign power was 
not the presence of an outside princely power, nor is the religion of the interlopers seen as 
having any real influence.  
I believe, indeed, that if the Bey of Algiers had landed with any forces and a stand of 
arms at such a time, people in such a temper of mind would have readily induced to join 
him, or a prince of any religion, either for the sake of revenge, redress, or exchange of 
state, rather than continue in their conceived wretchedness.108 
The reason that the unrest in the south of Ireland in the 1760s was not directly threatening to 
the state was that it was not armed with enough firearms to be a threat to the empire at the 
imperial level. However, they were armed well enough to intimidate a local magistrate or to 
march past a local garrison. The violation of the penal laws was a threat to the confessional 
order of society, but not a threat to the British Empire. The state’s response was varied by 
location. In the aftermath of the unrest few of those taken into the courts were executed. Not 
all escaped the noose however. In Limerick, a Revenue officer by the name of John Banyard 
and an accomplice were executed under a charge of houghing cattle.109 The citizens of Cork 
witnessed the executions of men in Whiteboy regalia in regional market towns spread a 
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message of repercussions to more isolated areas.110 In Waterford, seven men swung from the 
gallows, five of whom were sentenced under a treason statute from Edward III. In total, twelve 
men were executed and twenty others faced burned hands, fines and imprisonment.111 The 
Whiteboys had, through the administering of oaths and intimidation ensured to some degree a 
lack of targeted prosecutions. The effectiveness of the state response is debatable. Thomas 
Powers saw an overzealous Protestant interest to freely using the noose to redraw changing 
social boundaries of political and fiscal power.112 David Dickson concluded that the reputation 
for agrarian crime could perhaps account for the dispersal of economic power down the social 
hierarchy, labelling Tipperary a ‘cockpit of conflict and change.’113 
In the later 1760s, and after the withdrawal of troops from the affected areas saw an upsurge in 
unrest, new methods were discussed. In 1765, in the face of a more localized outbreak of unrest, 
the rate of executions increased in certain areas, and fell in others. This largely reflected on 
how effective the local courts were in the previous round of arrests, and the disposition of the 
local magistrates, as well as how much evidence could be gathered. Testimony was extremely 
hard to find in a society where collaboration was discouraged. An example of a less lethal but 
effective way to punish individuals working with authorities happened in Cahir, Co Tipperary, 
when local Whiteboys took a man who had threatened to inform on some local whiskey makers 
for distilling illegally, and carried him a mile on a bier, leaving him overnight in the centre of 
town.114  
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This leaves us with the question of whether an influx of firearms from abroad from one of 
England’s enemies would have provided the catalyst to a wide spread uprising for redress. It 
was the gun, or the lack of it, that seems to have been the reason the unrest was controllable, at 
least in the minds of the English legal authority tasked with resolving it. There was a lack of 
access to firearms for those engaged in specific levelling activities and in mixed crowds 
involved in prison rescues. Those engaged in direct confrontation with local soldiers or 
magistrates seem to have been better armed and more disciplined that the mixed crowds of 
men, women and children involved in the gaol breaks or prisoner rescues. Those making a 
show of force or flouting the penal laws did so by requisitioning horses, brandishing firearms 
and mimicking official broadsheets and proclamations. The argument could be made that this 
restraint in the use of arms was a careful husbanding of ammunition and gunpowder. Firearms 
were certainly used in a very visual way when their access could be secured and it seems to 
have been the case that firearms were used in direct confrontation in activities that less resemble 
the levelling and prison rescues that were common throughout the eighteenth century. 
From the vantage point of 1767 an anonymous author retrospectively examined the causes of 
the riots and outrages in Munster and came to his own conclusions as to the causes. The 
pamphlet itself presents a summary of the prevailing suspicions at the time and a caricature of 
those involved on both sides of the confessional divide. The author lays out the heightened 
suspicions to be found in war time, when many Protestants voiced the opinion that their 
Catholic neighbours ‘were ripe for rebellion, and, if the opportunity offered, would massacre 
us in our beds’.115 These Protestants are then portrayed as being ‘such enthusiastic supporters 
of the glorious revolution, as to have no other manner of expressing their loyalty but by 
bumpers, of their religion but by railing at popery’.116 The writer goes on to explain that 
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political loyalty was flexible and changing. All nations rebel, and the author concedes to 
Ireland’s violent past. However, the author then expresses the opinion that unrest was economic 
in motivation, rather than political, and that the real cause was the lack of effective magistrates 
responding.  
His assessment seems to be born out by the evidence assembled by later researchers. The 
reliance of armed military forces to engage in governance would be increasingly less tenable 
with manpower requirements overseas especially if magistrates were unwilling or unable to 
enforce law and order without military support in communities where they were actively 
opposed or having their horses killed outside their doors. In the late 1760s and early 1770s 
Ireland’s standing army was being transferred across the Atlantic to garrison and supress 
growing dissatisfaction with British rule and governance in the thirteen colonies. 
The military units that were most effective in supressing unrest seemed to have been the light 
horse and dragoons that had already been used to assist the revenue. This policy would be less 
effective with fewer troops in Ireland that could be called on. With Protestants in the northern 
part of Ireland also resisting what few inroads of law and order had taken place the resources 
of the army would be further strained. The question would remain as to what to do if the threat 
from an external invasion necessitated arming the people. Of even greater relevance would be 
how to disarm the population. 
iv. 
S.J. Connolly has warned about the dangers of overemphasizing rhetorical flourishes about 
fairy queens and loyalty towards the Hanoverian government or for arguing for the survival of 
Jacobite sympathies among a very small minority of Gaelic commentators. He alerts the reader 
that to overemphasize specific phrases or imagery is to ‘confuse the barnacles for the boat.’117 
                                                          




What he means through his own poetic simile is to emphasize the endurance of a traditional 
ancien régime society of orders, one that was extremely pragmatic in its interaction with one 
another and one that has to be separated from its folklore or idealized world preserved in song 
and poetry.118 I would ask that we do also not confuse the bushels with the bullets when trying 
to understand the way the gun, or the lack of it, affected Irish society. Connolly has also 
reinforced the uncomfortable notion to many Irish historians that the threat from Catholic 
Ireland was real and not the result of Protestant paranoia. One issue that I hope I have addressed 
is who they were a threat to, and how that shifted by the 1760s.  
Catholics were rehabilitated and armed by a growing empire with a chronic need for manpower, 
and willing to offer emancipation from the legacies of a confessional state. Local opposition 
would become more fragmented as recourse to the courts and to the law failed in the late 1760s 
and 1780s. A reliance on the military, or increasingly on a paramilitary for day-to-day 
governance, revenue collection and policing would have as profound an impact on Ireland as 
an enduring and largely Catholic participation in fighting the empire’s wars. A monopoly on 
the gun locally endured as the right to bear it abroad weakened. None of the agrarian outrages 
taking place within Ireland seem to have reduced a call for Catholic recruitment for service 
abroad, and recruitment of Catholics in southern Ireland would increase until it had become a 
standard practice for units shipping overseas. A divided Protestant Interest in a fractioning 
confessional state would have to confront a change of priorities and a fading of one of the 
legacies of their victory in the Williamite wars. In the next chapter we examine the state of law 
and order in Ireland and the dispersal of state firearms from a centralized state armoury into 
private hands in a climate of increasing violence. 
                                                          





Chapter 6. Protestant Ascendency redefined. 
The British state was increasingly making its presence felt in the isolated areas of Ireland 
through the construction of barracks, an increasing number of customs officials, and the 
expansion of the mechanisms of law and order outward from the garrisoned towns into 
Connaught and the mountains. In a process that began at the end of the seventeenth century 
and continued unabated into the eighteenth, Ireland was drawn tighter into the imperial fold. 
This process was embodied in the form of the magistrates and courts. State formation was 
confronted on the borders of civility by a population engaged in popular protest and 
paramilitary activity across both sides of the confessional divide. 
From the sixteenth century, Gaelic legal codes were discountenanced and former titles had to 
be proved to be recognized by common law. Furthermore, the English method of ordering 
political boundaries, in the form of county divisions, sheriffs, and justices of the peace and the 
assizes were established alongside a permanent armed presence. Michael Braddick has 
assessed these forms of dispute resolution as being ‘more effective and more durable than force 
of arms.’119 However, after 1641, the Irish were ‘no longer regarded as barbarians to be 
reformed but as perfidious Catholic reprobates, potential agents of foreign subversion, to be 
controlled.’120 
Remarking on the isolated nature and reputation of some areas of Ireland for ‘lawlessness’ by 
outside observers visiting from abroad had become something of a tradition. Travel writers and 
missionaries, soldiers and officials presented Ireland as a rugged and uncivilized place, an 
image that endured throughout the eighteenth century.121 However, the expanse of civility 
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should not necessarily be seen as a policy centrally directed by the British state, but rather a 
‘broader process, involving mutualities of interest between dominant groups and crown 
authority, both within England and other parts of Britain and Ireland.’122 Frictions occurred 
when a large segment of the population were excluded from privilege and patronage or chose 
to use an alternative system of resolution for conflict or securing patronage. The right to bear 
arms was one of the most important of those privileges. As this work has stressed throughout, 
debates about who was entitled to the privilege of wielding firearms were complicated by 
anxieties about who could be trusted not only to bear arms, but also who might use them 
without turning them on those they were meant to be protecting. 
Unlike the pacification of the Highlands, a violent process in part made possible through the 
restriction of a long enduring tradition of bearing arms, Ireland presented different challenges 
and a very different population dynamic. ‘An act for the more effectual securing the peace of 
the highlands in Scotland’ in 1716, and, ‘An act for the more effectual disarming the highlands 
in that part of Great Britain called Scotland; and for the better securing the peace and quiet of 
that part of the kingdom’ in 1725 were directed at the Highlands of Scotland and were limited 
to a specific minority of the population. As Jeremy Black bluntly summarized, the Highlands 
were to be pacified, ‘First by killings, rapes and systematic devastation, and secondly by a 
determined attempt to alter the political, social and strategic structure of the Highlands.’123 This 
second objective was accomplished through road building, the construction of forts, and the 
passage of cultural laws restricting the usage of the Gaelic language and the donning of cultural 
dress. 
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Settler concerns about security were increasingly at odds with the British Empire’s need for 
manpower, as the heavy recruitment in the Highlands after 1745 made clear. Military 
calculations and rotation schedules were calculated on the scale of a wide-ranging Empire, 
rather than local concerns. Yet Irish magistrates increasingly faced calls for professionalism 
alongside a broader remit of responsibilities as the number of troops they could call on for 
assistance were sent to overseas service. In areas where law and order had broken down, 
enforcement could be undertaken by local landowners. In such conditions, men like Charles 
Coote could rise to the occasion. In a country teetering at times into ‘lawlessness’ private men 
could respond by sending out ‘privately by night a number of stout fellows, well-armed, under 
a brave leader’, as had been the case during the Houghers outbreak in the earlier part of the 
century.124  
Armed men on the frontier were the edge of the sword of Protestant Ascendancy. Rather than 
the grand houses and stately gardens that spring to mind when the term is invoked, this was 
instead a group of rough and bellicose men on the edge of the frontier who had settled and 
established the society of orders in regions outside of the remit of the magistrates. In Ireland, 
British elites worked out a ‘politics of difference and subordination’ where land was secured 
through settlement of English or Scottish settlers. 125 In areas on the margins, it would be those 
same people who secured it through force of arms.  
A reliance on independently armed men became increasingly common in Ireland as the overall 
number of troops in garrisons available for use in law enforcement fell, whether for dealing 
with agrarian unrest or assisting the officers of the revenue. Of course, this also avoided the 
sometimes-strained relationship between local authorities and military units. The financial and 
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military obligations of the British state after the end of the Seven Years’ were increasing in the 
1760s. Local communities would have to find ‘stout fellows’ to keep the peace when the troops 
of the Irish establishment were not available. In Ireland, law enforcement relied on the presence 
of armed men, whether in British crimson or undyed linen. Security in Ireland rested, in part, 
on the relationship between militias and professional soldiers, as well as armed civilians. Sir 
James Caldwell’s ‘Enniskillen Light Horse’ were sent from 1760-3 to assist the revenue and 
uniformed units like the Prussian Hussars. Caldwell had equipped them at his own expense and 
given the rank of a captain-commandant. Rather than being sent to European service however, 
they instead spent the time traversing the rough country in Connacht and Munster, 100 miles 
at a time. In this duty, they confronted large mobs of upwards of a hundred people and burned 
and spilt huge quantities of whisky and ale.126 
The common people of this Country are naturally fond of times of Confusion because 
they have an Opportunity of indulging in some favourite appetites such as Thieving and 
Cruelty; and if were not that the stand in Awe of a Sett of Folks in my Neighbourhood 
We should have some Instances of both, but we use so little Ceremony with ‘em that they 
do not have any Disputes [where] We are concerned.127 
As Padraig Higgins and others have observed, armed groups in Ireland overlapped between 
militia, ad-hoc volunteer associations, and local notables organizing independent companies or 
local Protestant gentry who led armed groups of their tenants. All of these groups had a mixture 
of vertical and horizontal bonds.128 One thing that all these shared in common was the ability 
to bear arms as a means of asserting legitimacy in a society where that right was restricted to a 
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minority. These various armed groups could be used to put wider population ‘in awe’ in areas 
where governance occasionally required treating the local Catholic population with ‘little 
ceremony.’ To put the reliance in Ireland on armed men to enforce a code of laws into context, 
it would be worth briefly discussing how law and order was evolving in England. 
The work of E.P. Thompson, P.B. Muncshe and Douglas Hay shows that concerns of security 
and the demands for a professionalized magistracy in Ireland had similarities with events 
elsewhere in the British Isles. In Britain, the intensifying presence of the state occasionally 
faced resistance. Examples of opposition to the expansion of law and order are present in 
accounts of the popular responses to the more consistent enforcement of game laws, changing 
uses of the commons and the standardization of weights and measures such as the contentious 
introduction of the Winchester Bushel. The 1737 riots of footmen at the Drury Lane theatre, 
the periodic outbreak of Jacobite sympathy and religious disturbances coincided with tax riots, 
election riots, and the Wilkite riots of 1760s, which were in part responses to state intrusion 
and an increasingly more homogenous idea of civil behaviour.129 The late E.P Thompson’s 
work on traditional rights and privileges of the lower orders as an erosion of a moral economy 
provides a format for understanding the social underpinnings of violence. W.E.H. Lecky 
provides an earlier foundation on the failures of law and order to be established in Ireland, and 
in some cases examples of material that has since been lost.130 I have discussed research on the 
British Army’s role in eighteenth-century Ireland previously in this work, and will not go into 
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great detail about the role of the garrison in securing the countryside in the earlier part of the 
century.131 
 In Ireland, it was the confessional divide where four fifths of the population were Catholics 
that makes the kingdom a unique case in understanding British Imperial expansion. The local 
Protestant community, split as it was between Presbytery and Episcopacy, created unique 
challenges to maintaining Protestant privilege against the majority Catholic population.132 
Although Scotland also faced such problems, it was not to the same scale or as long enduring. 
Protestants were also not a minority in Scotland. More than anything else, the gun had long 
been an arbiter of legitimacy in an increasingly confused social, confessional and imperial 
setting, a means of seeking some stability of one’s rank or station in a changing world. The 
observation given above about antagonisms in Ireland will come as no surprise to a student of 
its history. Scholars agrees there were tensions, though they disagree as to how much was 
present, or whether it was endemic or chronic. It is not the intention of this work to claim that 
the only way Catholic Ireland was governed was through the presence of an armed and 
antagonistic Protestant population. However, the restriction on bearing arms did have a role in 
vividly establishing the relative social standing of the wielders vis-à-vis the general population. 
Wielding a gun was a right reserved for Protestants regardless of rank or wealth. Assembling 
in the militia or volunteering together and marching through the countryside sent a message 
that the privilege of bearing arms was the sole right of free Protestants after 1688. This created 
situations where the gun itself became a shorthand for legitimacy. Many of the themes 
discussed in this work would collide together in the 1770s and 1780s. Calls for a reform of the 
penal laws were directly correlated with expectations of Catholics to support the British 
military either through manpower or money. Old tensions about the real intention of suspect 
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communities would reignite when external threats made the prospect of invasion once again a 
reality. The gun also facilitated the maintenance of law and order, and provided a coercive 
encouragement to cooperating with the state. In the 1770s and 1780s the gun would be diffused 
into a polygot of armed associations and groups as the standing army meant to defend Ireland 
sent its regiments to North America and began recruiting the very people it was meant to protect 
the population from.   
This chapter looks to the lives of two men, the Viceroy George Townshend and the first Earl 
of Bellamont, Charles Coote. These two very different Protestants are used to illustrate the 
different experiences of bearing arms for the empire, alongside their own views on who should 
wield the gun in Ireland. Following an examination of each of these men, the chapter engages 
with the debates surrounding the augmentation of the Irish establishment and the related 
debates of the role of the Militia in Ireland. The chapter ends with an account of the duel 
between Townshend and Coote in 1773. The duel serves as an apt motif of one of the final 
echoes of the peace of 1691. As I addressed in earlier chapters of this work, the legacy of the 
victory of William of Orange over James II had implications for both the imperial centre and 
the Protestant settlers. This was in part because of a different view of who should defend 
Ireland, and from what. Ireland after 1763 was primarily seen as a recruiting area and a place 
of sectarian bloodshed out of place in a more enlightened age where racial or political 
differences determined who to exclude. In the Williamite war, the British state’s victory had 
freed the resources in Ireland for other theatres and other conflicts. For the Protestant settlers 
who had fought a dirtier war, it allowed for the creation of penal laws and the disarming of the 
Catholic majority. Nearly one hundred years later it was becoming increasingly apparent that 
the standing army was to have to include Irish Catholics, and the bribe to be offered was a 








The haustorial roots of the British state had penetrated into Ireland in a persistent and much 
more visible way by 1765. Road expansion, the desire for general ‘improvement’, and the 
creation of an ordered and English landscape filled the lives of the gentry.133 The call for the 
expansion of the civil state was matched in Ireland with the desire to expand the number of 
soldiers being sent for garrison duty in the American colonies and the Mediterranean. This 
desire for an expansion of Ireland’s military contribution was met with opposition in the Irish 
Parliament. After 1763, Irish establishment regiments were 280 officers and men, compared to 
England’s 500.134 However, full strength regiments were sent to garrison the American 
colonies.  
The expansion of the Irish military establishment brought with it two different areas of concern. 
The first was financial, given the cost of supporting extra soldiers to be paid for by Ireland. 
The second was whether the troops would be constantly stationed in Ireland.135 Even in wartime 
this could be a difficult task. The previous Lord Lieutenant, Lord Halifax, had explained that 
the members of the Irish Parliament ‘have always been adverse to an increase of expense and 
an augmentation of the army’, suggesting to the secretary of state that he should manufacture 
an invasion scare to convince them of the necessity.136 A discussion of fears about security 
inevitably became a discussion about who would be bearing arms in Ireland. Was it to be a 
Protestant nation in arms in the form of a militia or a standing army? From the imperial 
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perspective, the security of the empire was better served by sending roughly half the standing 
army in Ireland abroad, and keeping the remainder understaffed. For the Protestants in the 
countryside, fears about security meant their concern was to keep their monopoly of the gun 
secure and to be ready to embody together in the face of either a domestic uprising or foreign 
invasion. But the gun in Ireland was involved in clashes that were much more personal. This 
chapter uses duel between Townshend and Coote in 1773 as a means of introducing a 
discussion of the breakdown between imperial versus local thoughts about the role of the gun 
in Ireland, much like its predecessor looked to Art O’Leary. 
Similar exchanges took place across the Atlantic seaboard of English North America. The early 
stages of the American Revolution were presaged by an attempt by the British state to disarm 
the colonial militias. In 1768, following an increase in the amount of British troops in the city, 
Town officials encouraged private citizens to arm themselves as a deterrent against tyranny. In 
1770 during the trial following the Boston Massacre, the right of to be armed was upheld. Five 
years later British officials were banning the importation of gunpowder, and ordering all the 
citizens of Boston to turn in their firearms.137 Beginning in 1775, the direct confiscation of the 
arms of the entire population of Boston took place, netting a total of 1,778 muskets, 634 pistols, 
973 bayonets and 38 blunderbusses.138 Such events could not help but have been noticed on 
the other side of the Atlantic. 
In Ireland, the disagreement was a breakdown between settler ascendancy and imperial 
viceroyalty, of the requirements of a victorious empire’s need for a standing army, and the 
recalcitrant settler community fears of a faltering guardianship of the legacy of a glorious 
revolution. This smouldering difference of opinion about the role of the gun in Ireland has been 
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somewhat unnoticed because it occurred alongside the blazing light of the disagreement across 
the Atlantic between a recalcitrant settler community and the British government about who 
should wield the gun in the colonies’ defence. In 1773, a duel took place that marked the 
breakdown between two different communities and two very different men. The duel provided 
contemporaries with the embodiment of the British eighteenth-century imperial functionary in 
the form of the veteran soldier Marquis Townshend. The other duellist was a young and the 
rakish upstart named Charles Coote, the newly minted Earl of Bellomont.  In the following 
section, the lives of these two men will be compared, as well as how the experiences of two 
very different lives shaped the duel they would fight. This single event represents wider 
disagreements and simmering tensions in Ireland between empire and settler, over who would 
have the gun, and to what purpose. It also makes for a look at personal confrontation and its 
influence on events, much like the personal animosities made manifest in the earlier coverage 
of Art O’Leary. 
 Perhaps the best embodiment of the type of man who spearheaded the expansion of the British 
state in the eighteenth century was the first Marquess George Townshend. Townshend first 
came into the world under the benevolence of King George I, who had helped sponsor his 
baptism, and was educated at Eton College and St John's College, Cambridge, where received 
a classical education. Townshend had served on both side of the Atlantic in military service, as 
well as having served in political office in England. During his extensive travels he penned 
caricatures of both personal rivals and the aboriginal people he encountered. Townshend first 
entered into military service in 1741.139 Townshend fought against the Jacobites at Culloden in 
1746 and was at the battle of Lauffeld in 1747 where he saw combat in Flanders against the 
French Army. In 1747 he became a Member of Parliament unopposed for Norfolk. Outside 
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Ireland he never achieved a high political office, although this may reflect personal preference 
over stymied ambition. His vocal distrust of standing armies coincided with him being 
identified with the Whig interest despite his later role in Ireland140 Despite earlier arguments 
against a standing army Townshend was crucially involved in the expansion of the Irish army 
the provisioning of the Irish militia.141 He would also agitate for an enquiry into the loss of 
Minorca, a matter briefly discussed in the previous chapter. Townshend saw further service in 
Quebec during the Seven Years’ War.  In North America, Townshend led the left wing of the 
British forces on the Plains of Abraham outside the walls of Quebec City. Following some 
fortuitous battlefield deaths, Townshend rose to overall command, eventually overseeing the 
surrender of Quebec in 1759. He also served tours of duty in Germany and Portugal in the early 
1760s.  In the middle of August of 1767 Townshend assumed command over an increasingly 
fractured and unruly political situation in Ireland.  
Scholarship on Townshend has been led by Thomas Bartlett, who has revealed that many of 
the radical reforms on the way the viceroyship was run were implemented not because of any 
imperial objectives but rather from Townshend himself. Bartlett began his academic work on 
Townshend during his PhD thesis at Queen’s University, Belfast in 1976, and added a 
contribution in an edited volume three years later.142 Martyn Powell has also added 
contributions towards our understanding of the Townshend viceroyalty and the Irish crowd.143 
The majority of this scholarship is rightly directed towards understanding Townshend’s 
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political legacy and his impact on the debates towards an Anglo-Irish Union and in Martyn 
Powell’s view of the relationship between constituents and their political representatives.144  
One aspect that has been neglected by this scholarship on Townshend’s residence in Ireland 
was his tour of the island before taking office. His unguarded thoughts and observations 
provide some insight into the way Ireland was viewed by the man tasked to govern it. The 
Ireland that Townshend encountered was transformed from a generation before. These changes 
were rapid and caused differing reactions among the Irish populace.145 The introduction is 
written in a clear legible hand and begins with a testimony in the first days of August in 1765. 
Townshend notes that the purpose is to ‘give a general, tho,’ imperfect idea, of such things, as 
do naturally strike the Eye of a Military stranger in passing once over a considerable extent of 
Country in a short space of time.’146 He then presents the general format the volume would 
take, divided into topographical description of the land, major rivers, and the nature of the 
roads. Additionally, the location and summary of towns, harbours and the state of repair of 
military buildings are also given.  
Townsend’s main concerns were the locations of ‘citadels or places for arms, if circumstances 
should make it hereafter necessary, to establish such works in this part of the country.’147 He 
was an experienced military veteran, and was surprised at the state of the defences that he 
encountered. He also rated the potential for the movement of men and materials, especially of 
cavalry. As has been noted, cavalry played a prominent role in the collection of the revenue 
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and the imposition of law and order on isolated areas or to deal with agrarian unrest. As 
Townshend toured the country providing a description of the seacoasts and of the state of the 
countryside he also noted the inhabitants. His description of Limerick was perceptive about 
both the landscape and the people. He also had an eye for agricultural pursuits. He 
complimented the local people who had ‘with prodigious labour and pains cleared the immense 
stones, collecting them in heaps’ and it was ‘there they plant their potatoes.’148 Roscommon 
appeared to Townshend to be ‘bleak, rugged and uncultivated.’ However, it is Townshend’s 
observations on roads that are of particular interest. 
There is no country whatever, where there are more, or in general better roads than in 
Ireland, the gravel or other material for making them so, are found in plenty, and 
excepting the bogs intervene, are near at hand. They appear likewise to be judicially 
enough constructed and substantially made but what contribute greatly to their lasting, is 
the little repair that is upon them, being entirely free of heavy carriages, those that are 
chiefly made being only smaller carrs or sledges, drawn by one or two horses at most.149  
Townshend goes on to mention the availability of crossroads to connect neighbouring 
communities, despite the isolating nature of the bogs. However, he specifically excluded parts 
of Kerry and Clare. The fact that the Viceroy of Ireland toured the country extensively 
demonstrates his difference in approach, as others in the role sometimes governed from the 
bank of the Thames after a brief period in Ireland. Townshend was the first to permanently 
reside in Ireland and the only to take such an extensive tour of the regions outside Dublin. His 
opinion as both a military figure and a first-hand witness gives the historian an accurate 
assessment of the condition of Ireland’s defensive works. Townshend found the condition of 
defences in Ireland wanting. An army fortress in Waterford had old rotten boards which were 
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used as makeshift drawbridges because of a collapsed bridge. This matches reports made of 
leaking roofs, pigs, and collapses walls in residential barracks in reports made on the condition 
of barracks from earlier in the period.150 
Townshend’s assessment was brutally honest when he assessed the state of the defences of 
Ireland. 151  If the badly maintained strongpoints were besieged, the chances of resistance for 
long enough for military units from other areas of the Empire to respond were low. This was 
not only due to the fortifications own indefensibility, but also the surrounding hostile 
population. 
Townshend remarks: 
 besides, a greater part of the inhabitants, instead of being such whose services we could 
in any way be depended upon, for their assistance in time of Danger, might from the[i]r 
despondency, and the prevailing of the Roman Catholick religion among them, be 
supposed favourers of their natural enemies and invaders of these Kingdoms.152  
Townshend assessed that actually attempting to build proper defences would be too expensive, 
and seeking to delay an invader would be the most realistic position. These conclusions are not 
very surprising and in line with traditional military thinking on the defensibility of Ireland, well 
grounded in previous experience during the 1640s and 1690s. Townshend’s jotted down notes 
in the backside of a notebook gives us some insight into his private thoughts. The observations 
are written haphazardly, jotted down in moments of reflections and undated. They contain his 
thoughts on topography, military positions, and other items of interest. I suspect it is from the 
period of the tour as it contains thoughts that appear in a more formal form in ‘General 
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Description of the South Part of Ireland’. The unguarded observations reveal a different 
perspective on Irish security than scholarship on Townshend has revealed. The observations 
are scattered throughout the notebook. To capture the nature of the source some of these 
fragments are quoted in full in the following passages. 
George Townshend’s notes begin by listing first impressions. Ireland is a land where one could 
find ‘farms to great expanse, - number of inland forts fear bombardment or famine –
disproportion of Catholics and Protestants’.153 After such a succinct summary, he suggests that 
in the event of a Catholic uprising that earthen depots could be constructed that would not only 
‘retard the enemies progress’ but more importantly ‘provide a refuge to Protestants who would 
otherwise be obliged to fly to the metropolis leaving their families and effects to the mercies 
of an enemy.’ If there is any doubt that Townshend feared a massacre, his subsequent note that 
a series of local fortifications was the solution removes it. ‘If it had been the case in 1641, many 
Protestants would have been saved’ demonstrates that he thought there would be blood 
spilled.154 This seems to indicate his concerns were grounded in popular accounts of past 
massacres.  
His proposed solution was to legislate for a wide spread construction of earthen ramparts which 
‘could become good for depots refuge for Protestants & their effects, a tolerable place for 
defence for either Protestant gentlemen with their Tenants’.  In Townshend’s view, Ulster was 
well protected, but in the southern part of Ireland, where ‘Protestants of the south’ were 
outnumbered by ‘15 or 16 Roman Catholics [they] had no refuge unless they fled to where the 
army was camped or to the Capitol.’155  Townshend suggested that military officers at Cork 
and Kerry should be given orders ‘to gain intelligence on the popish interest and smugglers 
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who had contacts with France and Spain.’156 Townshend was of the opinion that Ireland was 
effectively impossible to defend, and that the outnumbered settler community and armed 
tenants would mount a delaying resistance until a counter invasion could be mounted from 
Britain. The inability of the British army to defend the country and Townshend’s vocal support 
for militias combined to form two separate policies. One involved the recruitment of a military 
force for use outside Ireland, and the creation of a settler force of Protestant property owners 
and tenants specifically tasked to delay either an outside invader or a domestic uprising from 
the native Irish Catholic majority. The Protestant population would need to be armed and 
further militarized or it faced the prospect of massacre from the native inhabitants. In the next 
section we explore the means by which that population would be armed, through the expansion 
and arming of the Irish militia. 
ii. 
Military priorities in the late 1760s shifted from a wartime footing to the inevitable drawdown 
following the peace. In Ireland, crucially, the overall responsibilities of the military were 
expanding at the same time that the number of troops on the establishment was reaching 
critically low levels. Given the limited numbers of men available, several proposals were set 
forth as to how to most efficiently use these armed men to further the interest of the empire. I 
will also discuss the differing ideas of what the purpose of the militia and the British garrison 
was to be in peacetime. I outline some of the proposals, and explain how these mirrored wider 
imperial priorities. The reliance on coercive legitimacy through the use of the gun in day-to-
day governance became more entrenched at the same time that the reliance on privately armed 
individuals also allowed for the gun be used to reaffirm the status of Irish Protestants as 
sanctioned armbearers necessary for securing Ireland and the rule of law.  
                                                          




To understand why the militia in Ireland was seen as being useful for state-building on the 
cheap requires a brief overview of the history of the militia in eighteenth-century Ireland. 
Debates as to how often the militia was embodied before the 1760s have spilled more ink than 
would be expected given the lack of surviving documentation from the period.157 Alan Guy 
believes the evidence supports arrays in 1719, 1739-40, 1745 and 1756, a position supported 
by S.J. Connolly and Sir Henry McAnally.158 David Miller suggest is that there were a total of 
four arrays in 1719, 1727, 1745, and 1756. Other historians suggest even fewer arrays. Stephen 
Conway finds convincing evidence of just two arrays in 1745 and 1756, David Dickson 
suggesting three arrays, in 1719, 1745, and 1756.159 In the three large-scale arrays of the militia 
before the Seven Years’ War, the number of men involved was somewhere in the range of 
40,000 to 45,000 Protestants in 1719 and 1745, with the men primarily living in Munster and 
Ulster. The returns of 1756/7 claimed that 148,767 were embodied, but this must be seen as 
largely a head count of eligible Protestants rather than a total number of men mustering as a 
military force.160 These numbers are in line with upper estimates of the membership of the 
Volunteers in the 1770s and early 1780s. Neal Garnham’s position is that the evidence is 
stronger for the 1719 array, less so for the 1729 array and relatively strong for 1740, and 
1745.161 He also convincingly demonstrates that the 1756 array was largely ‘an administration 
exercise’162  
These arrays were largely in response to foreign threats of invasion, landings in the North of 
Britain, or in reaction to supposed Jacobite plots. As will be seen in the following section, the 
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use of militia for routine law-and-order responsibilities was a relatively new development. This 
was a development that took place alongside the increased use of military force in revenue 
collection and supressing agrarian protestors, as well as a reaction to falling troop levels and 
the way those troops were distributed in Ireland. The gun is incredibly important in 
understanding the role of the militia in Ireland. For the state, men coming together and forming 
associations were not a danger and provided additional security in times of invasion. However, 
providing firearms to the general population was seen as a dangerous step. 
From the inception of the militia in Ireland in 1719 to the dissolution of the founding legislation 
in 1776, the debates concerning a militia were less about men of a military bearing associating 
together, but rather the dangers of arming them. In England, the opposition was more about the 
issue of a militia service creating political instability.163 Fifty years later a debate over the 
militia was also taking place. To effectively support law enforcement and revenue collection 
access to firearms instead of uniforms or drum kits was essential. Garnham seems to give 
credence to the idea that the militia was effective in reminding the Catholic majority of its 
place, quoting Chief Baron Willes’ statement that ‘a tolerable good militia’, made stalwart with 
some regular troops, would allow Protestants to ‘overpower the Papists.’164 He suggest that the 
presence of a few hundred militia could help explain the lack of a rising in Ireland in 1745. 
Garnham description of the militia as a group of farcical coats of arms, a relative lack of access 
to weaponry, and a preoccupation with toasts did not reduce their potential to be armed by the 
state. The low level of military competence and a military campaign whose highlight seems to 
have been visits to the theatre does not create a picture of dread to the state.165 In the 1760s the 
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militia changed and became a more active and more formidable force. The case can be made 
that there must be a distinction between the adequacy of Ireland’s defence and the way the 
militia behaved in its day-to-day social interaction with the Catholic population. To create a 
militia capable of effectively countering a domestic uprising or a foreign invasion meant 
arming the men who would serve in it. The dispersal of firearms from government stockpiles 
meant the theoretical right to wield firearms by Irish Protestants would become asserted at the 
same time as debates about removing the formal probation over the Catholic population bearing 
arms of their own. 
In the opening months of 1765, the Whiteboy outrages had burned themselves out in southern 
counties of Ireland, and as Townshend toured the south and western coast a different series of 
outrages in the North had been dealt with through from the cooperation of regular army units 
and the embodied private individuals and local ‘stout fellows.’ Ulster was host to the airing of 
grievances that stemmed in part from the creation and maintenance of the road network that so 
impressed Townshend. In the North of Ireland, a group called the ‘Oakboys’ came together not 
only to protest county cess and mandatory labour, but also to engage in some light looting and 
bad behaviour. Like the Whiteboys of the south, the Oakboys also had an issue with tithes.166  
These protesters presented a problem to the authorities that differed from the largely Catholic 
Whiteboys. They were primarily Protestant. Outside of the issue of confronting co-religionists 
was the reported audacious manner in with which the Oakboys operated. As Neal Garnham 
rightly emphasises, what marks the Oakboys as distinct was their confidence. The Oakboys 
embodied in daylight, and were more than willing to confront armed troops. James Donnelly 
and Eoin Maggennis both cite reports of the protestors responding to troops by entering into 
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martial formations.167 Garnham reported that they had ‘equipped themselves with drums, 
colours, and other military trappings’.168 Despite an apparent abundance of military training 
and the necessary accessories, they were lacking in one of the most important accessories. The 
Oakboys do not seem to have been particularly well armed. However, they did seem to be 
actively seeking to arm themselves. In a country where firearms in private hands were scarce, 
state-produced firearms were the primary source for groups looking to arm themselves.  
Whether the Oakboys intended to actually raid state arsenals cannot be discovered in the 
historical record, but rumours of this intent abounded. A series of letters reported the claim the 
Oakboys intended to arm themselves by taking the militia weapons stored in caches throughout 
Ulster, which bears similarity to the reports of seizures of militia arms in Lexington and 
Concord in the opening salvo of the American Revolution a decade later.169  The Oakboys were 
defeated with a combination of regular military units and privately armed individuals. Garnham 
cites twenty Protesters being killed in a series of skirmishes.  Direct confrontation dispersed 
the crowds of the men involved, at least temporarily.170 The twenty men killed during the 
confrontations was comparable to the Whiteboy executions between 1763 and 1765. The 
crucial difference between the two was that the Whiteboys were executed after due process 
through the legal system whereas the Oakboys were killed in direct confrontations.  
Neal Garnham has used the suppression of the Oakboys to highlight the role of the Irish Militia. 
In my view, this is somewhat problematic from the perspective of defining who should be 
considered to be a sanctioned member of the militia but could be used to understand a wider 
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concept of the militia as being a Protestant under arms. Garnham mentions a Co. Londonderry 
proprietor who supplemented his estate’s security with ‘militiamen’ from his own estate 
alongside two companies of regular troops in the area. In Donegal, the militia served as a barrier 
to Oakboys calling in relatives from further afield.171 These armed retainers could be seen as 
privately armed men under an almost feudal arraignment.172 Lacking uniforms and directly 
under the personal authority of their proprietor these men were more akin to personal levies 
than patriotically motivated citizens. These rural levies contrasted with the more recognizable 
citizen militia of armed burghers that placed mounted guard in towns, a group who Garnham 
has tended to emphasize in detail. This is in part a reflection of the surviving records. However, 
at what point does a tenant with a blunderbuss become a militiaman?  
Protestant Irishmen wielding firearms became legitimate through embodying together even if 
this took place outside of the traditional civic structure more traditionally examined when 
discussing militias. The tenant with a blunderbuss was exercising a right guaranteed by the 
1688 Bill of Rights and won through the service of his ancestors alongside William III. That 
wielding a gun could transfer its own legitimacy had implications for diffusing governance and 
law enforcement into a much more localized and visceral process. The historical precedence of 
using militia as a replacement for regular army had taken place sporadically throughout the 
eighteenth century. However, before the 1760s this was limited to wartime. By the 1760s, the 
British Empire increasingly relied on the Irish establishment to provide troops to garrison 
newly won territories.173 In terms of law and order, the militia were used in conjunction with 
regular troops rather than undertaking operations independently.174 If the militia were to replace 
the garrison role of the army, for that they would need to be armed. Unlike in England, arming 
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the Protestant population in Ireland was innately political. These questions faced Townshend 
as he considered augmentation of the number of men on the Irish establishment. We now return 
to Ireland’s newest Lord Lieutenant as he assumed his political office.  
The future Lord Lieutenant faced issues of maintaining law and order as well as defending 
against a military invasion. In drafting policy, he and others had access to Lord Hertford’s 
Scheme of Barracks for Calvary.175 The plan detailed local conditions and travel times, as well 
as the ruinous state of the current facilities, additionally, the scheme proposed emphasized the 
importance of the Calvary units in assisting the Revenue.176 The deficiency of the army in 
Ireland was also discussed. The chief concerns were the inability of troops to maintain the 
peace, or even to maintain their own discipline. This was in part attributed to the dispersed 
nature of the soldiers, who were reportedly ‘at least 20 miles from headquarters.’177 In some 
cases, units were 45 miles away from their commanding officers. Intriguingly, the report 
emphasises that the posts were needed specifically to help the magistrates enforce the law, as 
well as to prevent widespread smuggling. There was also the issue of the distance between 
detachments and their officers from headquarters.178 The troops needed to be dispersed to be 
able to assist the magistrates and revenue officers, but conversely, this made them less effective 
to oppose a landing by a hostile military power. Giving the Militia these responsibilities would 
allow for the military to be used for deterring external threats, and conversely mean that the 
militia would primarily be used to keep the Catholic population subjugated and deter agrarian 
unrest. 
 The report also explains that the location of armed men was as much a logistical question as it 
was one of utility. In terms of logistics, gunpowder for all of the detachments was stockpiling 
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at Charlemont and Carrickfergus.179 Killough had nine companies largely to facilitate rotation 
to England, rather than out of any tactical advantage. A separate plan by a Mr Mason was also 
presented, which suggested the financing of building of a barracks for a specialized detachment 
to catch deserters, highlighting another pressing issue in maintaining troop numbers.180 In the 
face of a diminishing number of regular units, the idea of using the militia became increasing 
attractive.  
The English militia was seen as a natural example, and Townshend was instrumental in the 
drafting of the English militia legislation. However, ‘the main alternation is that all officers 
shall be given to the Crown.’181 During wartime, rather than rely on local yeoman, the regular 
militia members would be led by crown-appointed officials. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
militia was explicitly for military defence rather than the local support of law and order, 
assistance with the revenue, or to protect the estates of landowners. They would be encamped 
together under regular army officers and military discipline. Responding to questions about the 
cost, the proposed plan stipulated that a small cadre of militia would be raised so that the 
scheme could be ‘corrected upon the grounds of experience and to be fit the more exactly to 
this country against a time of insurrection, invasion or war.’182 This plan would have essentially 
created an ‘Irish’ regular army similar to the garrison system used earlier in the century.  
Townshend proposed raising officers, 2000 citizens from the cities of Dublin, Cork, Limerick 
and Waterford, and double the number from the province of Ulster. The result would be 
approximately 10,600 Irish Protestant ‘men under arms in Ireland.’183 This was not a new idea, 
as a similar attempt on a smaller scale had been proposed by Charles I to raise 11,000 men ‘of 
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British birth’ to oppose a potential Spanish landing in Ireland without incurring the cost of 
raising regular troops.184  
This discussion was largely focused on finding suitable men. It was not, as had often been the 
case previously, about finding firearms. Townshend had the unique position of not worrying 
about finding suitable armaments. Townshend noted in the report that ‘the arms are already 
provided’ at cost of £25,318.185 The firearms had periodically being purchased and then stored 
up in Irish arsenals over the course of the previous century but had never been widely 
distributed. By the late 1760s, thousands of military grade firearms were stockpiled and 
intended to be given to a small and tightly-controlled cadre of loyal crown-appointed men. In 
times of necessity the arms would be distributed under controlled circumstances. Despite the 
best of intentions, this was not to be how the guns would be dispersed. In the next section, the 
story of how the Irish state acquired a large stockpile of military firearms is detailed. It also 
reveals the reluctance of the British government to hand the weapons out. By the 1770s, Ireland 
would be on a precipice of a large population instilled with a narrative of their right to bear 
arms and a large number of firearms dispersed throughout the country. 
iii. 
For over 350 years, Ireland’s experience with private gun ownership had been one of scarcity, 
in part because of a dearth of trust by the state when faced with dispersing military grade 
firearms into private hands. The evidence of both the scarcity of arms and the lack of trust from 
the state is found in the history of militia musters in Ireland. The number of men who could be 
mustered for military service was also consistently overestimated. Even more worryingly, even 
those could be found faced being underequipped. In 1691, William Perry estimated that the 
Protestant population in Ireland could muster 24,000 men.186 However, there was no provision 
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to arm so many. Equipment purchases varied, and at times municipalities privately equipped 
small local forces. This was the case with Waterford, whose townspeople outfitted the military 
equipment for 100 men, and in Kinsale, which outlaid £120 for militia arms.187  
A change in government changed who should have legitimate access to firearms.  James II 
ordered that militia arms distributed at the time of Popish Plot were seized and given out to 
largely Catholic regime loyalists. The estimated 15000 Protestants who saw service during the 
Williamite war did so outside a formal militia structure. At the end of the conflict, these ad-
hoc units dispersed with the crisis that brought them forth, although their experiences would 
affect how the wider Catholic population was viewed in the aftermath of the conflict.188 
Attempts at reviving the militia faced the question of who should be armed. The issue of 
trusting Presbyterians with arms was theoretical if there were no firearms to provide them with. 
During the muster of 1715, firearms were so scarce that in the case of Westmeath, there were 
no weapons available to arm the militia. The Lords Justice produced voluminous 
correspondence seeking any available arms and ammunition to defend Dublin in the same 
year.189 
The scarcity of firearms to arm the militia with competed with fears about arming the 
population. In the case of the 1756 array, although some obsolete firearms were given out, 
careful instructions were given not to distribute ammunition or powder.190 Neal Garnham has 
rightly seen a lack of enthusiasm towards arming the Irish militia with state firearms as a policy 
having originated in England. In the opening chapter of this work, we examined the long history 
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of fears of guns ending up in disloyal hands. Garnham states that ‘Arming the Irish population, 
even if it was restricted to the small conforming Protestant minority, was a risk some English 
Minsters were not prepared to take.’191 Despite English misgivings, Protestants who travelled 
to Ireland were convinced that Irish Protestants faced a repeat of 1641.   
Garnham provides an overview of scholars arguing for Protestant insecurity, quoting David 
Hayton’s work on fears of Jacobite recovery and James McGuire’s position that Protestants 
were largely concerned with their flimsy claim to newly gained estates.192 Garnham then quotes 
Ivar McGrath, Roy Foster, Robert Eccleshall, Thomas Doyle, and finally Eamon O Ciardha 
and David Szechi.193 Having shown the wall of supporters for the notion of the anxious and 
fearful Protestant elite, Garnham remarks that their assertions ‘might well be true’. Garnham, 
responding to the scholarship on an enduring Protestant fear of the Catholic majority and  
securing their own titles to newly gained land, rightly highlights the more mundane but 
persistent worries of securing the finances of the Irish state and protecting the Irish constitution. 
In those categories the conforming Protestant minority are described as being confident. In 
summary, Ireland in the eighteenth century faced the perennial problem of elites everywhere. 
Those at the higher echelons of society feared the implications of arming those below their 
station either socially or religiously, and also actively obstructing efforts of those above them 
politically to decide the issue for them. However, not arming them placed their own property 
and lives at risk. The militia formed one mechanism of arming the population but in a manner 
that allowed for some oversight. 
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In December 1735 a committee in the House of Lords was formed to report on the condition 
of the militia and subsequently failed to do so, although it did emphasise the need to provide 
arms. Four years later the Irish House of Commons had determined that 20,000 firelocks should 
be purchased. The bill further stipulated that 5,000 of them should be constructed and 
manufactured in Ireland. Funding such a large purchase caused some disagreement, with one 
faction suggesting a poll tax and another a loan at four percent interest. In the end, £35,262.10 
was allotted.194 Passing funding bills and actually acquiring firearms were very different 
matters. After discovering that the Royal armouries had no spare weapons, it was decided to 
order 10,000 from Liege.  
As we observed that we cannot have any more Arms from England, but may be supplied 
from Liege, and we are sensible to the Protestants of Ireland stand in great need of Arms 
for their security, we therefore apprehend that it may be advisable to purchase ten 
thousand firelocks and bayonets from Liege.195 
The logistics of finding firearms shows how international the business of acquiring firearms 
had become. Issues of quality control were also important. Further on in the correspondence, 
the authors made clear that sending someone over to verify quality was worth the cost.  
Against the time they will be ready, we think it may no[t] be amiss to send over from 
Hence a person properly qualified to view them and see them proved and to assist in the 
forwarding of them hither.196 
Furthermore, the Privy Council was adamant as to the need to expedite the process; largely it 
seems from the remonstrations of the militia members themselves. ‘The impatience that many 
express for want of these arms make us very desirious [sic] that they may be provided as soon 
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as conveniently may be’. They would be disappointed as a year later, none of the promised 
weapons had arrived.   
 In 1742, it was decided to try and acquire arms from the Hanoverian domains, despite a higher 
cost than the previously agreed suppliers.197 The Commons looked into the affair and 
discovered that only 5,000 had been brought from England alongside 3,700 inferior quality 
firearms from various European sources. Even worse, the guns were ‘so carelessly or knavishly 
made, that the men dared not fire them in common review, lest they should burst in their 
hands.’198 In 1745, £70,000 was allotted to fortify Cork Harbour and to purchase 30,000 
firearms and 10,000 broadswords. Perhaps reflecting the experience of the previous attempt to 
purchase guns abroad, the majority were to be acquired domestically from Birmingham. Unlike 
the debacle of the previous attempt, this seems to have been largely successful. The capacity 
to fulfil such a large order demonstrated the capacity of the Birmingham gunsmiths who were 
increasingly crucial to the slave trade. The letter reveals that the gunsmiths had ‘bespoke at 
Birmingham twenty five thousand firelocks and bayonets, and likewise ten thousand 
broadswords for the use of the Militia of Ireland’.199 It seems these were delivered successfully, 
and placed into storage. I suspect another 5,000 were sourced locally.  
An enquiry in 1753 showed that £85,000 had been spent since the spring of 1735 to acquire 
militia arms.200 The rising clamour of drums of war put issues of economy away from the 
debates of the House of Commons. Neal Garnham hints that the reminder ‘by a Virginian 
clergyman’201 of the dangers of ‘priest, friars, and hungry Gallic slaves’ may have prompted 
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additional caution.202 The changing fortunes of Britain in the Seven Years’ War prompted 
further debate. It was the actual landing of a small number of French soldiers at Carrickfergus 
that prompted further action by the governing authorities. In the aftermath of the privateer 
Thurot holding parts of Northern Ulster to ransom, a report on the total amount of firearms in 
government storage was produced. The results aptly illustrate the success at acquiring firearms, 
and also the limited amount that were distributed. The Irish state had distributed 7,000 
firelocks, while 30,000 remained in storage.203 
 A survey of all ordnance in Ireland provides a definite tally as to the amount of military arms 
available, at least by 1760. The record also provides precise levels of ammunition, powder, and 
other equipment available. Military equipment was divided for the defence of Ireland. Of 
particular interest is the division of stores into three categories of usable, repairable, and broken 
beyond use. These records show the production of approximately 22,000 militia arms and 
bayonets, as well as large stores of ammunition and gunpowder that were distributed to garrison 
towns. However, the vast majority of this equipment was stored in Dublin Castle. 1,200 of 
those militia arms were sent to Charlemont, where they would repeatedly change hands before 
the close of the century.204 These firearms were not of a single type, but were military grade 
firearms. Assessing the shelf life of a firearm is no easy task. The regular army itself faced 
issues in attempting to keep firearms in working order. However, a key difference of the militia 
arms is that they were effectively pristine, kept in storage rather than dispersed. 
In 1775 Lieutenant-Colonel John Deacon wrote a letter detailing the variation in types of 
firearms between units and regiments about to be sent to the colonies. Some of his men were 
being armed with the 1756 land service musket, the 1768/69 ‘short land musket’ or some 
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strange patchwork of the two. The maintenance of firearms left room for improvement. In a 
period from 1771 to 1775 the 62nd Regiment was garrisoned in Dublin in a perfect case study 
in firearms atrophy. Out of a stock of 390 muskets issued in 1771, only 39 were maintained in 
full working order, with 311 described as in a bad condition, and 40 lost or broken. In another 
testimony to the dangers of garrison service on the fighting capacity of the eighteenth-century 
infantryman, it was also observed that the some functionality was lost due to frequent polishing, 
perhaps saying something about the priorities of the commanding officer.205 The firearms for 
the militia would have been a melange of weapons from nearly a hundred years of funding bills 
and orders. Such a disparate collection of arms was also hard to track once they were issued. 
Assessing private firearm ownership is a harder task. Beginning around 1745 James Abercorn 
began sending letters requesting an account of firearms of his tenants in Ulster.  
 
Interestingly, he also gave directions on how to deal with his tenants’ misgivings about being 
asked about their firearms: 
 
I would willingly have you go round the manors of Magevelin and Donelong (freeholds 
included) and take an account of the number of firearms, distinguishing the condition 
they are in. In any are backward in producing them, you are to assume them the enquiry 
is made only with a view of their own security.206 
 
He further instructed McClintock to go ‘round the manors of Cloghohall and ‘Derigoon 
(freeholds included) and enquire what number of firearms there are, and what condition they 
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are in.’207, once more telling him to answer objections to being registered with an appeal to 
collective security. By October, Abercorn had received the report and instructed his agent to 
tell them to form some provision for a defence of the property.208 Clearly there was some degree 
of private arms ownership, at least in Ulster. These would not have been large calibre weapons 
suitable to military use but rather fowling pieces, blunderbusses and hunting guns. When 
tenants were given militia arms, there was an awareness of the danger that they would take the 
guns with them if they emigrated, a situation highlighted during fears of a diminishing 
Protestant presence in the first half of the eighteenth century. 
This clearly demonstrates that fears of giving men arms must be considered against the need 
of men to bear arms in times of threats to security both internal and external. While Garnham 
and others are correct to see political motivation in the militia issue, I think another point has 
been missed.  It is the position of this work that these fears were to be found throughout the 
social and religious boundaries of Ireland. S.J. Connolly has made the claim that the militia 
was in part an ‘expression of perfect vertical bonds.’209 D.W. Miller and Stephen Conway 
likewise find the militia as a means of binding the body of Protestants to their traditional 
leaders.210 I think the fear of others becoming armed can also be seen as a type of bond shared 
by all the communities of Ireland. English Ministers feared arming the Protestant minority. The 
Protestant minority feared arming the Presbyterians. The Protestants feared arming the 
Catholics. Landed Catholics and Protestants feared both each other gaining more land or 
political power while at the same time harbouring suspicions that their tenants or the growing 
numbers of cottiers and spailpín might gain access to firearms. These were fears that only grew 
after 1750. The works mentioned above highlight some of these fears, but none have attempted 
                                                          
207 20 September 1745, P.R.O.N.I., Abercorn Papers, D623/a/12/22- 23, 24. 
208 26 October 1745, P.R.O.N.I., Abercorn Papers, D623/a/12/22- 23, 27. 
209 Connolly, Religion, Law and Power, p. 136. 
210 David W. Miller, ‘Non-Professional Soldiery, c. 1600-1800’ in Bartlett and Jeffery eds. A Military History of 




to show them as they evolved in relation to one another. With the exception of Garnham’s 
work, they also have a good deal to say about fears of armed men, but little to say on how these 
men intended to become armed, or what to do when men took the initiative to arm themselves 
outside of the mandate of a militia or as an auxiliary component of the British state.  
iv. 
Charles Coote, the recently elected Member of Parliament for County Cavan stands out as the 
type of individual who could operate outside the careful planning of men like Townshend.211 
James Kelly describes the man as an unstable man, whose ‘vile temper and poor judgement 
had got him into numerous scrapes.’ Charles Coote had inherited 10,000 acres and the county 
seat of Cootehill. In 1763 Coote acted as a magistrate for Co. Monaghan. He serves as a prime 
example of how a single individual’s actions could influence wider perceptions of the gun, and 
in my view best exemplifies the very different character of a landowner with his own armed 
retainers from a civic militia designed to replace a garrisoning force. To expand on this point, 
I will examine Coote’s campaign against the Oakboys in the 1760s and subsequent duel with 
Townshend in 1773.  
Coote left a pamphlet detailing his campaign, likely as an attempt to gain support during his 
charge for a murder during it. I think given the character of the man, it could also have been 
published out of sheer vanity. A Genuine Account of Charles Coote, Esq. in Pusuing and 
Defeating the Oakboys in the Counties of Monaghan, Cavan, and Fermanagh begins with a 
brief summary of the formation of the Oakboys. It describes a large gathering on 14 July 1763 
at the border between Counties Monaghan and Tyrone. The Oakboys were encamped together, 
with an estimated 10,000 in attendance. This number, like many estimates of crowd sizes from 
the eighteenth century, is likely exaggerated. All accounts agree the movement was popular 
                                                          




enough to gain large crowds, and numerous reports seem to indicate their numbers in the 
thousands rather than hundreds.212 In any case, two columns began marching towards 
Aughnecloy and Clogher, whilst the largest moved towards Monaghan. The Oakboys made 
local officials and wealthier citizens swear oaths, and infiltrated towns under the pretence of 
purchasing cloth.213 By Saturday, the former soldier Charles Mayne met with Thomas Dawson, 
the deputy governor, to form a plan of action. They both determined that they would not ‘submit 
to any indignity or insult from such a rabble.’214 Dawson then informed his tenants who he 
suspected of harbouring sympathy for the Oakboys not to meet with anyone ‘if they had any 
regards for the Lives and Property of them and their families.’ This outright threat towards his 
tenants was followed with an appeal for military assistance from Dublin. 
At this point Charles Coote had returned to his lands, and reported to the men that a regiment 
of Blue Horse had departed from Dublin. In addition, Coote armed and provided mounts to 
fourteen of his tenants to oppose the ‘10,000’ Hearts of Oak or to ‘die in the attempt.’215 Coote 
and his newly minted ‘light horse’ encountered ‘hundreds’ of men wearing Oak sprigs in their 
hair.216 The posse remonstrated with the inhabitants of Ballibay to remove the branches from 
their hair, and proceeded to Castle Blayney in the early afternoon. In a description which 
reveals the nature of the crowds being confronted, ‘every creature, Man, Woman, and Child, 
Had Oak Boughs up, and also on their doors.’217 Tensions mounted as some of the bolder 
members of the crowd began insulting the servants attending Coote. 
 The ‘light horse’ retreated to an inn for several glasses of wine. Coote and Edward Mayne 
took their swords and headed outside in the pouring rain. Charles Coote was confronted by 
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twenty Oakboys and their commander, a man called McDonald. After being told he would have 
to remove his hat and be less insolent, the fracas began. In the confusing melee that followed, 
punches quickly escalated to volleys of shot from doorways and windows. Coote was hit 
several times but the noise alerted the remainder of his men drinking in the tavern, who also 
began firing from the windows and doors.218 The sounds of fighting quickly drew the local 
garrison from the Castle. The end result was several dead Oakboys, several wounded tenants, 
sporadic fighting, and an attempted rescue of prisoners.  
The Oakboys retreated after more troops arrived the following morning. Coote and his tenants, 
along with some regular soldiers proceeded to Monaghan, where the inhabitants were not only 
wearing Oak Sprigs in their hair, but had ‘Arms of different Kinds’. Further reinforcement 
came trickling in, as did reports that the Oakboys intended to seize ‘1000 stands of arms.’219 
Coote also seems to have been disarming communities, seizing 40 pistols and firelocks from 
Belturbet.220 Coote and his personal troops acted in conjunction with a small number regular 
mounted troops to pacify the surrounding area, eventually heading towards the area of Redhill. 
Coote, his tenants and nine soldiers pursued and captured large numbers of Oakboys, finally 
pursuing the remainder into a bog. In a rather cinematic ending to the whole affair, the captain 
of the ‘rebels’ rode until he was within  30 yards distance, raised his carbine, and plunged into 
the ranks swinging his gun like a club. He was quickly shot, stabbed, and bludgeoned but 
managed to survive the encounter. In the affray seven Oakboys were killed, and the large 
number of prisoners taken slipped away during the fighting. Charles Coote’s actions in leading 
‘stout fellows’ against the Oakboys resulted in him gaining a Knighthood. Though Coote 
eventually stood trial for murder, he was cleared of the charge.  Private service such as this led 
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to its own rewards. In Armagh, the governor Charlemont received the title of an Earl for his 
part in opposing the Oakboys. 
Coote’s opponents seem to have been largely Protestants. He pursed an active policy of 
disarming his co-religionists, and relied in part on the support of a small number of regular 
army units to do so. The military bearing, standards and drums that the Oakboys were able to 
display shows evidence of either demobilized veterans or skills gained from earlier militia 
musters. Coote’s ‘light horse’ were provided with arms and horses by Coote himself, and seem 
to have been relatively effective is confronting the protesters. In comparison to the way that 
the Whiteboys were dealt with, it seems that the confrontations were briefer and bloodier in the 
North, and much less theatrical.  
Townshend’s main responsibility when operating as Lord Lieutenant was to secure the 
augmentation of Ireland’s standing army from the 12,000 set down in 1699 to a more robust 
15,000 during his tenure from 1767-1772.221 He confronted two of Ireland’s leading political 
figures to achieve this. John Ponsonby and Earl of Shannon effectively delayed the passage of 
the augmentation bill and even more seriously of a money bill in 1769. Townshend’s response 
was to change the Irish political dynamic by centralizing patronage and power through the 
direct management by a resident English lord Lieutenant. The response in Ireland was 
increasingly using the language of the patriotic and armed citizen soldier confronting a 
tyrannical and foreign power. Sides were being drawn, and positions were argued through an 
increasing number of pamphlets written with the language of confrontation.222  
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These works were explicit in claiming that the militia was of ‘the utmost service to the liberty 
and the constitution’.223 One of the most forceful contemporary critics to an expansion of a 
standing army was Charles Lucas. Charles Lucas’s hostility to standing armies was compatible 
with his stringent espousal of fundamental Whig principles. This issue did not preoccupy him 
during the controversy that made his name in Dublin in 1749-50, but his feelings were later 
forcefully expressed during the debate over the augmentation of the army in 1768. Lucas 
assiduously linked his long-term goal for term-length parliaments with this contemporary 
controversy as he insisted that ‘standing parliaments and standing armies have ever proved the 
most dangerous enemies to civil liberty.’224  
Neal Garnham argues these debates were largely a political issue, with little thought given to 
the capacity to actual serve as a defensive force.225 Geography and demographics seem to have 
had a good deal of influence on the issue of army augmentation versus militia reform. In 
Munster, this seems to have been because of the lack of enough Protestants willing to form a 
militia and the need for a heavier armed presence of soldiers.226 The political controversy 
increased in the 1768 election, with claims that a standing army was ‘as likely to enslave, as to 
defend you’227 Not everyone was convinced, and instead argued that Ireland’s defence would 
rely on a regular army made up of English Protestants.228 
One of the most effective criticisms of raising a permanent and armed militia was that it would 
further inflame the ‘restless, turbulent, busy spirit’ of the Presbyterians, alongside the perils of 
Jacobites or Jesuits gaining access to arms and training through improper vetting of religious 
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principles.229  The end result was the return of whig principles and a very different idea of who 
would or should have the gun in Ireland. A further outbreak of agrarian troubles by the 
‘Steelboys’ in Ulster prompted the James Caldwell to decry the idea of arming Presbyterians 
into a militia, that would put guns into the hands of men who were prone to turning them on 
their betters. In the South, Protestants were so thin on the ground as to make the idea of arming 
them moot, even as the Whiteboys regrouped once more in the south from 1769-1776.230  
As Townshend and the military establishment attempted to determine the most efficient way 
to increase the Irish military establishment from 12,000 to 15,000 men, private individuals saw 
opportunities to gain access to patronage and prestige through private action whilst others saw 
fearful portents of declining influence. The debates of the late 1760s and 1770s would 
determine whether the path Ireland should pursue would be one that led to an augmented 
standing army, or rather a robust militia to not only protect from external threats but from 
tyranny from the imperial centre. Coote was to confront a very different situation a few years 
later, during his interaction with Townshend. The militia issue which had gripped the political 
debates provides some of the background for discussions as to who should have the gun.  
v. 
In the closing scene of this work, the symbolic castration of the Irish landed elite took place 
politically - by the flow of patronage and power to an English Viceroy- and literally in the case 
of Townshend’s duel with Coote in 1773. Townshend had made many enemies over the course 
of his term as Lord Lieutenant, and speculation at the time suggested that Sir Edward 
Newenham, George Rochfort and the Earl of Belverdere each sought to face Townshend on 
the duelling field.  It was Charles Coote’s demand that he receive an apology for using a low 
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ranking Aide de Camp to inform him he would not be seen by Townshend that led to 
bloodshed.231 As noted earlier, Coote was no stranger to violence. He was also a man who took 
slights very seriously. Townshend refused to offer ‘a submissive apology’.232 Townshend was 
also no stranger to violence of a personal nature, having been prevented from finishing a duel 
with Lord Albemarle in 1759, and provoking Charles Lucas in 1769.233 It is fitting that the duel 
that took place would be resolved in Marylebone fields in London.  
Armed with a sword and pistol, Townshend fired a shot which hit Coote in the groin, which 
ended the affair as Coote was carried from the field in a chair. A member of the Protestant 
Ascendancy had challenged an official of the empire over an incident during an official post 
and in the ensuing conflict been effectively emasculated. Ready access to firearms made an 
issue of respect one of life and death. Coote had been in a similar altercation outside a tavern 
in 1763. The pre-existing tensions between the people of Ireland, whether based on social 
status, confessional affiliation or political rivalry would continue to be exacerbated by the 
reliance on firearms to resolve the issue. Throughout the eighteenth century controlling or 
restricting access to firearms had been relatively successful. However, internal divides over 
who could be trusted, the very real need for a military defence, and mutable positions from the 
imperial centre made debates about who could be trusted with a gun a divisive topic. It was in 
this chaotic environment that news from across the Atlantic of a growing rebellion made war 
once more a pressing concern for the empire. In 1778, France and Spain both entered into an 
existential conflict with the British Empire. In the following conclusion, the themes of this 
work and the impact of firearms on three major events is discussed. 
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Conclusion: The gun in Ireland after 1778 
In the final section of this thesis I layout the two major findings of this thesis about the gun in 
Ireland. Firstly, I gave a summary of the dispersal of firearms into private hands from 1778 to 
1781 and provide a brief overview of the Volunteers. I then discuss Catholic relief of the penal 
laws from 1772 to 1793. Catholic relief and the Volunteers are both well served by researchers 
and it is not my intension to supplement the work done on these topics, but rather highlight the 
way the themes discussed in this thesis influenced subsequent events in the closing years of the 
eighteenth century. Finally, I summarize the work thus far. 
i 
When France formally entered the Revolutionary War only 8,500 soldiers remained in Ireland 
out of a peak strength of 15,325 in 1775.234 These soldiers were placed into large encampments, 
leaving much of the country bereft of troops. The defence of substantial sections of Ireland was 
left to a recently formed movement of armed citizens called the Volunteers, who quickly 
amassed a force of 40,000 men equipped with firearms, artillery and patriotism.235 Already 
armed and increasingly politicized, they extorted a series of political concessions from London. 
After 1782 they slowly withered after the conflict that birthed them ended; they were finally 
outlawed in 1793 with the passing of the Gunpowder Act and Convention Act, concurrent with 
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the formation of a state-controlled Militia and Yeomanry.236 Radical members in Belfast went 
on to form the United Irishman, harnessing the energies of the Catholic majority to political 
reform. The British state countered by raising a large Catholic militia led by Anglo-Irish 
officers. 
The summary above is a representative aggregate of most research that Irish historians have 
produced on the Volunteers.237 The one question which has been neglected, and surprisingly 
so, was how the population was able to arm themselves so effectively in such a short period of 
time. This thesis has been an answer to this question. In the late eighteenth century, Ireland 
went from being host to the largest population in the British archipelago disbarred from both 
active military service and private arms ownership, to being a centre of both military 
recruitment and armed groups outside the authority of the state. If we can understand how the 
gun was used in Ireland, we can address the broader issues of where Ireland fits into the wider 
crisis the British Crown faced in governing a fragmenting empire in the late eighteenth century.  
The late eighteenth century was a crisis of legitimacy throughout the Atlantic world. This work 
engaged with the issue of legitimacy generally, but especially in regards to the state’s response 
to challenges to its authority. The government lacked the resources to deal with many of these 
problems, and as ‘The Gun in Eighteenth Century Ireland’ demonstrates, firearms were 
intimately involved in the interactions between soldiers, magistrates, excise officers, crowds, 
smugglers and bystanders in a myriad of ways. Coupled with a changing way of life, increased 
demands for integration into an enduring fiscal-military state, and the demands of war with a 
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reinvigorated France, old faction and symbols and a new interpretation of the citizenship and 
identity were taking place.  
There has been a substantial amount of research on the Volunteers. The question that has not 
been asked by people researching the Volunteers is what the impact of so many weapons into 
a largely disarmed population was. Breandan Mac Suibhne’s ‘Whiskey, Potatoes and Paddies, 
Volunteering and the Construction of the Irish Nation in Northwest Ulster’, as well as Padhraig 
Higgins’ A Nation of Politicians examine the increasingly threatened Ascendancy’s response 
to the Volunteers. Mac Suibhne also examines the construction of an Irish identity through 
symbolic forms of toasting, and the use of drinking glasses. Higgins broadens the traditional 
focus to examine the participation of women in the free trade debates, their role in supporting 
Volunteering, and the importance of concepts of manliness.238  
David Miller’s article on ‘non-professional soldiery’ provides an invaluable resource in the 
history of levies and militias preceding the Volunteers, as well as providing an in-depth look 
at the typical responsibilities and roles of the regiments in maintaining public order.239 J. E. 
Cookson’s The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815 gives a wider view of British forces in the 
region, as well as the scale of Irish Catholic recruitment into the British armed forces. Ian 
McBride wrote that the act of Volunteering armed the people of Ulster not only with military 
training, but also their own political discourse.240 There were 49,460 men in independent corps 
by September 1779.241 The movement’s political influence declined after 1782, in part because 
of a disagreement over whether Catholics should be allowed to join the Volunteers as well as 
issues of trade with England. In 1783, Parliament refused to respond to ‘proposals at the point 
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of a bayonet.’242  In 1784, a secret Dublin Castle census revealed the numbers of Volunteers to 
be in decline. It estimated there were perhaps 19,000 men still actively involved, of which 30 
percent were Catholics.243 To put these numbers in comparison, at the height of the American 
War, 60,000 armed men were involved in fighting in North America.244  
Volunteer companies were not homogenous. The London-Derry Independent Volunteers were 
made up of young well to do gentleman, and the Derry Fulsiliers were largely weavers.245 In 
Dublin and Belfast the Volunteers were armed associations of tradesman, craftsmen, and 
townsmen, whilst the country gentry and their tenants followed earlier traditions.246 In the 
strongholds of Volunteering in Belfast and Cork, Volunteering emphasised the playing of 
martial tunes and crisp uniforms, as well as a clear demonstration of martial spirit. As the 
movement expanded, oaths and methods of mustering were adapted and evolved.   
As the secret return indicated, some Volunteers companies allowed Catholics members to join, 
whilst others forbade their participation. Some charters dictated that in the event of a battle, the 
decision of whether to fight was to be by acclamation.247 In Rathfriland, the core principles 
were resistance to threats to the rule of law, whether from internal or external agencies. Other 
companies had a greater emphasis on strict laws of behaviour and the need to defend religious 
and civil liberty. The more traditionally minded companies emphasised the loyalty to the 
Hanoverian Monarch and Protestant military victories. The Lisnavein Company was founded 
on the twin pillars of support of the Protestant king, and the prevention of popish corruption. 
The entry of France and Spain, declared to be the ‘limbs of the Anti-Christ’s kingdom’ into the 
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War against the American colonies reignited old grievances. Political participation, the wearing 
of a uniform, and the bearing of arms was reinforced in political sermons, where the Volunteers 
were regaled with the message that ‘no nation can continue free’248 without an army of the 
people. Ireland was to be ‘bound by her legislator’, that is, her citizens in arms, and ‘the old 
maxim of the Saxon constitution.’249  
As this thesis demonstrated, Dublin Castle had attempted to keep centralized control over a 
large number of firearms from 1695 onward. In 1779, the dispersal of state firearms into the 
countyside created a situation where a society that had been marked by the exclusion of the 
majority of the population from owning arms or participating in the military found itself in 
possession of a large number of small arms. These ‘Irish’ guns were stamped with the proof 
mark of Dublin Castle, and represented the largest dispersal of domestically produced firearms 
in Irish history.250 The impact of so many firearms into the possession of the general population 
was a testimony of the inability of the state to control firearms after the 1760s. By the summer 
of 1778, more than 40,000 Irishmen had gained access to a large amount of military grade 
firearms as well as 144 pieces of field artillery. By 1782, the number of Volunteers had 
doubled. In England, a similar proposal to arm British Volunteers looked directly to the Irish 
experience. The New Daily Advertiser proclaiming, ‘It was through the tube of this firelock 
that Ireland received the electrical shock of freedom.’251  
As early as 1779, men were questioning the need for gaudy uniforms, with some remarking 
that when all a Volunteer really required was a working musket.252  This need for firearms is 
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attested by muster rolls from the period.  In one report, out of a total of 3,925 men, only 666 
did not have access arms.253 These guns were acquired from local government arsenals.254   
What was the impact of the gun entering into private hands? This thesis has in part been an 
account of a relatively successful policy to keep a population disarmed. In doing so, the gun 
became a harbinger of political legitimacy to those who wielded them. The gun was also a 
dangerous and expensive piece of equipment, and one that required training to use effectively. 
Misuse of the gun by enthusiastic participants could end in disaster. In 1780 Volunteer 
companies celebrated with several volleys of a fue-de-joie on New Year’s Eve, 1779.  From 
Armagh and Maghbrasalt, and as far south as Cork, local Volunteers celebrated by firing 
volleys in conjunction with local garrisons. The volleys were generally over a bonfire, and 
accompanied with a variety of toasts and alcoholic punches as hundreds of Volunteers in 
uniform, and under arms, participated alongside the regular army.255 On 4 January Simeon 
Blakey accidently shot himself in the head in the process of cleaning his firelock. On 14 January 
1780 an army unit accompanied a local excise official in Roscommon into a ‘lawless part of 
the County’ where they encountered a large crowd. The detachment reported being fired upon 
with guns several times, pelted with stones, and were forced to retreat two miles. The encounter 
left one man killed, two revenue horses shot, and the saddle and bags of the excise man’s 
symbol of office burned. The writer of the article was shocked that ‘in a county which can at 
present boast of a superb civilization’ there could exist such an armed banditti.256 On 29 January 
1780, a member of the Volunteer company of Mullingar lent a fowling piece to a friend to take 
to his home. The gun was taken to a local exercise and the man accidently shot Mr. John Gibbs 
in the head, leaving a grieving widow and six children. On 31 January 1780, a party of soldiers 
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and a company of Volunteers hauled cannons to a house occupied by squatters. After a running 
gun battle, including the torching of the outside of the house and the firing of artillery, the 
occupants surrendered.257   
Irish Volunteers were not only given access to firearms, they were using them to support the 
revenue officers, as well as working alongside professional military units to enforce law and 
order. The reliance upon the coercive power of armed men to deal with eviction and the 
inherent dangers of handling firearms led to both personal tragedy, and marked change in the 
way communities interacted. The wide spread participation of Volunteering gave a number of 
men military training as well as access to guns for the first time. The Volunteers were the 
embodiment of a nation in arms and a legacy of the narrative of citizen soldiers. The issue of 
arming Catholics would prove to be divisive enough to become a focal point of unrest in the 
1780s in part because it was still illegal for Catholics to bear arms. This included the disarming 
of Catholics by lower class Protestants enforcing the penal laws outside of any legal or state 
backing.  
William Blacker was one of the founding members of the Orange Order. In his memoirs he 
recalled that the firearms procured during the first ‘orange boy’ meeting in 1795 were relics. 
Some of the Protestants came with ‘long barrelled Queen Annes’ rusted and in no condition 
for use for their intended purpose.’258 They were facing a rapidly changing world and reacted 
to it by swearing an oath to resist the change on a rusted gun that was nearly a century old. The 
monopoly of the gun by Protestants was a powerful symbol. However, the status of Protestants 
as the only sanctioned bearer of arms was not to last.  
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Catholic relief was a slow process and one that was directly correlated with the willingness to 
support the British military. The first reforms were about land tenure. In 1772, the passage of 
two pieces of legislation extended Catholic leases of bog land from 31 to 61 years.259 In 1774, 
two additional laws allowed for the swearing of allegiance to the Monarch regardless of 
confessional affiliation.260  In 1778 Catholics gained the right to leases of 999 years, although 
they were still denied freeholds.261 The pace of reform accelerated and in 1782 Catholics were 
legally allowed to buy land.262 Crucially, the two laws that were not repealed during this period 
of reform are indicative of the penal laws’ central purpose. An attempt to repeal the law banning 
the intermarriage of Protestants and Catholics failed in the 1770s. This relates to the discussion 
about the fear over the infiltration of people of suspect loyalty addressed in chapter four. It 
would take another decade, and the intervention of George III, to allow for intermarriage. By 
1792, Catholics would be able to practice law and to marry Protestants.263 An aspect of the 
penal laws that resisted reform the longest was the restrictions on Catholics owning firearms. 
It was not until 1829 that Catholics were allowed to sit in Parliament and local corporations. In 
summary, the four aspects of the penal laws that resisted reform the longest related to 
intermarriage, the right to bear arms and vote, and the right to sit in Parliament. Discussion 
now turns to the importance of the 1793 Relief Act to understanding the role of the gun 
alongside another important piece of legislation, the Gunpowder Act. 33 Geo III c. 2 ‘An Act 
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to prevent the Importation of Arms Gunpowder and Ammunition into this Kingdom; and the 
removing and keeping of Gunpowder arms and ammunition without license’.  A radical law, it 
effectively made any form of Volunteering illegal, and heavily regulated the use of firearms by 
Irish people regardless of confessional allegiance. It forbid the clandestine importation of 
firearms, and made it illegal to possess firearms without a license. Any arms found on ships 
were to be seized and held for use by the state with the owner of the ship to be fined £500 
pounds. No single individual was to be in possession of more than four pounds of gunpowder 
and producers of firearms or gunpowder were to be required to obtain licenses.264 The 
Protestant population of Ireland was effectively banned from the private ownership of firearms 
without a license, a tyranny previously only reserved for Catholics as a legacy of the Treaty of 
Limerick. In effect, Protestants who independently took up arms had become a suspect 
community. 
John Lord Baron Fitzgibbon, Lord High Chancellor of Ireland delivered an impassioned 
rejection of further relief of Catholics, which looked to 1641 and 1689 as pivotal moments.265 
He reflected on the condition of the Irish in 1691: ‘They were an English colony settled in 
Ireland at the Revolution, which had been reduced by a sword to a sullen and refectory 
allegiance’.266 This tranquility that Ireland had benefitted from in the preceding hundred years 
was directly because of the penal laws. For him, political restriction was necessary for the 
tranquility even more than keeping the Catholic population unarmed and subjugated. ‘I do not 
mean stripping them of offensive weapons, if perpetual tranquility was the objective, it was 
essential to disarm them of all political power.’267 Keeping Catholics disarmed and politically 
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powerless were both connected. The Earl explained he had been told on good authority that in 
1745 the Catholics were waiting only for a signal to rise.268 By giving Catholics access to the 
offices of government, he sardonically declared they would also gain the right to place Bishops 
in the Irish Parliment and put a Catholic Prince on the throne. Despite his impassioned efforts, 
the measure was successful.  
At the same time, the passage of ‘An Act for the Relief of His Majesty’s Popish or Roman 
Catholick Subjects of Ireland’ in 1793 effectively allowed for Catholics to serve in the army 
and militia and privately own firearms.269 The act put Catholics on the same voting terms as 
Protestants if they took an oath of allegiance, made civil and military offices open to Catholics, 
and allowed for wealthy Catholics with over £100 a year or a personal estate of £1000 to own 
firearms.270 In a society where from 1695 onwards, the right to bear the gun had been a 
Protestant privilege, this was the beginning of a period of uncertainty. The Protestant 
population was witnessing the dismantling of an institution and the Catholic population began 
to reassert its political power. Despite a remarkably successful attempt to disarm a large 
segment of the population, attempts to arm a Protestant militia led to the release of thousands 
of firearms to the Volunteers.  
The Gunpowder Act neutered Protestants ability to assemble under arms outside the authority 
of the state, and the final Relief Act of 1793 gave Catholics both political power and the means 
to own arms. In the end, the priorities of the British state were better served through the 
allegiance of the Catholic population and a willingness to fund and serve the state than in 
preserving the rights of the Protestant settler community. However, the reliance on coercive 
power to enforce law and order and the weakness of Irish state institutions would mean that the 
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final decade of the eighteenth century, and the early years of the nineteenth, would be marked 
with unrest, aborted rebellions and increasingly violent sectarian organizations. By 1793, it was 
radical Protestants who it could be said were of ‘sullen and refectory allegiance’. 
iii 
This thesis has argued that the victorious Protestant population of Ireland was able to 
successfully use the penal laws, a discriminatory law code, to disarm the Catholic population. 
It has shown that by the middle of the eighteenth century the British state was increasingly 
willing to dismantling the penal laws in order to secure a strategically valuable supply of 
manpower, despite local Protestant opposition. The delicate balance between the right to bear 
arms, the maintenance of law and order, and the balance of power between the citizen and the 
state became increasingly volatile between the post Williamite victory of the 1690s and the 
increasing hostile diplomatic situation Britain faced in the 1760s and 1770s. The possession of 
firearms deeply affected the relationship between the state and its citizens, in part because of 
the increasing use of coercive military power to enforce law and order in Ireland. The monopoly 
of the right to bear arms intersected with everyday life, such as the invasive searching of a linen 
closet by Presbyterians in Ulster in the 1720s, or a disgruntled magistrate challenging a foppish 
youth from abroad in the 1770s. As I expressed in the opening of this work, the gun was 
somewhat paradoxically a symbol of legitimacy that was as often as a means of display, as a 
tool of coercion.  
Catholics and the Gun provided a detailed account of the formulation of the penal laws in the 
1690s, which are crucial in understanding the gun in Ireland.  The chapter also examined the 
existence of a surviving legacy of Catholics allowed to bear arms into the early decades of the 
1720s. The chapter also briefly discussed how Catholics subverted the penal laws regarding 
firearms, and the subsequent reforms of the laws to prevent this practice in the first three 




 ‘The Nesting Ground for Wild Geese’, dealt with: the recruitment of Irishmen for continental 
service, Protestant attitudes towards this recruitment, examines attempts at legislating on the 
problem, and assesses the degree of enforcement against enlistment for overseas service. It then 
revealed how the return of Irishmen trained in the use of firearms from overseas contributed to 
lobbying for more strict enforcement of existing legal statutes prohibiting the return of armed 
Catholics from abroad. It also provided an analysis of contemporary critiques on the 
competency of the magistrates tasked with preserving the Protestant monopoly of the gun.  
Suspect Communities engages with the changing perception of who exactly could be relied 
upon in the event of a foreign invasion or domestic uprising. Building on discussions begun in 
the previous chapters, this section compares the two groups deemed most suspect within the 
community of Protestants: the Dissenting population, and the small number of Catholic 
converts. Despite the failure of widespread conversion, the presence of former Catholics - 
whose real loyalty remained suspect - was a recurring bugbear. The chapter also served as the 
transition point exploring where Ireland was transformed from a confessional state into the 
junior partner of a growing fiscal-military empire. 
Arming Ireland: Confessional and Conditional Loyalty covered Ireland’s experience in the 
Seven Years’ War and the changing priorities of the wider empire. This period led to the 
resumption of the recruitment of Catholics for service in the British military and coincided with 
the rise of a sustained and endemic period of agrarian unrest. This chapter focused on the 
fractures caused by a schism between confessional and military loyalty addressed in the 
preceding chapter, and discusses how firearms were increasingly being used as a tool both to 
assert the legitimacy of the Protestant community and conversely to overtly demonstrate the 




Protestant Ascendency Redefined examines the Lord Lieutenancy of Townshend, the impact 
of the outbreak of revolution in America and the demise of the lower echelons of the Protestant 
ascendancy from the commanders of armed settlers on the forefront of state building into a 
ghostly remnant of an earlier time. The 1770s were a decade where for the first time a large 
number of firearms were released into private possession and Irish Catholics become the 
mainstay of British recruitment in Ireland. These two events marked a radical departure from 
the previous eighty years of policies and the meeting point of two major themes of this thesis, 
namely legitimacy and power. The viceroyalty of Lord Townshend was used to mark the 
beginning of the Le Morte D’Ascendancy as armed Protestant settlers who had successfully 
argued for their rank as victors over the defeated Irish Catholic population be supplanted by 
the appetite of the imperial centre for recruits regardless of confessional allegiance. 
Ireland in the 1770s must be understood as the transformative period when a large number of 
firearms were released into private possession and Catholic military service became a mainstay 
of imperial power. This thesis has revealed an Ireland that enforced the penal laws to a greater 
level than previous scholars have attested. It has contributed to an understanding of the 
evolution of judicial and administrative attempts to disarm the Catholic population of Ireland 
and the circumstances of their rearmament. It has also provided a glimpse into how everyday 
life was impacted by the gun. It is hoped that it will contribute to a better understanding of the 
eighteenth century in Ireland and help give other scholars the tools to continue the study of the 
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